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Many African countries such as Ghana have adopted rules and procedures that regulate 
the conduct of public procurement. These developing countries usually rely on foreign 
aid, which is disbursed through public procurement, to undertake major development 
projects. However, unreliable domestic systems contribute to the motivation of donors 
who usually require beneficiary countries to apply procurement rules and procedures set 
out by the donor for the implementation of development projects funded by the donor. 
Different rules of donors are applicable to procurement in addition to existing rules 
under the domestic regime, which results in the application of multiple procurement 
rules.  
Adopting a doctrinal approach, this thesis examines the issues of multiple procurement 
regimes using Ghana as a case study. It seeks to analyse the manner of interaction 
between the rules of the different regimes and to identify and elaborate the policy issues 
arising from the application and interaction of the different sets of rules. 
The thesis concludes that policies of the multiple procurement rules are almost the 
same but rather expressed in different terminologies. However, implementation of the 
multiple rules may have negative implications not only for the achievement of domestic 
policies such as value for money and simplification of procedures, but also for policies of 
the development partners that seek to promote domestic development on issues such 
as corruption and local capacity development. Particularly, the significant complexity 
created in the system, may work against other policies on domestic development.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1   Context of Research 
This thesis examines the issue of multiple procurement regimes and the policy 
implications arising from the multiplicity of regimes using Ghana as a case study. 
Multiple regimes refer to the application of different sets of procurement rules and 
systems including institutions set by donors in addition to existing domestic rules on 
procurement. The research focuses on issues arising from the interaction of the several 
sets of procurement rules and systems applicable to procurement conducted in Ghana. 
Several reasons underpin the regulation of public procurement. Public procurement 
holds a significant share of the domestic market in Africa which is estimated between 
9% and 13% of GDP1 and in Ghana, public procurement alone represents about 17% of 
GDP.2 Regulation of public procurement allows a fair balance between the interest of 
the different stakeholders such as those of taxpayers and suppliers. Regulation also 
allows the achievement of specific policy objectives such as those targeted at 
disadvantaged groups in the society.  
Ghana is among many other African countries that over the last decades are reforming 
their procurement systems which involve the adoption of public procurement rules and 
procedures for the implementation of development projects.3 
Major development projects in Ghana and in many African countries are financed by 
external partners through foreign aid. Aid is an important component of government 
expenditure in Africa and funded more than 40% of government expenditure over the 
period of 20 years.4 Aid funds are spent on goods and services needed for domestic 
development projects. To secure these goods and services, public procurement rules 
are followed. This involves buying goods and services from international or domestic 
markets which offer the best value for aid funds. Public procurement rules are therefore 
essential in disbursing aid funds in an efficient and strategic manner to achieve policy 
objectives. Moreover, public procurement regulation is relevant in foreign aid, given the 
large volume of business it generates and the usually complex nature of development 
projects with diverse international actors.  
However, several reasons, including unreliable domestic systems, limits the 
disbursement of aid funds through domestic management systems. The public sector in 
Ghana and many African countries are usually plagued with corruption and fraudulent 
acts. Aid funds are sometimes channelled away from projects for which they were 
                                                          
1 W. Odhiambo and P. Kamau, Public Procurement: Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, OECD Working 
Paper 208 (2003), p.10. 
2 World Bank, Ghana: 2007 External Review on Public Financial Management, Vol. 2, World Bank Public 
Procurement Assessment Report (2008), p.2. 
3 S. Arrowsmith and M. Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (Kluwer Law International, 
2003), p.14. 
4 D. Brautigam and S. Knack, ‘Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (2004) 52 Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 255. Note that the percentage of expenditure may be higher in specific countries. 
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provided. Donors have increasingly grown dissatisfied and generally lack confidence in 
national procurement systems of many African countries.  
The ineffective spending of aid funds has motivated donors to step in and become 
involved in procurement regulation. Donors are accountable to their tax-payers and 
those providing funds for development projects. In order to fulfil these accountability 
requirements, donors expect efficient and transparent procurement regulation in 
disbursing aid funds. Though procurement procedures for aid funded projects are 
usually conducted by the recipient country, donors have assumed a supervisory role 
over the procurement process. Donors lay down their own procurement rules and 
procedures which must be followed for aid funded projects. 
Both major bilateral and multilateral development partners have all developed their own 
sets of procurement rules as attempts to achieve desired transparency and 
accountability in the conduct of procurement. The use of donor’s procurement rules has 
become a common practice in development assistance and encouraged other smaller 
donors to develop their own sets of rules. The rules of donors are occasionally modified 
to reflect best practices through donor experiences developed along the procurement 
process.  
The existence of national procurement rules in addition to those of many donors, each 
with its own set of procedures, have led to a proliferation of procurement rules. The 
rules often use different terminologies relating to similar processes and objectives within 
the field of development assistance.  For instance, the World Bank procurement rules 
refers to a supplier as a bidder whiles the national procurement rules of Ghana refers to 
the same supplier as a tenderer. 
As a result, the domestic system faces laborious and time-consuming procurement 
processes where the same procurement officer may be responsible for multiple 
procurement projects. At the same time, several project reports are submitted to multiple 
review and oversight bodies, which cause duplication in the system and places 
unnecessary burden on the capacity needs of domestic systems. 
1.2  Aims and Objectives 
The issue of multiple procurement regimes has been mentioned in a book on public 
procurement in Africa edited by Arrowsmith and Quinot5. However, like many other 
issues specific to Africa and other developing countries, it has not been analysed in 
detail, which is not surprising given the relative dearth of work on procurement in 
developing countries, including in Africa. Some other literature provides the basic rules 
generally adopted by states for regulating procurement including the domestic rules in 
Ghana6 and the detailed rules of external regimes.7 However, this literature does not 
                                                          
5 A. La Chimia, ‘Donor’s Influence on Developing Countries’ Procurement Systems, Rules and Markets: A Critical 
Analysis’ in G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), Ch. 11. 
6 D.N. Dagbanja, Law of Public Procurement in Ghana (Lambert Academic Publishers, 2011). This is the only book 
on Ghana which describes the regulatory framework. 
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deal in detail with the issue of multiple regimes and their policy implications in specific 
contexts.  
This thesis provides an analysis of the specific issues created by the operation of 
multiple regimes, in the sense of multiple regulatory rules applying to the award of public 
procurement contracts, using Ghana as case study. This issue has not been examined 
in detail before, either in general or in the context of any specific countries. Challenges 
observed in Ghana may be of wider importance to many African countries. This is not to 
assert that Ghana is representative for the entire African continent. However, the issue 
of multiple regimes is a phenomenon in many African countries and findings from the 
context of Ghana may also be relevant for these other countries.8 
In this regard, the research, first, aims to examine the nature of interaction between 
different regimes operating in Ghana, namely the domestic regime and various regimes 
imposed by external funders of development projects – for example, as regards the 
hierarchy between the regimes and the use of one regime to fill gaps in another. 
Secondly, the research aims to identify and elaborate the policy issues arising from the 
existence of these multiple regimes, in light of the relationship between them.  
The research has two main objectives. Firstly, it will provide information on the issue of 
multiple regimes and the policy implications that could assist policy making in steering 
procurement reforms. The practice of multiple regimes may create unintended policy 
implications which could work against the achievement of specific policy objectives. 
Findings of this study will further understanding and inform the approach of policy 
makers and development partners to procurement policy reform in developing countries 
such as Ghana.  
Secondly, the research will enhance understanding on the nature of interaction between 
multiple regimes and provide potential directions for further research. Given the 
exploratory nature of this research in clarifying the nature of multiple regimes and the 
possible policy implications, this study sheds light on the problems of multiple regimes. 
Understanding the issues will provide essential indications of potential problems which 
will then inform specific focus on issues to be addressed in the future. For example, if 
the research identifies the use of different rules on issues, such as procurement 
methods, then a future research could evaluate the extent to which the differences 
actually increase costs for procurement, whether through delays in the process or the 
lack of skills to manage complexities created by the multiple rules. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2005); J. Cibinic, R. C. Nash and C. 
R. Yukins, Formation of government contracts (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011); S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. 
Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2000); P. 
Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation (OUP, 2004). 
8 La Chimia, (note 5 above). Also, many other themes discussed in the edited book, including the introductory chapter 
and study on the specific countries highlight the existence of multiple regimes in Africa; OECD-DAC, The Mali Donor's 
Public Procurement Procedures: Towards Harmonisation with the National Law (OECD, 2000). 
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1.3   Choice of Regimes for the Case Study 
Several multilateral and bilateral development partners operate in Ghana. Currently, 
Ghana alone receives development assistance from over 32 donors who operate within 
11 sectors including the health and education sectors.9 However, analysis in this thesis 
focuses on the major multilateral and bilateral development partners operating in Ghana 
based on their volume of funding and the level of activities relating to development 
assistance. The following regimes have been identified as the major external regimes 
operating in Ghana and will be examined in this research. 
 
Multilateral development partners 
 The World Bank 
 The European Union (EU) 
Bilateral development partners 
 The United States of America (US) 
 
The choice of these specific regimes for the study is motivated by several reasons. The 
World Bank is the largest donor in Ghana and its policies serve as a model and 
influences those of other donors such as the African Development Bank. The EU and 
the US are also significant and their policies are not modelled directly on the World 
Bank but adopt different policy approaches which is useful to illustrate the issues under 
discussion. The detailed reasons for the choice of these regimes are explained in the 
later chapters.10 
China has also been identified as one of the major bilateral development partners in 
Ghana. However, China has not been included in this analysis due to a number of 
considerations; there is little information on the rules and procedures of procurement 
funded by China in Ghana. Moreover, procurement funded by China is conducted in 
China and does not involve the domestic regime. There is limited information on the 
applicable procedures to procurement funded by China in Ghana. By allowing little 
engagement of the domestic regime in its funded procurement, China offers some form 
of relief on the already weak capacity of in the domestic regime as will be discussed. 
However, this has the potential of discouraging the much needed skills and capacity 
development of domestic personnel and encourages reliance on external consultants for 
the implementation of development projects in Ghana.  
1.4   Research Method 
The thesis takes mainly a doctrinal approach involving the analysis of primary legal 
materials and secondary literature.  
The thesis is split into two parts.  
                                                          
9 OECD Statistics, www.oecd.org/dac/stats (accessed 3 March 2016). 
10 See discussions in section 4.1; section 5.1; section 6.1. 
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Part I consist of a case study analysis of each regime, outlining the procurement rules 
and systems relevant for the issues of multiplicity. This part seeks to describe and 
evaluate the different regimes that are applicable. It does not seek to describe the very 
detailed content of the procurement rules (these have already been covered by other 
research scholarship11) but focuses on the manner in which external regimes operate in 
Ghana and their interaction with each other but, referring to the detailed content of the 
rules only in so far as necessary for the purpose of the thesis. 
Part II sets out an analysis of possible policy implications of issues arising from the case 
study analysis in Part I. This part identifies and elaborates on the various policy issues 
arising from multiple regimes.  
Analysis in both parts, as mentioned, takes a doctrinal approach. The aim was to 
identify those policy issues that can be observed from such a doctrinal analysis. The 
doctrinal nature of the analysis means that it is not possible to draw specific factual 
conclusions – for example, as to the relative and absolute importance of the different 
problems identified – but it was not possible to undertake empirical research that would 
be necessary within the time scale of the present project. These issues could, however, 
be the subject of further research.   
As regards the sources of materials, legal texts such as the Constitution of Ghana and 
the procurement legislation of Ghana were used. The thesis also examined soft law 
such as guidance notes issued by policy makers, the UNCITRAL Model Law, the World 
Bank guidelines and other rules of external regimes. Soft law has a normative nature 
with non-binding and non-enforceable character but have practical effects that are 
comparable to hard law. Studies have also shown that soft law in the form of 
declarations and hard law in the form of treaties are complied with largely to the same 
extent.12 In addition, there was analysis of literature which provides an understanding of 
practical problems that may not be easily identified in the primary sources. 
There was the opportunity to interact with procurement practitioners in Ghana in order to 
obtain doctrinal information where such information could otherwise not be accessible. 
Doctrinal materials such as administrative guidelines on Ghana are not readily available 
in books or on the internet and sometimes needed to be accessed within relevant policy 
departments through interaction with procurement experts. Though no formal interviews 
or questionnaires were used, the interaction with practitioners also contributed to 
understanding of the practical context and identifying problems faced in the application 
of the rules. 
1.5   Outline of the Study 
Apart from this introductory chapter, Part I of this thesis consists of Chapters 2-7 which 
involves a case study of each regime. Chapter 2 sets out the general framework for 
public procurement in the context of Ghana. It introduces the broad administrative 
                                                          
11 See discussions in section 1.2.  
12 H. Hillgenberg, ‘A fresh look at soft law’, (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law, p.502. 
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context of governance both on the domestic system and on development partners and 
also provides an overview of the procurement environment in Ghana which is relevant 
for the operation of the different procurement regimes in Ghana.  
Chapter 3 outlines the framework of public procurement in Ghana specifically for the 
purposes of domestic regulation. The chapter identifies the domestic regime of Ghana 
as one of the regimes that interact with other procurement regimes in Ghana. It focuses 
on how public procurement is regulated domestically when external procurement 
regimes are not involved. 
Chapter 4 provides an outline of the framework for regulating procurement funded by 
the World Bank with reference to its application in Ghana. The chapter identifies and 
examines the World Bank procurement regime as one of the multiple procurement 
regimes operating in Ghana. 
Chapter 5 outlines the regulatory framework of procurement funded by the EU in 
Ghana. Analysis in this chapter focuses on the European Development Fund (EDF) as 
the main funding instrument relevant for the specific context of Ghana. The chapter 
identifies and examines the rules and procedures under EU funded procurement in 
Ghana as one of the multiple regimes applicable in Ghana. 
Chapter 6 examines the regulatory framework for procurement funded by the US with 
reference to its application in Ghana. The management of procurement funded by US 
regime is usually carried out by different agencies, each with its distinct rules and 
procedures. For the purposes of US funded procurement in Ghana, USAID has been 
identified and examined in this chapter as the main US agency operating in Ghana. 
Analysis of USAID’s rules forms the applicable rules under US regime as one of the 
distinct donor regimes operating in Ghana. 
In order to closely analyse the issue of multiple regimes, Chapter 7 provides a case 
study in one specific area – correction of errors in tenders once accepted tenders have 
been opened. This chapter illustrate the sort of issues that arises when applying 
different rules in relation to the conduct of different stages of the procurement process. 
This case study is particular useful since it is not possible to deal in equal detail with all 
the areas in this context. 
Part II of the thesis is covered in Chapter 8 which draws on previous discussions in part 
I to analyse the themes arising from the nature of interaction between the regimes and 
to highlight some of the possible policy implications resulting from multiplicity of regimes. 
Analysis in this chapter provides understanding on the policy issues arising from 
multiple regimes. 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides concluding remarks which draws on the findings discussed 
in parts I and II. 
The thesis will show that a system with multiple procurement rules is characterised by 
significant complexity which arises mainly from the application of different sets of largely 
13 
 
similar rules but with different terminologies and ways of doing basically the same 
things. It will be seen that multiplicity could also frustrate the effectiveness of policies 
aimed at dealing with the inherent lack of capacity in developing countries. In this 
regard, a system with multiple rules imposes rather unnecessary administrative burden 
on procurement officials and potential suppliers which could work against development 




Chapter 2: The General Framework for Public Procurement Regulation in 
Ghana 
2.1   Introduction  
Ghana is among many developing countries embarking on public procurement reforms.1 
This chapter examines the general regulatory framework of procurement in Ghana. Its 
role is to provide an overview of the procurement environment2 which is relevant for all 
the different regimes operating in Ghana.  
The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the administrative system of governance. 
The structural framework for procurement regulation will then be discussed, focusing on 
the institutions involved. Measures on preventing corruption and issues of capacity 
development will then be considered, followed by the role of development partners in 
regulating public procurement in Ghana.  
2.1.1 Ghana in Context 
Public procurement in Ghana constitutes a large proportion of government expenditure, 
representing about 17% of GDP and about 80% of tax revenue in 2007.3 Procurement is 
administered by policy formulation and regulation at the central level of government. 
Implementation of procurement is in line with the decentralised system of administration 
and supported by the central regulation. This means that purchasing is carried out at a 
local level by the officers who need the goods, works, and services without reference to 
anyone else. It will be seen that this has placed procurement responsibility with capacity 
challenges on public entities, many of whom were not prepared for this role. 
2.2   Coverage of Procurement 
The Public Procurement Act, as the fundamental legislation on public procurement in 
Ghana provides the coverage of procurement for domestic purposes of regulation. 
Discussions in this section will focus on the institutions involved in procurement that are 
also relevant for the operation of other regimes in Ghana. Other aspects of procurement 
covered for the purposes of domestic regulation will be discussed in chapter 3. 
2.2.1 Institutions Involved in Procurement in Ghana  
The main institutions involved are the Public Procurement Authority, Procurement 
Entities, Tender Committees, Tender Evaluation Panel and Tender Review Boards. An 
important institution involved in procurement whose role has not been articulated is the 
                                                          
1 B. Basheka, ‘Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: A Tool for Effective Governance of the Public Sector and 
Poverty Reduction’ in K. V. Thai (eds), International Handbook on Public Procurement (CRC Press, 2009), Ch. 6; J. 
M. Akech, ‘Development Partners and Governance of Public Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the 
Administration of Aid’ (2004) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 829; A. Anvuur, M. 
Kumaraswamy and S. Male, Taking Forward Public Procurement Reforms in Ghana (CIB, 2006). 
2 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.18-22; R. Dibie, ‘Public Sector Management Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in A. 
K. Kalu (eds), Agenda Setting and Public Policy in Africa (Ashgate publishing, 2004), p.87-113. 
3 World Bank, Ghana: 2007 External Review on Public Financial Management, Vol. 2, World Bank Public 
Procurement Assessment Report (2008), p.2. 
15 
 
Parliament of Ghana. The nature and duties of these institutions are discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
Firstly, procurement rules become legally binding and enforceable when they are 
enacted by Parliament with the assent of the President. Indeed, the Public Procurement 
Act is a legislative instrument enacted by Parliament and all its provisions are legally 
binding for domestic purposes of regulation. Since its enactment ten years ago, the 
Procurement Act has not yet seen any amendment. There is however a proposed 
amendment bill currently before Parliament and the relevant structural changes 
proposed in the bill will be highlighted where relevant. Parliament is also responsible for 
granting approval on procurement conducted with loans to which the Government of 
Ghana is a party.4  
2.2.1.1 The Public Procurement Authority 
Public Procurement Authority (PPA), formerly known as the Public Procurement Board, 
is the institution with the regulatory and oversight responsibility.5 Following an Executive 
instrument (E13), the formerly Procurement Board was renamed Procurement Authority 
in 2007. The Procurement Authority however maintains a nine member governing board 
appointed by the President with members from both the public and the private sectors.6 
The secretariat of the board, led by the Chief Executive Officer is responsible for the day 
to day operation of the institution.7 Other African countries including Kenya, Uganda and 
Nigeria have also established similar procurement oversight authorities.8 Though the 
names and hierarchical location of the oversight bodies vary in these countries, they 
generally retain a supervisory duty as discussed below.  
2.2.1.1.1 Functions of the Public Procurement Authority 
PPA was established specifically to exercise direct regulatory and oversight authority 
over procurement in Ghana.9 The functions of PPA are broadly outlined as follows: 
Policy-making and regulatory function: PPA develops policy proposals, reviews 
policies for amendment and steers the overall procurement policy aimed at the 
achievement of national objectives.10 PPA plays a key role for example in initiating the 
current proposal for amendment to the Procurement Act through consultation with 
stakeholders including development partners. Duties of PPA are performed in 
consultation with the Head of the Ministry responsible for finance. This approach is 
similar in other African countries including Kenya and Uganda where the policy making 
and regulatory functions of the oversight body are performed in consultation with the 
Minister responsible for finance.11 In Tanzania however, there is clear separation 
                                                          
4 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, (1992), art. 181 (5). 
5 Ghana, Public Procurement Act, (2003), s. 1(1), (Hereinafter Ghana Procurement Act) 
6 Ibid, s. 4. 
7 Ibid, s. 2. 
8 G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
country studies in Part I. 
9 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 3. 
10 Ibid, s. 3(a). 
11 See discussions in section 2.2.1.1. 
16 
 
between the policy making authority and the regulatory authority which is assigned to 
separate bodies.12 Such separation can be useful in ensuring some level of autonomy 
based on institutional resource capacity.  
Monitoring and advisory function: PPA has the duty to monitor the procurement 
system and track compliance with procurement standards.13 With assistance from the 
World Bank, PPA developed the Public Procurement Model of Excellence (PPME), 
which is a web-based tool that allows both qualitative and quantitative measurement of 
procurement activities and enhances PPA’s monitoring duty.14 PPA also works closely 
with development partners to identify innovative and best practice standards that could 
enhance efficiency in the domestic system. For example, PPA works with partners in 
Switzerland in adopting sustainable procurement policies in Ghana.15  
PPA also advises stakeholders on the functioning of procurement in Ghana. For 
example, PPA advises the Government of Ghana on procurement policies.16 PPA also 
provides regular guidance to entities and also publishes general information on its 
website.17  
Information management and capacity building function: PPA is responsible for 
managing procurement information including implementation and maintenance of an 
information system.18 It also requires keeping accurate record of information to facilitate 
accountability.19 PPA has implemented a procurement management tool which allows 
entities to generate management reports and plan procurement activities.20 The tool 
could facilitate procurement record keeping as an essential means of verifying 
compliance. The procurement records can also provide research information to identify 
potential areas for reform.  
PPA also has the duty to build procurement capacity not only for entities but also the 
capacity of suppliers to bid on government contracts.21 This requires identification of 
capacity priorities of the domestic system and facilitating capacity development 
programmes for the domestic system. It also involves coordinating capacity building 
programmes of development partners.22  
                                                          
12 Tanzania, The Public Procurement Act (2011), s. 6; s. 7, (hereinafter the Tanzania Procurement Act). 
13 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 3(d). 
14 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (June 2013), Vol. 4(3). 
15 T. Liebert, Swiss-Ghana Project on Sustainable Public Procurement (IISD, 2012), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/spp_swiss_ghana.pdf (Accessed 3 March 2016). 
16 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 3 (l). 
17 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (June 2013), Vol. 4(3). 
18 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 3(f). 
19 Ibid, s. 3(g). 
20 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (Sep-Oct 2012), Vol. 3(5). 
21 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 3(j), (k), (t). 
22 Ibid, s. 3(n). 
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Enforcement function: PPA also has the duty to enforce compliance with domestic 
procurement rules through administrative review procedures.23 PPA has explicit powers 
to investigate procurement misconducts and require compliance with the rules.24  
The functions of PPA are not limited to those explicitly written in the Procurement Act as 
outlined above. PPA has much broader functions which include any incidental function 
necessary for the achievement of the overall procurement objectives as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.25 The broad mandate of PPA could be explained by the 
generally inadequate capacity of domestic institutions to allow efficient resource 
allocation and separation of powers.  
2.2.1.1.2 Structure of the Public Procurement Authority 
PPA is a legal entity with the capacity to engage in any activity relating to its duties.26 
Member of PPA governing board are drawn from public and private sectors as a 
requirement with explicit experience and skills in procurement.27 This ensures diverse 
knowledge and experience are drawn in arriving at decisions. Members are appointed 
by the President in consultation with the council of state.28  
PPA operates as an agency under the Ministry responsible for finance (the Ministry) and 
reports to the Head of the Ministry. For example, PPA’s policy proposals and annual 
reports shall be submitted through the Ministry.29 Expenses of PPA are usually provided 
directly by Parliament but any other source of funding for PPA shall be approved by the 
Ministry.30 This arrangement has implications for the autonomy of PPA and its 
supervisory responsibility may be compromised. 
In other African countries such as Gambia, the oversight body reports directly to cabinet 
which provides autonomy for the oversight body.31 Significantly, Gambia’s position 
highlights a useful approach that countries such as Ghana could adopt. Where PPA 
reports directly to cabinet, it could ensure the independence of PPA and reinforce its 
coordinating ability to harmonise procurement activities in Ghana. 
2.2.1.2 Procurement Entities 
The term “Procurement entities” refers to the institutions conducting public 
procurement.32 Entities are responsible for carrying out procurement in accordance with 
the regulatory requirements.33 Procurement entities are divided into two main groups; 1) 
central government institutions, which are made up of Central Management Agencies 
(CMAs) and Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs); 2) government 
                                                          
23 Ibid, s. 80. 
24 Ibid, s. 3(m); s. 80. 
25 Ibid, s. 3(u). 
26 Ibid, s. 1(2); Tanzania Procurement Act, s. 7(2)(b); Zambia, The Public Procurement Act (2008), s. 5(2), 
(hereinafter the Zambia Procurement Act).   
27 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 4(1). 
28 Ibid, s. 4(2). 
29 Ibid, s. 3(i); s. 13(1). 
30 Ibid, s. 10. 
31 Gambia, Public Procurement Act (2001), s. 13(1)(b), (hereinafter the Gambia Procurement Act). 
32 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 98. 
33 Ibid, s. 15. 
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para-statal institutions which are either statutory bodies or state owned enterprises. In 
accordance with the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), central government 
institutions were decentralised which led to the creation of local governments, made up 
of the Metropolitan, Regional and District Assemblies, each with procurement 
responsibility for their own needs. The decentralised procurement system means that as 
a matter of general rule, all procurement entities, including smaller entities at the 
decentralised level of government, usually conduct their own procurement. In effect, 
procurement functions particularly at the decentralised level are diffused in 
administrative functions due to the lack of skilled procurement personnel and this places 
greater demand on procurement coordination both at the central and local levels as 
discussed in section 2.4 below. 
Domestic procurement rules in Ghana have no explicit provisions on central purchasing 
authorities nor joint procurement by entities or whether large entities may conduct 
procurement on behalf of smaller entities. The rules are also silent on the use of third 
party procurement agents. In practice however, some entities, particularly in the 
educational sector, are piloting procurement of common user items on behalf of other 
entities as will be discussed below.34 Essentially, these entities are not central 
purchasing authorities. Moreover, some other entities use third party procurement 
agents for the conduct of procurement as the case particularly under donor funded 
procurement. For example, Crown Agent Ghana Limited and the Ghana Supply 
Company Limited (GSC) are agents regularly contracted in Ghana for the procurement 
of goods and services including common user items and training programmes.35  
The Procurement Act provides two main criteria that determine which entities must 
comply with its provisions;36 1) procurement financed by public funds,37 either in part or 
in whole; 2) functions relating to procurement including the description of requirement, 
preparation and award of contracts and the phases in contract administration. Both 
criteria must be met and the Minister responsible for finance may declare any person or 
institution as procurement entity.38 The Procurement Act further provides a list of 
identified entities that meet the set criteria as follows:39 
 Central management Agencies (CMA): These are the central agencies of 
government administration. For example, the Office of the President and the 
Public Service Commission. 
 Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA): These are the 
national ministries and departments. For example, Ministry of Education and 
Department of Feeder Roads. 
                                                          
34 This information was obtained in a correspondence with a Procurement Official at the Public Procurement Authority 
in Ghana. The information is on file with the author.  
35 For more information, see http://www.crownagents.com/Ghana.aspx (accessed 3 March 2016). 
36 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 14(1). 
37 Public funds are defined by the Ghana Procurement Act to include the Consolidated Fund, the Contingency Fund 
and such other public funds as may be established by Parliament. 
38 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 16(1). 
39 Ibid, s. 14(2). 
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 Sub-vented Agencies:40 These are agencies set up by the government with the 
aim of providing public service. For example, Ghana Library Board and it 
procurement is financed by public funds allocated by parliament. 
 Governance Institutions: These are institutions such as the Regional Co-
ordinating Councils and District Assemblies that are created to facilitate 
governance and administration of the state.  
 State Owned Enterprises (SOE) to the extent that they utilise public funds. For 
example, the Ghana Water Company and Electricity Company of Ghana. 
 Public universities, public schools, colleges and hospitals. 
 The Bank of Ghana and financial institutions such as public trusts, pension 
funds, insurance companies and building societies which are wholly owned by 
the State or in which the State has majority interest. 
 Institutions established by Government for the general welfare of the public or 
community. 
However, the list of procurement entities is non-exhaustive and other entities not on the 
list may have to comply with the rules if they fall within the criteria outlined above. It 
implies that the list is by way of illustration and does not intend to provide the full range 
of entities that must comply with the rules.  
The guide to enactment of the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law suggests states consider 
defining procurement entities with the extent to which they utilise public funds for 
procurement purposes.41 However, the approach has not been uniformly applied in 
African systems. In Gambia for example, the rules cover public sector institutions with 
little reference to their use of public funds.42 In Tanzania and Uganda, the rules apply to 
all entities that use public funds.43 In the case of Nigeria, the law explicitly provides a 
minimum of 35 per cent use of public funds as the cut-off point for the procurement rules 
to apply.44  
An important exception to the application of the Procurement Act is provided for loan 
funded procurement including procurement funded by development partners. 
Significantly, the exception applies to procurement conducted with loans obtained by the 
state, the details of which will be discussed further below in section 2.5.1.  
Procurement entities in Ghana have an appointed heads of entity with overall 
responsibility for compliance with the rules including approval of procurement decisions 
                                                          
40 Ibid, section 98 defined a sub-vented agency as an agency set up by Government to provide public service and 
financed from public funds allocated by Parliament in the annual appropriation. 
41 UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, with Guide to 
Enactment (1994), Guide to Enactment, Commentary on art. 2 para. 2. 
42 Gambia, Procurement Act, s. 2. 
43 Tanzania, Procurement Act, s. 2(1)(b); Uganda, The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2003), 
s. 2, (hereinafter Uganda Procurement Act). 
44 Nigeria, The Public Procurement Act (2007), s. 15(1)(b), (hereinafter Nigeria Procurement Act). 
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within allocated threshold value.45 Each entity is required to have a number of 
committees responsible for various stages of the procurement as outlined below. 
2.2.1.2.1 Tender Committee 
Entities are required to establish a Tender Committee with the responsibility to ensure 
every stage of the procurement process complies with procedures in the rules.46 Tender 
Committees are usually led by heads of entity and have the responsibility to review and 
approve tender awards and annual procurement plans of entities. The Committee 
reviews tenders and approves recommendation on evaluated tenders for the award of 
contracts below allocated value threshold.47 For Procurement decisions above its 
approval threshold, the Committee is responsible for securing concurrent approval, thus 
a “no objection” from the relevant Tender Review Board prior to making any contract 
award decision.48  
2.2.1.2.2 Tender Evaluation Panel 
Entities are also required to establish Tender Evaluation Panels with the duty to conduct 
the technical and financial evaluation of tenders and make recommendations for the 
award of contracts.49 The complexity of the procurement is vital in determining the 
number of expert evaluation personnel required.50  
Tender Evaluation Panel usually evaluates tenders and presents its award 
recommendations to the Tender Committee who makes the final award decision by 
either approving or rejecting the award recommendation. The Tender Evaluation Panel 
acts solely as advisory organ of the Tender Committee by making recommendations 
that assist the Tender Committee in reaching award decisions. Unlike Tender 
Evaluation Panels, Tender Committees are permanent Committees within entities and 
members of Tender Committees shall not serve on Tender Review Panels.  
Some other African systems including Kenya and Uganda also adopted similar 
approach where an independent advisory body assists the decision making body.51 A 
different model is used in Gambia where the committee responsible for making 
procurement decisions also has the responsibility to evaluate tenders. The latter model 
could create opportunities for abuse where procurement decision making is left in the 
hands of few personnel who may lack the necessary technical expertise. 
2.2.1.2.3 Procurement Unit 
Procurement units are established within entities with the duty of undertaking and 
coordinating all the detailed procurement activities for the entity. The unit liaises with 
end-users who initiate the procurement process and also provides technical 
                                                          
45 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 15. 
46 Ibid, s. 17. 
47 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 17(1)(b); s. 17(1)(c). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, s. 19. 
50 Ibid, s. 19(1); Uganda, Procurement Act, s. 37(4). 
51 Kenya, The Public Procurement and Disposal Act (2015), s. 46(4), (hereinafter Kenya Procurement Act); Uganda, 
Procurement Act, s. 37. 
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procurement services to the Tender Committee with responsibilities including arranging 
the publication of notices and maintaining procurement records.52 It acts as the 
secretariat to the Tender Committee and prepares tender documentation. 
2.2.1.3 Tender Review Board 
Tender Review Boards are located outside the procurement entity and they provide a 
“no objection” approval on tenders that are above Tender Committee threshold value.53 
Tender Boards are also responsible for reviewing appeals on complaints handled by 
entities.54 In practice however, the review function has been neglected as discussed in 
section 3.11.4. Tender Review Boards are established at four different decentralised 
levels of administration as follows; 
 Central Tender Review Board: The Board will usually approve tenders from any 
entity which has tender value above the threshold for the Ministerial Tender 
Review Board.  
 Ministerial/Headquarters Tender Review Board: The Board will generally 
approve tenders from entities which have tender values above the threshold for 
the Regional Tender Review Board but within its own allocated threshold value. 
 Regional Tender Review Board: This Board will usually approve tenders from 
entities with tender value above the threshold for the District Tender Review 
Board but within its own allocated threshold value.  
 District Tender Review Board: This Board will usually approve tenders from 
entities with tender value above the threshold for entity Tender Committees but 
within its allocated threshold value.  
In practice, the model in Ghana has encountered several inefficiencies. Meetings are 
significantly delayed due mainly to the compositional structure of the Board. Delegated 
decisions at the decentralised levels tends to be bureaucratic where for example, high 
value procurement from District Assemblies still require approval from the Central 
Tender Board whiles complaints at the District Assemblies are often referred directly to 
PPA and does not provide the required autonomy for the decentralised institutions.  
The guide to enactment of the 1994 Model Law suggests states could locate decision 
making authorities either within or outside the procurement entity and this seems to be 
the approach adopted in many African systems. Botswana has a model similar to that in 
Ghana where the decision making authority is located outside the entity.55 Some other 
                                                          
52 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 98. 
53 Ibid, s. 20(2). 
54 Ibid, s. 20(2)(e). 




African systems including Gambia, Kenya and Tanzania adopted a different model 
where decision making authorities are located within the entities.56  
The current amendment bill on the procurement law in Ghana seek to give greater 
autonomy to local governments in procurement matters where final decision making 
authority will be vested in the local government. The bill, if approved, will reduce the 
current four levels of the Tender Review Board to two levels; one for the central 
government and another for the local government, each with different composition of its 
members. The amendment will also see significant increase in threshold values for 
entities in order to speed up decision making and minimise delays. 
2.3   Measures on Preventing Corruption  
Ghana is among many other developing countries undergoing major reforms, 
sometimes with assistance from donors, in the fight against corruption.57 Ghana enacted 
a number of anti-corruption legislations including the Whistle-blowers Act 2006 of 
Ghana (Act 720) which offers protection for witnesses and informants on corrupt 
practices from prosecution and victimisation. The Procurement Act also criminalised 
corruption as defined under Ghana’s Criminal Code and provides sanctions for the offer 
or receipt of any form of bribe or the use of public office for private gain.58 However, 
available data indicates that there is still wide spread corruption in Ghana.59 
Transparency of domestic procurement procedures is still affected by challenges of 
enforcement, capacity and resources which make public procurement highly vulnerable 
to corruption. The vulnerability lies mainly in the weak domestic institutional framework 
which exposes the uncoordinated strategies with the lack of independence of regulatory 
institutions. For example, the weak institutional resources including low salaries and 
poor working conditions as well as the lack of independence of PPA and other anti-
corruption agencies such as the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) places 
an impediment on their enforcement capabilities.60 Conflict of interest rules for public 
officials including asset disclosure requirements also lack institutional mechanisms to 
monitor and enforce compliance.61 
As will be seen below, many donors in Ghana, particularly the World Bank, implements 
policies aimed at supporting domestic efforts on combating corruption. However, these 
policies are usually implemented separately by the individual donors rather than a 
coordinated anti-corruption policy. For example, the Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition 
(GACC) which is a coalition of both public and private sector anti-corruption institutions 
has received technical and financial support from different donors at different stages of 
                                                          
56 Gambia, Procurement Act, s. 48(1); Kenya, Procurement Act, s. 46; Tanzania, Procurement Act, s. 31(1). 
57 S. Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures (Hart Publishing, 2012); F. Anechiarico and J. Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption 
Control Makes Government Ineffective (University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
58 The Criminal Code of Ghana (1960) Act 29, art. 245; art. 252. 
59 This is the finding of the 2011 Global Integrity Report. The information is available at 
https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/report-2011/ghana/ (3 March 2016). 
60 See discussions in section 2.2.1.1; also see M. Chene, Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ghana (2010) 
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Report, p.6.  
61 Ibid, p.5. 
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its existence.62 However, there is no single anti-corruption strategy or a single focal 
point for the delivery of an anti-corruption strategy but rather there are fragmented anti-
corruption strategies as developed with assistance from individual donors as will be 
discussed.63 
2.4   Capacity Development 
The lack of capacity is an inherent problem in Ghana and more generally also in other 
developing countries.64 Adequate level of capacity is important not only to ensure quality 
implementation of projects but also to minimise opportunities for abuse of power. In 
Ghana, the ability to generate national revenue for example, is hampered by low 
resource capacity among tax collection agencies and misapplication of exemption laws 
whiles poor working conditions including low salaries provide opportunities for 
corruption.65 The capacity constraint in Ghana became more evident after the 
implementation of Ghana’s decentralisation programme where procurement entities 
including even smaller entities at the district and municipal level became responsible for 
the procurement of their own needs without reference to any other entity.66 Many of the 
smaller entities in particular, do not have the required capacity and resources to conduct 
their own procurement. 
Capacity development for the purposes of procurement funded with domestic resources 
has been on the agenda of PPA in whom responsibility for capacity development lies.67 
By the first decade of its existence, PPA has organised a number of capacity 
development workshops, seminars and has trained over 20,000 public officials and 
other civil servants involved in procurement.68  
However, the impact of capacity building efforts of PPA appears to be minimal, perhaps 
without support from donors. For example, PPA’s ability to coordinate capacity building 
programmes across the country is constrained by the lack of its own resources and 
institutional capacity.69 PPA does not have coordinating offices in other regions of the 
country apart from its head office in the nation’s capital city.70 Moreover, the absence of 
reliable modern communication through technology in Ghana’s procurement 
environment limits PPA’s ability to reach out and support capacity development of 
entities particularly in other regional and rural communities. 
                                                          
62 A. Doig et al, Measuring ‘success’ in five African Anti-Corruption Commissions - the cases of Ghana, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Uganda & Zambia (2005), (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Report, p.60. 
63 Ibid. 
64 P. Trepte, ‘Procurement Regulation and Emerging Economies: The Examples of Laos and Bhutan’ in S. 
Arrowsmith and A. Davies (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law International 1998), Ch. 6; 
World Bank, An Independent Review of World Bank Support to Capacity Building in Africa: The Case of Ghana, 
(2005); W. A. Wittig and H. Jeng, Challenges in Public Procurement: Comparative Views of Public Procurement 
Reform in Gambia (PrAcademics Press, 2005), p.24-28. 
65 Ghana Integrity Initiative, GII Alert: Quarterly Newsletter (March 2011) issue 27.  
66 See discussions in section 2.2.1.2. 
67 See discussions in section 2.2.1.1.1. 
68 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (August 2014), p.4. 
69 Information obtained by the author in an interview with an official at the PPA head office in Ghana who wishes to 
remain anonymous. 
70 Ibid.  
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As indicated earlier, many donors in Ghana provide support for capacity development in 
different ways. Donors may provide financial and technical support for training 
workshops and seminars for officers engaged in procurement funded by the donor. In 
such cases, capacity building is directed specifically at addressing issues on 
procurement funded by donors. For example, the World Bank usually finances capacity 
building workshops in Ghana which offers training on the Bank’s procurement 
procedures to ensure officers comply with requirements under the Bank’s funded 
procurement.71 This form of capacity building has been the focus of many donor funded 
capacity development programmes in Ghana and also in many African developing 
countries.72 However, it tends to be unsustainable and may provide little benefit for the 
domestic system in the long term as will be discussed below.  
In some other cases, donors may support capacity building programmes that are not 
directed at funded procurement but rather aimed at encouraging reforms in the domestic 
system. This form of support is usually uncoordinated, fragmented and sometimes 
duplicating as indicated above. It is usually in the form of non-financial support but 
donors usually provide some financial commitments towards the project as will be 
explained below. For example, US aid regime under the MCC agency, financed the 
development of study curricular, modules and lecture notes for procurement education 
in Ghana which is intended to develop professionalism and provide career path for 
procurement in Ghana.73 The curricular and modules also serve as the basis and 
template for a similar project funded by the World Bank in Liberia which is likely to be 
used in other African countries.74   
2.5   Development Partners and Procurement 
Developing countries such as Ghana rely on foreign aid to finance major developments 
in the domestic economy. Foreign aid forms an important component of government 
expenditure in Ghana which is estimated at 39% of government expenditure in 2009.75 
This proportion is comparable to those in many other African countries such as Malawi 
and Zambia.76 Foreign aid to Ghana supports several development projects; from 
capital intensive such as building infrastructures to low value and basic needs such as 
educational materials and clean drinking water which domestic resources are usually 
inadequate to finance.  
Aid funds are used to acquire the goods and services needed for the implementation of 
development projects. In the process of securing these goods and services, public 
procurement rules are followed. This involves buying goods and services that offer the 
                                                          
71 Information obtained by the author in an interview with Procurement Specialists at the World Bank Ghana country 
office who wishes to remain anonymous. 
72 P. Trepte, ‘Building Sustainable Capacity in Public Procurement’ in S. Arrowsmith and D. Anderson (eds), The 
WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.378. 
73 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin, (August 2014), p.8. 
74 This information is available at https://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/pressrelease-0530-13mcc-world-bank-
mida (3 March 2016). 
75 Ghana, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Report (2009), p.81. 
76 D.A. Bräutigam and S. Knack, ‘Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa’ (2004) 52 
Economic development and cultural change 255, p.257. 
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best value for aid funds from the markets. Public procurement rules are therefore 
essential in spending aid funds in an efficient and strategic manner to secure specific 
objectives.  
Donors finance development projects in different ways which underlies the modalities of 
transferring aid funds to the domestic economy. The diversity in aid modalities allows 
donors to target the achievement of specific policy objectives as will be seen below. In 
Ghana, donors usually provide aid through two major modalities. Firstly, there is budget 
support approach, where aid is channelled directly through the government’s budget. 
This approach usually relies on domestic resource allocation and accounting systems 
including the domestic public procurement rules for the acquisition of the required goods 
and services. Donors usually attach conditions to granting aid through budget support 
and require reform of domestic policies such as good governance, fiscal adjustment and 
strengthening of national institutions. However, these reform conditions appear to have 
limited impact, perhaps due to other policies imposed by donors as will be seen. This 
perhaps creates some reluctance among donors to finance development projects 
through budget support. Despite this situation, budget support approach does not 
necessarily result in multiplicity of regimes and will therefore not be considered in this 
research.  
Secondly, there is also the project aid approach, which finances specific development 
projects with limited budget, timeframe and objectives. This process is usually 
supervised by donors and the approach is based on identified areas of intervention with 
defined project results. Project aid also comes with a number of conditions including the 
requirement to apply procurement rules set out by donors as will be discussed below. 
This approach raises many of the issues of multiplicity which this research seeks to 
highlight. Indeed, many donors in Ghana adopt this financing approach and a significant 
proportion of aid to Ghana is financed through project aid which is estimated at 46% in 
2010.77 This implies that any small reduction in project aid and its conditionality could 
have a significant impact on the level of duplication in the domestic system.  
The nature of interaction between policies of development partners and those of the 
domestic regime could have significant policy implications for development in the 
domestic system. The policy approach of development partners can be classified into 
two major forms. Firstly, there are policies directed specifically at loan funded 
procurement and secondly, there are other general policies targeted at reforming 
procurement systems in developing countries. Both policy procedures are discussed 
below. 
2.5.1 Loan Funded Procurement  
As indicated earlier, development partners provide funds in the form of loans and grants 
for development. The fiduciary duty to ensure funds are used for the purposes intended 
has often led donors to engage in regulating the procurement process. Donors usually 
                                                          
77 This information is available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed 3 March 2016).   
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require application of specific procurement procedures in order to guarantee the proper 
use of its funds. Loan funded procurement refers to the application of procurement rules 
and systems set by donors to the implementation of development projects. Donors may 
require the use of either procurement rules applicable under the domestic regime or 
other external rules as set by donors.   
For the purposes of procurement funded by donors, several rules other than the 
domestic rules are usually applicable as set by donors. When donors provide funds for 
development, they usually lay down certain conditions to be fulfilled by the domestic 
regime. One of these conditions is the use of procurement rules and systems that are 
developed and set by the donor for the implementation of donor funded projects. Donors 
have significantly developed their own sets of rules and procedures which they require 
aid recipient countries such as Ghana to apply whenever the donor provides funds for 
procurement. An example is the World Bank guidelines and its standard documents 
which have been developed and extensively used for projects funded by the Bank. 
Other donors including the EU and the different US aid agencies have also developed 
their individual sets of procurement rules which are usually applicable when they 
provide funds for development. Some donors simply adopt procurement rules of other 
donors with modifications to reflect their own objectives. For example, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) adopted 
the World Bank procurement guidelines with some modifications as will be discussed. 
Application of the separate sets of procurement rules developed by donors is by origin, 
external to the domestic system. The application of domestic procurement rules in 
addition to external procurement rules as set by individual donors, each with its own set 
of procurement rules, has led to the proliferation of procurement rules in Ghana. This 
means that several different procurement rules may be applicable to similar or different 
procurements. In some cases, the same donor has different procurement rules for 
different types of projects it implements. It also means that different rules may be 
applied at the same time by a single or several procurement officials. 
There are several reasons for the application of different procurement rules which are 
generally intended to ensure the proper use of funds. A major drive, particularly under 
the World Bank regime is the need to eliminate corruption in donor funded procurement 
as will be discussed. Developing countries such as Ghana often experience high levels 
of corruption which presents unprecedented risks to donor funding activities. The use of 
donors’ procurement rules may be preferred since domestic rules may not have 
adequate mechanisms to detect and prevent corrupt practices. Another argument holds 
that domestic systems such as the public finance management and institutional 
capabilities are unreliable and under less optimal conditions. The domestic systems do 
not guarantee adequate monitoring and accountability for the use of funds which donors 
require in order to remain accountable to their lenders and tax payers. 
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However, the argument for applying donors’ procurement rules rather than those of the 
domestic regime becomes controversial especially in developing countries such as 
Ghana where domestic procurement systems are undergoing major reforms with the 
assistance and recommendation from donors which is usually based on recognised 
international best practice standards such as those provided under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Nevertheless, procurement rules of donors are applicable in Ghana and 
operate as additional rules to the existing domestic rules on procurement.  
The obligation to apply procurement rules set by donors is reinforced by the introduction 
of specific exemption clauses into domestic procurement legislation. The Public 
Procurement Act of Ghana provides that the “Act applies to procurement with funds or 
loans taken or guaranteed by the State and foreign aid funds except where the 
applicable loan agreement, guarantee contract or foreign agreement provides the 
procedure for the use of the funds”.78 The rules further state that “notwithstanding the 
extent of the application of this Act to procurement, procurement with international 
obligations arising from any grant or concessionary loan to the government shall be in 
accordance with the terms of the grant or loan”.79 These provisions exclude application 
of domestic procurement legislation to donor funded procurement and allow donors to 
determine the applicable rules which is often those set by themselves. In other words, 
the obligation to apply procurement rules set by donors is not unilaterally imposed by 
donors but rather, domestic procurement legislation emphatically allows application of 
donors’ procurement rules in Ghana.   
The use of specific exemption clauses to allow application of procurement rules set by 
donors is also the case in many other African countries particularly those undergoing 
procurement reforms with assistance and perhaps some influence from development 
partners.80 This is the case under procurement rules of Liberia and Tanzania.81 These 
exemption clauses are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law which exclude application 
of domestic procurement legislation to international agreements such as those entered 
into between a state and international financial institutions.82 These exemption clauses 
provide legal legitimacy for the application of procurement rules set by donors and these 
will have precedence over domestic procurement rules. 
2.5.2 Other General Policies Aimed at Procurement Reform 
Apart from policies directed specifically at loan funded procurement, development 
partners also implement other general policies aimed at steering procurement reform in 
developing countries. In Ghana, such reform programmes are usually drawn up as part 
                                                          
78 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 14(1)(d). 
79 Ibid, s. 96. 
80 A. La Chimia, ‘Donor’s Influence on Developing Countries’ Procurement Systems, Rules and Markets: A Critical 
Analysis’ in S. Arrowsmith and G. Quinot (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p.219. 
81 Liberia, Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2005), s. 3(a), (hereinafter Liberia Procurement Act); Tanzania, 
Procurement Act, s. 4. 
82 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, art. 3. 
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of an overall public sector reform initiative.83 Development partners will often identify 
weaknesses in domestic procurement systems and adopt specific policies to encourage 
reform in the system. For example, the MCC agency as part of US aid regime, identified 
the lack of procurement capacity and skilled personnel in Ghana and adopted specific 
policies on professionalising the procurement function in Ghana as will be discussed in 
chapter 6.  
Reform policies of development partners may involve information sharing or transfer of 
technical skills to assist domestic authorities in the implementation of reforms. This form 
of assistance is essentially non-financial and does not necessarily involve donors 
providing monetary funds. However, some financial commitments are usually made by 
development partners towards the implementation of the policies. For example, 
development partners may pay for consultants to undertake law reforms as the case in 
Ghana where the World Bank financed consultants to assist in drafting Ghana’s 
procurement legislation. Development partners may also pay for training sessions 
organised for local procurement officers to ensure that officers are well equipped to 
implement law reforms. 
Policies of other external regimes such as trade regimes that are not necessarily donors 
could also encourage reforms in the domestic system. Policies of good procurement 
regimes such as those of UNCITRAL and the Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) that have gained international recognition could also encourage reforms in 
domestic systems. Regimes such as the UNCITRAL are by no means a funding 
organisation and do not provide financial assistance. However, these regimes have 
gained acceptance as generally good with well formulated procurement model and 
usually recommended by development partners for adoption.  
 
                                                          




 Chapter 3: Framework for Domestic Regulation of Public Procurement in 
Ghana 
3.1   Introduction  
Procurement rules set out by States are often applicable to procurement within domestic 
territories when there is no interference from external procurement regimes. This 
chapter outlines the framework for public procurement in Ghana for domestic purposes 
of regulation, focusing on situations where external regimes are not involved. The role of 
the chapter is to identify the domestic regime as one of multiple regimes operating in 
Ghana.  
The chapter first looks at a brief background to the development of the current 
regulatory system. The chapter then sets out the objectives of regulating procurement 
for domestic purposes. Discussions will then move on to the types of contracts regulated 
in Ghana. Tender documentation and record keeping will be highlighted before moving 
on to methods of procurement allowed in Ghana. Discussions will continue on the 
procurement procedures used in Ghana and elaborating on those issues relevant for 
interaction with other regimes before examining the remedies system. 
3.1   Reform of the Domestic System  
Prior to enactment of the public procurement act, there was no one law for regulating 
public procurement in Ghana.1 The rules on procurement were fragmented and the 
procurement of services was not regulated.2 There were no requirements for publication 
of contracts.3 Some major shortcomings of the system include loose legal framework, 
weak capacity of procurement officials and unclear institutional arrangements which led 
to widespread inefficiencies.4  
The need to improve public procurement as part of recommendations from the World 
Bank appears to coincide with government efforts at reforming public sector finance 
management system.5 However, technical assistance from the World Bank served as a 
major stimulation to begin the reform process. Following the creation of a procurement 
oversight group in 1999, a reform proposal was prepared which included a draft Public 
Procurement Bill.6 Following parliamentary consultations, the draft bill was passed into 
law in 2003 and referred to as the Public Procurement Act, Act 663. 
                                                          
1 Two major reports, Country Procurement Assessment Reports (CPARs) published in 1996 and 2003 by the World 
Bank provides a comprehensive assessment regarding the state of the procurement system in Ghana. Both reports 
revealed significant shortcomings of the procurement system in Ghana and made recommendations for reforms. 
2 Ibid, p.15. 
3 Ibid, p.17. 
4 Ibid, p.11. 
5 D. N. Dagbanja, The Law of Public Procurement in Ghana; Law, Policy and Practice (Lambert Academic Publishing 
2011), p.45; K. Osei-Afoakwa, ‘The Antecedents and the Prospects of Public Procurement Regulation in Ghana’ 
(2013) 3(1) Developing Country Studies (IISTE), p.127; A.B, Adjei, Message from the Chief Executive of the Public 
Procurement Authority, (9th June 2006), available at http://www.ppbghana.org/story_detail.asp?story_id=18  
(accessed 3 March 2016). 
6 World Bank, Ghana: Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR), (2003), vol.1, p.4, vol.2, p.19. 
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The Procurement Act provides a framework for regulating procurement of goods works 
and services including consultant services.7 The framework provides fundamentally 
detailed rights and obligations of parties. Some of these details are found in subsidiary 
rules such as administrative guidelines and working manuals8, which parties to the 
procurement are required to follow.   
A relevant subsidiary instrument perhaps, is the Procurement Regulation, which is 
expected to supplement the Procurement Act. However, Ghana’s Procurement 
Regulation has not yet been formally adopted but it is publicly available on PPA website 
in its draft format. Though the Procurement Regulation has provisions directed at the 
conduct of public procurement in Ghana, the instrument in its current state is not legally 
binding on parties to procurement and it cannot be relied upon nor legally enforced for 
the conduct of procurement in Ghana.  
3.2   Objectives of Regulating Procurement in Ghana 
The objectives of regulating procurement in Ghana are not independently stated in the 
procurement law but rather reflected in the objectives for establishing PPA as the 
procurement oversight body. Section 2 of the Public Procurement Act provides the 
purpose of the Act is “to harmonise the processes of public procurement in the public 
service to secure a judicious, economic and efficient use of state resources in public 
procurement and ensure that public procurement is carried out in a fair, transparent and 
non-discriminatory manner”. A close examination of this provision highlights a number of 
objectives for regulating procurement in Ghana. 
Firstly, the aim “to secure a judicious, economic… use of state resources” implies the 
achievement of “value for money” or “maximising economy” in procurement. Value for 
money entails acquiring goods and services on the best possible terms and of a quality 
that is fit for purpose.9 Goods and services acquired on the best possible terms require 
effective use of state resources where the best available price is paid in relation to the 
value to be derived. Fit for purpose goods implies that goods must meet requirements of 
the government and suppliers must also have the capability to meet such 
requirements.10 It has been observed that value for money is the major objective in 
Ghana due to its high ranking on the list of objectives.11 
Secondly, the requirement “to secure… efficient use of state resources” highlights 
efficiency as an objective in Ghana. Efficiency requires that procurement is conducted in 
a timely and cost-effective manner. This implies the procurement process should not be 
unduly delayed and resources should be used in a manner that reduces waste. 
According to Arrowsmith, “whatever the goal pursued, rules on procurement will always 
                                                          
7 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 14. 
8 For further information, see http://www.ppaghana.org/documents/FINALMANUAL_PPB.pdf?story_id=27 (accessed 
3 March 2016). 
9 P. Badcoe, ‘Best Value - A New Approach in the UK’ in S. Arrowsmith and M. Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: 
The Continuing Revolution (Kluwer Law International, 2003), p.197. 
10 Ibid. 
11 D.N. Dagbanja, ‘The Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement in Ghana’ in G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith 
(eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University Press 2013), p.80. 
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take account of the objective of efficiency…”12 This indicates that in a sense, efficiency 
can be an objective in its own right but also efficiency could be inherently part of some 
other objectives. For example, the objective of value for money entails elements of 
efficiency which require cost-effectiveness. The explicit statement of the requirement for 
efficiency in the Procurement Act indicates the importance of efficiency as an objective 
for regulating procurement in Ghana. The need for efficiency does not only justify, to 
some extent, the different methods of procurement13 but also justifies the different 
procurement implementation options such as the decentralised procurement system 
adopted in Ghana as discussed in chapter 2. 
Thirdly, the “fair… and non-discriminatory” manner in which procurement must be 
conducted suggests an objective of fairness and non-discrimination. Fairness requires 
honest and just in conduct without taking advantage of any of the parties in the 
procurement process. Non-discrimination requires impartiality in the procurement 
process except where otherwise justified by law. Discrimination occurs if the 
procurement procedure is such that it treats differently any potential bids that are 
identical in every commercially relevant respect.14 Non-discrimination rules are directed 
mainly towards procurement officials who exercise some discretion. Non-discriminatory 
requirements are similar to fairness in that they both relate to the treatment given to 
parties involved in procurement.  
Fourthly, transparency is also required in Ghana and denotes openness where 
expectations and requirements are clear and accessible to interested parties. This 
means that all information relating to procurement including opportunities must be made 
public for interested parties.15 This ensures that no other criteria apart from those 
already known to participants are used in the selection process. Transparency also 
entails making decisions based on laid down rules and procedures which could provide 
limited scope for discretion. As a result, possibilities of making biased decisions or 
making judgemental errors through the use of discretion could be reduced. 
Transparency also ensures the possibility for verification to ensure laid down 
procedures have been followed properly. In this regard, transparency is a key element 
in achieving value for money and may be relevant to a large extent in achieving other 
objectives of procurement in Ghana.16  
In addition to the above objectives, specific provisions in the Procurement Act suggest 
the pursuit of other objectives not explicitly included in the statement of objectives of 
                                                          
12 S. Arrowsmith, ‘National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or 
Conflict’ in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law International 
1998), p.10. 
13 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.32. 
14 S. J. Evenett and B. M. Hoekman, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: What can We Expect from 
International Trade Agreements?’ in S. Arrowsmith and M. Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Continuing 
Revolution (Kluwer Law International 2003), p.272. 
15 S. Schooner, ‘Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law’ (2002), 11 Public Procurement 
Law Review, p.106. 
16 S. Arrowsmith, ‘Transparency in government procurement: The objectives of regulation and the boundaries of the 
World Trade Organization’ (2003), 37 Journal of World Trade, p.287-303. 
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PPA. Particularly, section 3(t) of the Procurement Act requires PPA to “assist the local 
business community to become competitive and efficient suppliers to the public sector”. 
This provision, in addition to the use of some specific criteria for the ward of government 
contracts in Ghana, suggests the pursuit of industrial and social policy objectives. The 
industrial and social policy entails giving preference to local products in the award of 
contracts where for example specified domestic content may be required for the award 
of contracts as discussed below.  
Many other African countries have adopted procurement policy objectives for domestic 
purposes of regulation. Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria for example, adopted a number of 
procurement objectives. The principles of value for money, transparency and non-
discrimination are among these objectives but value for money appears to be the major 
objective of these other systems.17 The importance of value for money as an objective in 
Ghana but also in many African regimes could be explained firstly, by the need for 
efficient use of scarce resources particularly in developing countries as Ghana. 
Secondly, the UNCITRAL Model Law, on which the procurement law of Ghana and 
many other African regimes are closely modelled,18 clearly states the maximisation of 
economy as the first of its objectives in its preamble. 
There is the need for clear distinctions between the ultimate independent objectives of 
procurement on one hand, and what could be seen as the means to achieving the 
objectives on the other hand. In Ghana, the aim of securing a judicious, economic or 
value for money and efficient procurement system, suggests that these are the ultimate 
objectives of procurement. However, the phrase “carried out in a… manner” in section 2 
of the Procurement Act suggests a procedural conduct which relates to the procurement 
process itself rather than the outcome of the process. In this regard, fairness, 
transparency and non-discrimination which are expressed within the process-related 
phrase, could be considered as the means to achieving the objectives such as value for 
money in Ghana.19  
The distinction between ultimate objectives of procurement and the means to achieving 
these objectives is essential in considering procurement policy options. In some cases, 
the means to achieving the objectives, for example, non-discrimination and prevention 
of corruption may become ultimate independent objectives of the system. An example is 
the case of South Africa where non-discrimination is an independent objective of the 
procurement system in recognition of historical discriminatory policies.20  
Ghana and many other Countries usually adopt several objectives for regulation.21 
However, the relationship between some of the policy objectives requires a trade-off or 
                                                          
17 G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
Part 1, Country Studies, particularly chapters 3,5 and 7. 
18Ibid.  
19 Arrowsmith et al, (note 13 above), p.31. 
20 P. Bolton, ‘Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics’ (2008) 37 Public Contract Law Journal 
781. 
21 Arrowsmith, ‘National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or Conflict’ 
(note 12 above), p.4. 
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perhaps an appropriate balance between achievement of competing objectives.22 It is 
necessary for the procurement entity to decide at the outset of the procurement process 
which policy objectives to pursue. Such decisions should inform the procurement 
method and procedures adopted. 
3.3   Scope of Regulated Procurement in Ghana 
The institutions involved in procurement with regards to their relevance for development 
partner regimes in Ghana have been discussed in chapter 2. Discussions in this chapter 
will focus on the types of contracts covered in Ghana’s domestic context. 
3.3.1 Types of Contracts Covered 
 The Procurement Act, provides the scope of regulated contracts in section 14(1) as;  
(1) The procurement of goods, works and services, financed in whole or in part from 
public funds.23 This implies that any procurement involving government funds will 
be covered. For the purpose of applying different rules, government contracts 
have been classified into goods, works and non-consultant services on one hand 
and contracts for consultant services on the other. The procurement of goods, 
works and non-consultant services follow the same set of rules, making it 
possible for the general procurement rules to be uniformly applied. The 
procurement of consultant services however, follows a separate set of procedure 
as will be explained below.  
(2) Functions relating to procurement of goods, works and services including 
description of requirements and invitation of sources; preparation, selection and 
award of contracts; and the phases of contract administration.24 It implies 
transactions that are incidental to procurement of goods, works and services 
including consultant services, and all the processes including contract 
administration are covered by the Procurement Act. 
There are however, exceptions for application of the procurement rules to certain 
transactions. Firstly, the Procurement Act does not apply where the Minister responsible 
for Finance decides that “it is in the national interest to use a different method”.25 For 
example, the procurement of sensitive military equipment may require different 
procurement procedures for state security reasons. In this case, the Minister is required 
to define the method of procurement to be published in the Gazette (an official public 
record of important statutory and non-statutory notices).26  
Secondly, the Procurement Act does not apply where a procurement entity decides to 
“undertake procurement in accordance with established private sector or commercial 
practices”27 under conditions that (a) the procurement entity is legally and financially 
                                                          
22 Arrowsmith et al, (note 13 above), p.28. 
23 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 14(1)(a). 
24 Ibid, s. 14(1)(b). 
25 Ibid, s. 14(1)(a). 
26 Ibid, s. 14(3). 
27 Ibid, s. 16(2). 
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autonomous and operates under commercial law;28 (b) it is beyond contention that 
public sector procurement procedures are not suitable, considering the strategic nature 
of the procurement;29 (c) the proposed procurement method will ensure value for 
money, provide competition and transparency to the extent possible.30 All these 
conditions must be fulfilled with the approval from PPA for the Procurement Act not to 
apply. It is not quite clear when this exemption might apply since it could be difficult for a 
regulated entity to satisfy all the conditions listed above. For example, a state-owned-
enterprise that is determined to be financially and legally independent from government 
control, might be excluded from complying with the Procurement Act. However, it may 
be difficult to argue that any proposed alternative method could ensure principles such 
as competition and transparency beyond those provided in the Procurement Act so as 
to warrant derogation from the rule. Also, what might constitute “established private 
sector or commercial practices” and the procedures to be adopted by the entity in the 
use of the different method is not defined in the Procurement Act. 
The absence of specific provisions that exclude defence and security contracts implies 
that such contracts are generally covered by the Procurement Act. In practice for 
example, the defence ministry conducts procurement, particularly for common user 
items such as uniforms in accordance with the Procurement rules.31 However, 
procurement of certain sensitive military items such as security equipment may be 
exempted.32 
The 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law suggests an outright exclusion of defence 
procurement, in addition to any other contracts that a state may consider excluding from 
regulation.33 However, provisions under 2011 edition of the Model Law are applicable to 
defence procurement but offers the flexibility for enacting states to modify the 
procedures to accommodate classified information.34 Many other African systems adopt 
a partial exclusion for defence procurement. Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia are 
among such countries.35 In Liberia for example, procurement in the defence sector for 
common user items such as stationery is in accordance with the national rules whiles 
procurement of security equipment require modification of the rules by the oversight 
authority in consultation with the head of national security agency and approved by the 
President.36 
                                                          
28 Ibid, s. 16(2)(a). 
29 Ibid, s. 16(2)(b). 
30 Ibid, s. 16(2)(c). 
31 For further details, see http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/03/01/ghana-armed-forces-adhere-to-
transparent-procurement-procedure/ (Accessed 3 March 2016). 
32 D.K.D Letsa, “Ghana” in J. Davey and J. Falle (eds), The Government Procurement Review (Law Business 
Research, 2013), p.91. 
33 UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, with Guide to 
Enactment (1994), art. 1(2). 
34 UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011), General remarks 
Part 1, B, note 1b, para. 3. 
35 Liberia, Procurement Act, s. 1(5); Nigeria, Procurement Act, s. 15(2); Tanzania, Procurement Act, s. 2(2); Zambia, 
Procurement Act, s. 3(2). 
36 Liberia, Procurement Act, s. 1(5). 
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3.4   Tender Documentation and Record Keeping 
3.4.1 Tender Documentation 
Entities often use standardised procurement documentation to solicit tenders which are 
required every time entities conduct procurement.37 For the purposes of domestic 
regulation, “Standard Tender Documents” is the terminology used in Ghana for 
standardised procurement documentation. This corresponds with reference to a supplier 
as “Tenderer” in Ghana.38 The terminology differs from the use of “Solicitation 
Documents” under the UNCITRAL Model Law or “Standard Bidding Documents” as 
used in the World Bank procurement rules when referring to the same procurement 
documentation. 
In Ghana, an invitation to tender is issued to interested suppliers for a fee which is 
limited to the cost of printing and delivery.39 Based on the type and value of contract, 
different tender documents are required. For example, tender documents required for 
goods are different from those required for consultant services as under schedule 4 of 
the Procurement Act. These template documents are publicly available on the website 
of PPA. 
In Ghana, the description of goods, works or services “shall be based on objective, 
technical and quality characteristics…”40 Where there is no precise and intelligible way 
of describing the characteristics of a product without reference to a particular trade mark 
or other origin, the use of the word “equivalent” is required.41 Objective and clear 
manner of descripting requirements in Ghana could reduce obstacles to participation in 
the procurement process.  
3.4.2 Record Keeping  
Procurement records are vital in promoting transparency and accountability. They 
provide the means for verifying conducts and has the potential to enhance procurement 
reform by providing quality and performance data for identifying areas for improvement. 
For example, investigations on alleged misconducts or verification and approval of 
procurement decisions often rely on procurement records. The Procurement Act 
requires entities to maintain records of procurement in line with the Evidence Act of 
Ghana, 1975 (Act 323).42  
In Ghana, procurement records are usually fragmented or unavailable and this could be 
attributed perhaps to the lack of effective guidelines to assist procurement entities in 
keeping proper records.43 
                                                          
37 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 49(1). 
38 Ibid, s. 98. 
39 Ibid, s. 49(3). 
40 Ibid, s. 33(2). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 27 
43 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (Sep - Oct 2011), Vol. 2(5). 
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Moreover, the Procurement Act explicitly exempts entities from liability for damages for 
failure to maintain records of procurement proceedings.44 The rules are silent on 
whether liability other than damages may be enforced against entities for failure to 
maintain procurement records. The exemption may be intended at preventing 
unnecessary complaints which could cause delays and increase the cost of 
procurement. However, with regards to the context of Ghana where a culture of 
absence or inadequacy in maintaining public records prevails, some form of liability, 
probably in the form of disciplinary sanctions, could be placed on procurement entities 
and individuals involved. This could prevent, to some extent, for example, deliberate 
destruction of records under the pretence of non-availability of records for investigative 
proceedings so as to conceal misconducts. The author is unaware of specific incidents 
of this nature in Ghana. However, a recent inability of some major institutions engaged 
in procurement to produce records for verification, raises concerns as to what extent 
failure of a legal responsibility to maintain public records should be ignored.45 This issue 
is being partially addressed through the collaboration of PPA with the Public Records 
and Archives Administration Department in Ghana (PRAAD), to develop a Procurement 
Records Keeping Manual as a standard guideline to assist entities.46  
3.5   Procurement Methods 
The Procurement Act allows a number of procurement methods based on the 1994 
UNCITRAL Model Law and in general, other influences on methods in Ghana, which 
reflects the degree of exposure to competition and cost-effectiveness as outlined below. 
3.5.1 Competitive Tendering 
Competitive tendering or open tendering is a terminology used under the 1994 and 2011 
UNCITRAL Model Law as followed in Ghana and some other African systems. In 
Ghana, competitive tendering is the default method of procurement for goods, works 
and non-consultant services.47 It requires openness with the widest participation by all 
interested suppliers and any derogation shall be justified.48 This method ensures 
competition and value for money through the wide participation. The Procurement Act 
distinguishes two types of competitive tendering as detailed below.   
3.5.1.1 National Competitive Tendering 
National competitive tendering is a form of open tendering method that opens up 
participation to only national suppliers.49 The method engages formal open procedures 
including public notice and public opening of tenders. The focus of this method is on 
domestic suppliers at the expense of foreign suppliers. A domestic supplier is regarded 
as a citizen of Ghana who is a supplier or corporate bodies with majority shares owned 
                                                          
44 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 28(5). 
45 For further information, see http://graphic.com.gh/General-News/two-bodies-fail-to-furnish-judgement-debt-
commission-with-document.html (access 3 March 2016). 
46 Ghana Public Procurement Authority, Electronic Bulletin (note 43 above). 
47 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 25. 
48 Ibid, s. 35(3). 
49 Ibid, s. 44(1). 
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by a supplier who is a citizen of Ghana.50 The use of national competitive tendering in 
Ghana is based mainly on allocated threshold values according to schedule 3 of the 
Procurement Act.  
3.5.1.2 International Competitive Tendering 
International competitive tendering is the default competitive tendering method in 
Ghana.51 The method engages formal open procedures including public notice and 
public opening of tenders. Competition is ensured by allowing equal participation of all 
eligible suppliers. This method is often used unless the value of the contract falls within 
those required for national competitive tendering. International competitive method is 
also the preferred method for development partners and used in loan funded 
procurement as will be discussed.  
3.5.2 Two-Stage Tendering 
Two-stage tendering52 is largely similar to competitive tendering and exhibits some 
degree of openness and competition. It is considered a method for the procurement of 
complex projects and involves two stages; firstly, suppliers will submit tenders based on 
any relevant aspect of the contract except the tender price53 and then followed by 
negotiations on any aspect of the tenders.54 The negotiation process enables the 
procurement entity to identify and set a common specification in a manner that will meet 
its needs. Secondly, tenders including tender prices will be submitted based on common 
specifications prescribed by the entity.55 The essence of this method is to allow entities 
to hold consultations with suppliers to assist in formulating detailed product 
specifications. The use of this method is not subject to approval by the PPA presumably 
due to the competitive and open call for tenders.  
Two grounds for the use of this method are available; (a) where there is the need to 
engage in discussions to formulate specifications which may be due to the fact that prior 
detailed formulation of specifications may not be feasible56 or (b) in contracts for 
research and development.57 Satisfying any of these conditions may allow the use of the 
method. Under the 2011 Model Law however, contracts for research and development 
are dealt with under request for proposals with dialogue.58 Conditions applicable to the 
use of two-stage tendering under the Model Law are the need to hold discussions with 
suppliers or where an open tender method failed to result in a procurement contract.59 
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3.5.3 Single Source Procurement  
Single source procurement is considered the least competitive method of procurement. 
It entails soliciting goods and services directly from a single supplier which is subject to 
little procedural requirements.60 Prior approval from PPA is required for the use of this 
method.61 Conditions for the use of this method as provided in article 40(1) of the 
Procurement Act include the existence of only a single supplier, emergency situations 
and cases of catastrophic events. These conditions are similar to those provided under 
the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law. The 2011 Model Law provides additional conditions 
including the protection of essential security of the state or the promotion of specific 
economic policy where no alternative is available.62  
In practice, several reports, including auditor’s reports suggest an abuse of the single 
source procurement method.63 The auditor’s report for example identifies the arbitrary 
use of single source procurement without obtaining the requisite approval. The report 
also identified that in most cases, single source procurement is used when competitive 
methods of procurement could be used even when approval is obtained. Moreover, 
procurement audits in Ghana which reveal these findings are usually conducted several 
years after the completion of the procurement process as confirmed by an average of 
two to three years’ delay in audit reports recorded in 2004.64 These delays make it 
difficult to detect procurement misconducts at stages appropriate to take corrective 
measures.  
The misuse of single source method could also be explained by the inadequate support 
and guidance for entities. There appears to be little consultation and communication 
between entities and PPA, particularly prior to submitting documentation for approval. 
Effective communication between the institutions involved could minimise risks of non-
compliance. Though the head of entity is answerable for any non-compliance, the rules 
seem to provide inadequate sanctions or perhaps there is a failure to enforce sanctions 
imposed by the rules.  
3.5.4 Request for Proposals  
This method is generally used in Ghana for the procurement of consultant services. The 
Procurement Act provides a distinct set of rules for the procurement of consultant 
services with the use of request for proposals.65 The separate set of rules in Ghana, 
which is also found in many African regimes, closely models the position of the 1994 
edition of UNCITRAL Model Law and that of the World Bank rules for implementing loan 
funded procurement.66 The position of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the World Bank 
guidelines can be justified by historical reasons in the development of the Model Law 
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and the importance of consultants in the work of the World Bank.67 However, the 
domestic rules provide no clear reason for adopting this approach in Ghana except 
probably because of its close interaction with UNCITRAL and the World Bank regimes. 
The 2011 edition of the UNCITRAL Model Law however, no longer requires a separate 
method for the procurement of consultant services but rather recognises the complexity 
of the procurement as the main determinant of the method to be used.68  
In Ghana, request for proposals entails publicly advertising the call for expression of 
interest from interested consultants.69 Subject to approval of PPA, direct invitation to 
individual consultants for the expression of interest may also be issued for economic 
and efficiency reasons under specified conditions.70 Entities are required to prepare a 
shortlist of potential consultants who expressed interest in the procurement.71 The 
limitation on candidates to be shortlisted could ensure efficiency in the conduct of 
procurement by removing any disproportionate burden on entities. The method of 
request for proposals is sometimes used for contracts involving public-private 
partnership in Ghana.72  
3.6   Other Purchasing Arrangements 
An important purchasing arrangement introduced in Ghana is framework agreement, 
also referred to as blanket purchase agreement. There are currently no explicit 
provisions in the rules allowing the use of framework agreements. However, PPA issued 
draft Guidelines for the use of framework agreements.73 These frameworks are simple 
single supplier service level agreements which essentially, are procurement contracts 
covered by the procurement rules. This implies that irrespective of whether or not the 
guideline on frameworks has a legally binding status, these agreements can be 
operated under the procurement law with no legal problems. However, the use of single 
supplier frameworks is explicitly written into the proposed amendment to the 
Procurement Act.  
In Ghana, framework agreements are currently in a pilot phase particularly in the 
education sector.74 Procurement entities in the education sector forms clusters with a 
lead entity, and procurement functions of the lead entity may be outsourced to a third 
party. An initial open tendering process with the applicable procedural rules is 
conducted to establish the terms and conditions including the price and minimum 
quantity of the framework.75 A single supplier is then selected where subsequent or 
future call-offs could be made by individual procurement entities themselves without 
reference to the lead entity.76 In essence, no contract exists until the entity issues a call-
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off. The framework agreement is used for the purchase of common user items with the 
aim of eliminating variations in prices.77 With this arrangement, it is expected that the 
use of the framework agreement will increase value for money through time saving and 
uniform price over the period of the agreement.78 
3.7   Publicity for Contracts  
Procurement entities in Ghana are required by law to advertise contract opportunities in 
most cases when soliciting tenders. The medium of publication however depends on the 
degree of openness of the procurement which is reflected in the threshold value of the 
contract.79 In Ghana, contract opportunities are also published on the website of the 
PPA which is often the case for specific contract opportunities. 
3.8   Qualification of Tenderers 
Section 22 of the Procurement Act specifies the criteria which procurement entities shall 
use in every case for the selection of qualified suppliers. Qualification criteria which 
relates to the procurement contract, including financial and technical qualification are 
clearly among these criteria.80 The use of other qualification criteria not related to the 
performance of the contract, including the payment of tax and social security 
contributions are also required.81 Procurement entities have the discretion to set other 
criteria it considers appropriate to determine the qualification of suppliers.82 Qualification 
criteria shall be set out in tender documents.83 These provisions in Ghana are closely 
modelled on the position of the UNCITRAL Model Law where it suggests the setting out 
of qualification requirements and the evaluation of qualifications in the tender 
documents or other documents for solicitation of proposals.84  
A shortlisting process may be required where too many suppliers meet the minimum 
qualification criteria.85 “Shortlisting” refers to the process of reducing the number of 
permitted tenderers participating in the procurement process where too many tenderers 
meet the minimum requirement. This terminology is used in Ghana and some donor 
regimes including the World Bank. The terminology is also used in some other African 
regimes particularly in systems influenced by the World Bank.86  
3.9   Evaluation and Award of Tenders 
Tenders to be evaluated must generally conform to requirements spelt out in the 
invitation documents and non-conforming tenders shall be rejected.87 In order to 
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illustrate the issue of multiplicity in the area of non-conforming tenders and correction of 
errors will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Acceptable tenders shall be evaluated and compared with a view to selecting a winning 
tender in accordance with criteria set out in invitation documents.88 A tender with the 
lowest evaluated tender price89 and the lowest evaluated tender shall be considered the 
successful tender.90 The above consideration shall be given relative weighting or 
expressed in monetary terms where practicable.91 The successful tender is determined 
on the basis of price in combination with other criteria. The criteria include mandatory 
criteria on price;92 operation and maintenance cost;93 national security and the effect of 
the tender on factors including economic development94 which entities shall consider in 
every case.  
The determination of the lowest evaluated tender as award criteria in Ghana denotes 
the use of other criteria apart from price in the selection process. Mandatory criteria 
such as the effect on economic development could allow a broad interpretation of the 
criteria which could provide opportunities for abuse. The complex nature of the 
evaluation process which allows opportunities for abuse may require the provision of 
clear and well defined guidelines on the use of evaluation criteria in order to reduce the 
discretion of procurement officers. The 2011 Model Law provides a different standard 
where apart from price, the use of other criteria is not mandatory though a combination 
of price and the other form the basis for determining successful tenders.95  
The domestic rules have no provision on standstill period as will be discussed below. 
Moreover, unsuccessful suppliers shall be given notice of contract award after its entry 
into force,96 which could present significant limitation on suppliers’ ability to obtain 
effective remedy as will be seen. 
3.10 Procedure for Selection of Consultants 
The term “selection” as used here refers to the process of identifying or choosing the 
successful tender other than the shortlisting process as defined in section 3.8 above. 
The terminology is adopted in Ghana and some African systems as used under the 
World Bank regime. Some other regimes including UNCITRAL, broadly define the 
selection process to include shortlisting which offers enacting states the flexibility in 
adapting terms considered appropriate for domestic usage. As will be seen, procedures 
particularly for selecting consultants in Ghana are largely influenced by World Bank 
procedures for engaging consultants. This could be explained perhaps, by the close 
interaction between the two regimes through the involvement of domestic officers in 
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Bank funded projects. Over time, the domestic system may have found World Bank 
procedures useful for adoption into domestic rules for purposes of procurement.  
The principal selection procedure for consultants in Ghana is the selection procedure 
with consecutive negotiations. The entity is required to establish a threshold on the 
quality and technical aspects of the proposals in accordance with pre-determined 
evaluation criteria.97 Each proposal is rated by the procurement entity according to set 
criteria including the relative weight and manner of application of any other criteria.98 
Those rated above the set threshold are considered and given ranks.99 Negotiations 
with the successful supplier are permitted, one at a time starting with the supplier that 
received the highest ranking. However, negotiations are not permitted under 
procurement of goods and works as indicated in section 3.5 above.  
In Ghana, the Procurement Act provides six types of selection procedure under the 
selection with consecutive negotiation procedure by which a procurement entity may 
choose which supplier it wants to engage in negotiations with. The choice of selection 
procedure and the nature of negotiations with the highest ranked supplier depend on 
whether or not entities consider price as significant in the procurement. Where price is 
considered significant, selection procedures available are; (a) Quality Cost Based 
Selection (QCBS),100 (b) selection based on the least cost, thus based solely on price101 
and (c) selection based on a fixed budget of the procurement entity.102 Where price is 
not considered significant, the available selection procedures are (d) Quality Based 
Selection (QBS),103 (e) selection based on the qualification of the supplier104 and (f) 
single source selection procedure.105 Procurement entities shall give prior notice to 
potential suppliers of the choice of selection procedure including the criteria that will be 
used in the procurement process.106  
3.11 Enforcement Mechanisms  
3.11.1   Introduction 
In the remaining of this section, discussions will focus on the enforcement mechanisms 
for domestic regulation of procurement in Ghana. We will consider the review 
mechanism for enforcing the rules as provided under the Public Procurement Act. The 
section begins with an outline of the review forums that are available under Ghana’s 
domestic system for aggrieved parties. Discussions thereafter will focus on the 
administrative review procedures including review by the procurement entity as 
applicable in Ghana. The section moves on to examine the judicial review system for 
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handling procurement disputes. We will then consider other alternative review 
mechanisms applied in Ghana for enforcing compliance with the procurement rules. 
3.11.2   Forum for Review 
According to the Procurement Act, complaints may be received firstly by the 
procurement entity itself.107 The complaints are reviewable by two independent 
administrative bodies; the Tender Review Board108 and the Public Procurement 
Authority.109 A final judicial review is also obtainable as will be seen below. However, 
the substantive procurement law is silent on the availability of a judicial forum for review. 
Under the current proposal for amendment of the procurement rules in Ghana, the 
availability of a judicial review is expressly written into the law. These review bodies and 
their adjudicating powers will be discussed below. 
The forum for review in Ghana is a three tiered system. This implies review by the 
procurement entity at the first stage shall be exhausted and serves as a pre-condition 
for allowing review at the higher stages. The tiered review system in Ghana is modelled 
on provisions under the 1994 and 2011 editions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, 
the 2011 Model Law no longer requires review by the procurement entity as a 
compulsory stage.110 This change recognises the practically less effective compulsory 
entity review requirement where some entities deliberately delay the resolution of 
complaints or simply ignore the complaints.111 Many other African countries have 
adopted a tiered review system, particularly in those countries where the Model Law has 
been influential. Gambia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania are examples of countries with 
tiered review systems.112 These other African countries, with the exception of Kenya, 
also maintain a first instance review by the procurement entity as a compulsory 
requirement.113 The proposals for amendment of the domestic procurement rules in 
Ghana do not introduce any changes in this respect but maintains review by the 
procurement entity as a compulsory stage.  
3.11.3   Review by Procurement Entity 
Complaints from aggrieved suppliers shall in the first instance be submitted to the Head 
of the procurement entity.114 Derogation from this requirement is only permitted where 
the procurement contract has already entered into force.115 In this case, aggrieved 
suppliers have the option to initiate complaints before the procurement entity or directly 
before the independent administrative review bodies. However, the Procurement Act 
does not provide adequate procedural rules on how review decisions should be arrived 
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at.116 For example, there are no rules on how the head of the procurement entity may 
act or what possible actions it could take in respect of its decisions. 
Requirements to exhaust review by the procurement entity as a compulsory first 
instance, and the lack of procedural rules for the review function, could constrain 
effectiveness of the procurement system. Firstly, the decision of the procurement entity 
may be partial given its particular interest in the procurement process.117 Secondly, the 
lack of procedural guidelines may result in irregularities and compromise. The 
procurement entity may want to maintain its reputation as a faultless entity and so 
decide to amicably resolve the complaint by offering a “deal” such as sub-contracts or 
future contracts to aggrieved suppliers. 
Nevertheless, review by the procurement entity may have the benefit of a non-
adversarial resolution of disputes. The procurement entity maintains the information 
relating to the procurement process which could be accessed and corrected at an early 
stage to ensure efficiency and effective remedy.118    
3.11.4   Review by Independent Body  
A second stage of review is available from the Tender Review Board on one hand or 
from PPA on the other hand.119  There is no explicit requirement to seek review before 
the Tender Review Board before going to the PPA. It is unclear whether appeals from 
the Tender Review Board shall be reviewed by the PPA or whether appeals may lie 
directly to the higher judicial review body. However, it is envisaged that appeals from the 
Tender Review Board may require review by PPA since the Procurement Act provides 
that decisions and reports of the Tender Review Board shall be presented to the PPA 
for inspection.120  
The proposed amendment bill seeks to reinforce the autonomy of decentralised 
authorities including the Tender Review Boards by re-allocating review functions to 
decentralised authorities. Under the new proposals, the Executive Committee of 
Metropolitan and District Assemblies which is the highest administrative authority under 
the decentralised system may review appeals from entities at the decentralised level. 
Appeals from entities at the decentralised level may lie directly to the courts of Ghana 
without any obligation to exhaust review by the Executive Committee of Metropolitan or 
District Assembly. However, appeals from the Metropolitan and District Assembly shall 
first lie to the PPA for review before the option for judicial review. The current review 
function of Tender Review Boards (renamed as Tender Review Committees under the 
proposed amendment), shall be carried out at the entity level. This implies that Tender 
Review Boards become first instance review bodies who act on behalf of entities and 
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appeals from their decisions may lie to the Executive Committee of the Metropolitan and 
District Assembly or directly to the courts of Ghana. 
In practice, the review function of the Tender Review Board is not being pursued and 
the Tender Review Board does not receive complaints.121 This could be explained firstly 
by the nature of its review function as shared with the PPA. Since review by the Tender 
Review Board is not a pre-condition for appeal to higher review bodies as indicated 
above, the PPA with its expertise in procurement matters may be preferred by aggrieved 
persons for having the credibility in making informed review decisions. Secondly, the 
Tender Review Board could be seen as directly engaged in the procurement process 
through approving procurement decisions at every stage of the procurement process as 
its core function.122 This implies that the Review Board may be reviewing decisions 
approved by itself and may have an interest in the outcome of those decisions. Thirdly, 
the procurement law has no provisions regarding procedures or guidelines to be 
followed by the Tender Review Board in performing its review function. For example, 
there are no provisions on available remedies or time limits within which complaints 
should be reviewed.  
3.11.4.1 Review by Public Procurement Authority 
Unlike review functions of the procurement entity and the Tender Review Board, PPA 
has detailed procedural rules with explicit powers to guide its review process. Review is 
usually conducted on the initial complaint brought by aggrieved persons rather than on 
the review decision of procurement entities.123 For the purpose of effective performance 
of its review function, the PPA has established a special unit within its ambit with the 
exclusive responsibility for handling complaints. The complaints unit referred to as the 
Appeals and Complaints Panel is a nine-member review panel, whose membership 
includes members of the PPA.124 Review decisions of the panel are subject to approval 
by the Executive Board of PPA.125 
The structure of PPA’s review forum is fundamentally based on the 1994 Model Law 
which perhaps, weakly proposed that states could have the option of establishing a 
review system that did not involve any independent review. This approach could be 
attributed to the willingness of the Model Law to accommodate the sensitivities of states 
on review of their administration in general and to take account of their own 
constitutional and legal traditions.126 However, the 2011 Model Law is significantly 
different in this respect and imposes a higher minimum standard by placing emphasis 
on independence from the procurement entity rather than independence from the 
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government as a whole.127 Many African systems have instituted administrative review 
forums which reflect provisions under the 1994 Model Law where the review bodies are 
external to the procurement entity with some degree of independence. Liberia, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone are examples of such systems.128 In Liberia and Nigeria for example, 
the administrative review function is performed by the body that also has the duty of 
overall supervision of procurement functions. 
The nature of PPA’s review structure could provide some benefits for the domestic 
system. The combined role of PPA as a review body and supervisor of procurement 
activities may bring unique expertise to resolving procurement conflicts.129 This is 
because insights gained in the supervision function may be useful in resolving disputes 
and that could also reveal aspects of the law that may be considered for reform. 
However, the review function must perhaps be carried out with caution and address 
specific issues on conflict of interest that may arise through the multiple roles of PPA. 
3.11.5   Right to Initiate Review 
The Procurement Act provides that “any supplier, contractor or consultant that claims to 
have suffered, or that may suffer loss or injury due to a breach of a duty imposed on the 
procurement entity by this Act, may seek review”.130  The rules identifies a supplier as 
“any potential party or the party to a procurement contract with the procuring entity”.131 
These provisions imply that either a supplier who already has a contract with the 
procurement entity or a supplier who has the potential of being a party to the contract 
can initiate complaints.  
In Ghana, complaints from subcontractors and professional association representatives 
may not be admitted for review. Complaints from the general public or civil society 
organisations may also not be admissible for administrative review. These exclusions 
may be justified to the extent that it avoids unnecessary disruption to the procurement 
process in order to balance other interests including the public interest.132  
3.11.6   Interim Relief: Suspension 
Submitting a complaint in Ghana does not grant an automatic right to suspension of the 
procurement process. It rather at the discretion of the review body on a case by case 
basis. According to the rules, a 7 days’ suspension, with optional extension not 
exceeding 30 days133 is on condition that the complaint (a) is not frivolous,134 (b) 
demonstrates that the supplier will suffer irreparable damage if the suspension is not 
granted135 and (c) is likely to succeed.136 All these conditions must be met for a 
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suspension to be granted. Moreover, the review body shall ensure the suspension does 
not cause a disproportionate harm to the procurement entity nor to other suppliers.137 
This implies the discretion of the review body is not absolute but limited to the conditions 
spelt out above. The review body is required to ensure that conditions spelt out above 
are sufficiently met in every review application to allow suspension. However, 
suspension shall not be granted “if the procurement entity certifies that urgent public 
interest considerations require the procurement to proceed”.138  
The approach to suspension in most African procurement regimes is that of an 
automatic suspension.139 This means that granting suspension is not at the discretion of 
the review body. Ethiopia, Gambia and Sierra Leone are examples of such regimes.140 
These African regimes model the 1994 edition of the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, 
the 2011 Model Law departs from the automatic suspension approach by suggesting 
the granting of suspension based on the discretion of the review body as applicable in 
Ghana.141 
3.11.7   Final Relief:   
The main forms of final relief available in Ghana are invalidation of decisions to a limited 
extent and the award of damages in the form of compensation. Firstly, PPA may set 
aside, substitute, terminate or “annul in whole or in part an illegal act or decision of the 
procurement entity, other than any act or decision bringing the procurement contract 
into force”.142 This implies that decisions may be invalidated to the extent that the 
contract has not yet entered into force. In such cases, entities will be required to correct 
the violation or to proceed in a manner that complies with the rules. This approach, to 
some extent, ensures effective relief for aggrieved suppliers since the proper conduct of 
the process is a primary interest of aggrieved suppliers.  
PPA does not have the authority to invalidate decisions on concluded contracts and 
decisions that bring procurement contracts into force in Ghana cannot be set aside by 
administrative review bodies. This position is reinforced by the decision of PPA and its 
Complaints Panel which, in giving judgement to the aggrieved supplier, is unable to set 
aside or invalidate the decision of the procurement entity due to the fact that the 
contract has already come into force.143 However, the judicial review body has the 
authority to set aside or overturn decisions on concluded contracts as will be seen 
below.  
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In some African systems including Gambia and Malawi, the review body may also 
invalidate decisions of the procurement entity other than decisions bringing the contract 
into force.144 Some other regimes including Kenya provide an outright exclusion of 
concluded contracts from reviewable matters, indicating that no decision of review 
bodies shall overturn decisions on concluded contracts. The approach to protecting 
concluded contracts in Ghana is the position adopted under the 1994 Model Law which 
features in many African regimes including the regimes discussed above. However, the 
2011 Model Law introduces a significant shift from this position by allowing invalidation 
of concluded contracts.145 Indeed, the issue of protecting concluded contracts in review 
decisions has been a major subject of debate across procurement systems.146 
The lack of invalidating contracts may have adverse effects especially in Ghana where 
there are no standstill periods. The protection of concluded contracts perhaps makes it 
far too easy for entities to maintain wrongful award decisions. Moreover, the 
compensation scheme available in Ghana is generally restrictive as will be discussed 
below and this poses additional difficulty in obtaining effective remedy.    
Secondly, PPA may “require the payment of compensation for reasonable costs 
incurred”147 by the supplier or the procurement entity for wrongful acts. What can be 
considered a “reasonable” cost is left at the discretion of the review body to determine 
but may include the cost of litigation or cost of purchasing tender documentation. 
PPA does not have the authority to award compensation for loss suffered such as loss 
of profits or the cost of preparing tenders due to breach of the rules. This suggests that 
no generous compensation scheme could be expected from the review body. This 
position could be explained perhaps, by the fact that Ghana is a developing country with 
scarce resources where donor support is usually required to implement development 
projects. Moreover, donors do not allow the use of their funds for the settlement of 
procurement disputes as will be discussed. The narrow compensation scheme available 
under the domestic system suggests that the review system seeks to ensure mainly the 
integrity of the domestic system by providing compensation that could only incentivise 
suppliers in submitting complaints. The approach to award of compensation is not 
uniformly applied in African systems, but it can be seen as generally restrictive. Whiles 
regimes such as Liberia and Uganda have no explicit provisions on the award of 
compensation, some other regimes including Kenya and Tanzania adopt narrow 
compensation schemes where for example, only payment of costs incurred is 
allowed.148 In Botswana for example, such payment of cost is capped at a maximum 
                                                          
144 Gambia, Procurement Act, s. 55(6)(b); Malawi, Procurement Act, s. 38(8)(c). 
145 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011), art. 67(9)(f). 
146 Quinot,  (note 139 above), p.324-327; S. Treumer, 'Towards an Obligation to Terminate Contracts Concluded in 
Breach of the E.C. Public Procurement Rules - the End of the Status of Concluded Public Contracts as Sacred Cows', 
(2007) 6 Public Procurement Law Review, p.371-386.  
147 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 80(3)(f). 
148 Kenya, Procurement Act, s. 98(d); Tanzania, Procurement Act, s. 97(5)(f). 
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which shall not exceed the commercial outlay for the preparation of a bidding 
package.149 
3.11.8   Judicial Review 
The Public Procurement Act of Ghana is silent on the availability of judicial review for 
aggrieved suppliers and this means it has no provision on procedures including time 
limits for submitting complaints for judicial review. The position in Ghana seems not far 
different from that of the Model Law where reference to judicial review is sparingly 
made.150 The Model Law perhaps envisaged a rigorous administrative review system 
where many of the complaints could be resolved. This can be inferred from the Guide to 
Enactment which suggests that enacting states should have clear rules to the extent 
possible and consider among other things, the cost of litigation, the disruption to the 
procurement process and the length of time for dispute resolution in traditional courts for 
designing a review forum.151  
However, available case law indicates that aggrieved suppliers may seek judicial review 
in the High Courts of Ghana though resort to judicial review in practice is minimal.152 
The current proposal for amendment to the procurement rules in Ghana has express 
provisions allowing judicial review. The judicial review system is the final of the three-
tiered review system in Ghana. It is not clear, whether aggrieved suppliers are required 
to exhaust the administrative review procedures before applying for judicial review. The 
general administrative justice provisions enshrined in the Constitution provides the basis 
for judicial review153 whiles the review procedures of the High Court are determined by 
its Civil Procedure Rules.154  
The right to initiate judicial review in Ghana appears to be open to a wide range of 
stakeholders including individuals, contrary to the limited review right applicable under 
the administrative review system. In a decided case before the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiff is a former Attorney-General who is declared as an individual seeking the 
interest of the public through a suit in relation to the award of a contract in violation of 
the procurement procedure.155 This case gives an indication that individuals and their 
associations may initiate judicial review proceedings. Furthermore, there is no explicit 
limitation on matters that are subject to review before the judicial body. Arguably, all 
procurement matters are subject to review before the judicial body. This is demonstrated 
in a decision of the High Court which reviewed a complaint on the choice of single 
source method of procurement and the granting of approval for its use by the PPA as a 
violation of the rules.156 The principles in the decision of the High Court are rather 
                                                          
149 Botswana, Procurement Act, s. 108. 
150 Zhang, (note 117 above), p.220. 
151 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011), para.11-12. 
152 Alfred Agbesi Woyome v Attorney-General & Anor (2010), Unreported Suit No. RPC/152/10; Letsa, (note 32 
above), p.103; Dagbanja, (note 11 above), p.85. 
153 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, (1992), art. 23. 
154 High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules (2004) C. 1. 47. 
155 Amidu v. Attorney-General & 2 Others (The Waterville Case), (2012), Unreported Suit No. J1/15/2012. 
156 The Republic v. Ministry of Education and Sports and Others, Unreported (Suit No. AP6/2006). 
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different from the explicit exclusion of the choice of procurement methods as a subject 
matter for review under the administrative review forum. 
The powers of the High Court to award remedies are determined by the Civil Procedure 
Rules and other inherent general powers of the High Court. These include the authority 
to grant orders for the prohibition, injunction and mandamus. It also has the authority to 
overturn procurement decisions. Indeed, the court has powers to invalidate or set aside 
concluded contracts and decisions of the procurement entity and require it to act in a 
lawful manner. In the unreported Waterville case,157 the Supreme Court overturned the 
decision of the Ministry of Education and Sports as a procurement entity in the award of 
a duly approved and concluded contract to the defendant foreign supplier. The court 
ruled that the contract award was in violation of the procurement procedures by failing to 
secure an additional parliamentary approval required specifically for contracts classified 
as international business transactions as discussed in Chapter 2.2.1. The jurisdiction of 
the courts to invalidate decisions on concluded contracts also applies to other violations 
of the procurement law. For example, the courts have powers to overturn decisions that 
violate rules on publicity. 
The courts also have powers to award compensation including restitution where a 
contract awarded in violation of the procurement law has been overturned by the courts. 
In the CCWL case,158 the court set aside the decision of the procurement entity for the 
award of a contract in violation of the procurement procedures and ordered restitution of 
the benefits conferred on the defendant. The authority of the courts to award 
compensation applies to other violations of the procurement law including failure to 
advertise contract opportunities.    
3.11.9   Other Forms of Enforcement 
Sanctions for criminal offences including acts of corruption committed under the 
procurement law are punishable in accordance with the Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29).159 
The Procurement Act also imposes disciplinary sanctions for procurement misconducts 
such as the submission of false information and inducing public officials. The sanctions 
include rejection of tenders, disqualification or debarment of the suppliers.160 For other 
general procurement misconducts, the Procurement Act imposes administrative 
sanctions in the form of fines. For example, persons engaged in procurement 
misconduct shall be “liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 1000 penalty 
units or a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or both”.161  
In practice, debarment of suppliers is not actively implemented in Ghana. There are no 
procedural guidelines on the debarment function and PPA does not have an active list 
of debarred suppliers. PPA has currently no intention to debar suppliers since it 
                                                          
157 Amidu v. Attorney-General & 2 Others (The Waterville Case), (note 155 above). 
158 CCW Limited v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly, Unreported (Civil Appeal No. J4/5/2007). 
159 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 93(2).  
160 Ibid, s. 3(q), s. 22(5), s. 32. 
161 Ibid, s. 92(1). 
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considers the supplier market in Ghana to be small and the domestic system has not yet 
achieved the level of competition required.162 As a result, any debarment sanction 
issued could reduce competition which could compromise value for money.163 However, 
PPA makes reference to the World Bank list of ineligible suppliers on its own website.164 
This could imply that the World Bank list of ineligible suppliers serves as the list of 
debarred suppliers for the purposes of domestic procurement in Ghana. In the absence 
of further clarification from PPA, it could be envisaged that reference to the World Bank 
list of ineligible suppliers may serve merely as a guide for entities. This implies that 
review decisions of donors including decisions on debarment may serve as a guide and 
could influence domestic review decisions as will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
The Procurement Act is silent on the availability of disciplinary sanctions directed at 
public officials who violate the procurement rules. However, public institutions in Ghana 
usually have an internal disciplinary system which could be applied to procurement 
officials who engage in procurement misconducts. The internal disciplinary sanctions 
such as suspension or dismissal of procurement officials may be found in codes of 
conduct for public officials. Moreover, constitutional principles on conflict of interest on 




                                                          
162 This information is obtained from an official of the Public Procurement Authority in Ghana who wishes to remain 
anonymous. The information is on file with the author (21 November 2013). 
163 Ibid.  
164 For further information, see http://www.ppaghana.org/suppliers/supbarred.asp (accessed 3 March 2016). 
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Chapter 4: Procurement under the World Bank  
4.1   Introduction 
The World Bank, is a major development partner in Ghana. This chapter provides an 
outline of the framework for procurement under the World Bank in Ghana. The role of 
this chapter is to examine the World Bank regime as one of the multiple procurement 
regimes operating in Ghana. The significance lies in the large scale of funded 
operations which involves frequent application of the Bank’s Guidelines in Ghana.1 This 
facilitated familiarity with the Bank’s rules in Ghana and as will be seen below, some 
aspects of domestic procurement rules are modelled on provisions and practices under 
the World Bank rules.  Moreover, the global reputation as a development partner, 
provides the Bank with some form of influence over domestic development policies.  
The chapter begins with an outline of the legal framework and objectives of the Bank 
where the ongoing policy reform will be highlighted. The institutional and operational 
structure of the Bank will then be examined. Subsequently, procurement methods for 
goods, non-consultant services and more important in the Bank’s operation, consultancy 
services will be considered. 
As the case with other development partners, procurement policies of the Bank can be 
separated into two major forms as will be discussed in this chapter. On one hand, there 
are policies directed specifically at loan funded procurement as found in the content of 
the Bank’s rules and reporting procedures. On the other hand, there are other general 
policies aimed at steering procurement reform which include local capacity building. 
4.2   Legal Framework 
The legal basis for the Bank’s rules is the Loan Agreement which is the contract 
between the World Bank and the Government of Ghana. The Loan Agreement has the 
status of a treaty agreement which is governed by international law and as such, the 
Government of Ghana cannot rely on national legislation as a reason not to fulfil its 
obligations under the Loan Agreement.2 It implies that the Loan agreement in principle 
has precedence over national legislation. The procurement legislation of Ghana and that 
of many African countries indeed acknowledges the precedence of the Loan Agreement 
over domestic rules as discussed in chapter 2. The Loan Agreement defines the 
relationship between the parties. For example, the Government of Ghana has the 
responsibility for the conduct of procurement including the award of contracts.3 The role 
of the Bank is to supervise the procurement process and ensure that its procedures are 
complied with. If the borrower does not follow the laid down procedures properly, the 
                                                          
1 The World Bank in 2011 for example, disbursed over US$350M of its commitments to operations in Ghana. For 
more information, see http://www.aidflows.org/GH_Beneficiary_View.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016).   
2 A. Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and other subjects of public and private international law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p.33, also cited in M. Meireles, “The World Bank Procurement Regulations: A 
Critical Analysis of the Enforcement Mechanism and of the Application of Secondary Policies in Financed Projects” 
(2006), Unpublished PhD thesis, available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/pprg p.41.   
3 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.2; Consultant Guidelines s. 1.4.  
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Bank may declare misprocurement and cancel the funds for parts or whole of the 
project.4 
The Bank has a duty to ensure that proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes 
intended.5 It carries out this duty through the provision of Guidelines detailing how 
procurement should be carried out. There are two basic guidelines; Guidelines on 
Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (January, 2011) covering procurement 
of goods, works and non-consulting services (herein the Procurement Guidelines) and 
Guidelines on the Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers 
(January, 2011) covering procurement of consultant services (herein the Consultant 
Guidelines). These Guidelines are incorporated by reference into the Loan Agreement 
which forms part of the obligations of the Government of Ghana under procurement 
funded by the Bank. 
The Guidelines are complemented by standard documents referred to as Standard 
Bidding Documents (SBDs) which are designed for different types of contracts.6 These 
SBDs are template forms which borrowers are required to use in every case for Bank-
funded procurement. Essentially, the rights and obligations of borrowers and suppliers 
are defined by the bidding document and the procurement contract but not by the Loan 
Agreement or the Guidelines.7 
The operations of the Bank are also guided by some internal rules that are binding on 
Bank staff in performing their supervisory role. The World Bank Operations Manual 
(Particularly, OP/BP 11.00; January 2011(revised April 2013)) is a document containing 
the responsibilities of Bank staff, together with the Bank’s policies and procedures which 
include procurement provisions relevant for Bank-funded projects. 
The Bank’s rules and procedures are not laws in themselves but they serve the same 
purpose and effectively constitute the legal framework for the Bank’s operations.8 In this 
respect, the provisions are not guidelines but rather mandatory provisions to be applied 
in every Bank-funded project and failure to comply with the provisions may lead to the 
cancellation of funds. Through these provisions, the Bank is able to define its legal 
relationship with the borrower but also the legal relationship between the borrower and 
suppliers. However, any relationship between the Bank and suppliers remain unclear 
and the Bank often accepts little responsibility for suppliers.9 
                                                          
4 Ibid, s. 1.14 and s. 1.19. 
5 World Bank, Articles of Agreement, Article III, s. 5(b). 
6 The World Bank’s SBDs are publicly available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:20062006~menuP
K:84284~pagePK:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html (access 3 March 2016). 
7 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.1; Consultant Guidelines s. 1.2. 
8 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli, and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.110-114. 
9 For more information on the responsibility of the Development Banks towards third parties in general, see B. 
Malmendier, 'The Liability of International Development Banks in Procurement Proceedings: The Example of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the Inter-American Development Bank' (2010) 4 Public Procurement Law Review 135. 
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4.3   Objectives of World Bank Procurement Rules 
Procurement under the World Bank is undergoing major policy reforms following 
approval by its Executive Directors for a proposed new framework on procurement.10 
The reform is motivated by the Bank’s believe that changes in its clients including their 
institutional capacity but also changes in current public procurement practices, makes it 
necessary for the Bank to better support clients in strengthening their public 
procurement systems. The new framework sets out the Bank’s new vision as supporting 
clients to “achieve value for money with integrity in delivering sustainable 
development”.11 The guiding principles for implementing the vision are economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness, fairness, integrity, openness and transparency with good 
management, all of which are already identified under the Bank’s current operations. A 
significant change in the Bank’s operations at the project level, however, is a fit-for-
purpose procurement approach rather than the one-size-fits-all approach under its 
current operations as well as making progressive use of client country procurement 
systems.12 The reform process is in its final part of phase II where the new procurement 
framework will be launched by July 2016.13   
The current procurement guidelines administered by the World Bank provides the policy 
objectives that govern its current projects. The policy objectives guiding World Bank 
procurement can be summarised as follows; 
Firstly, the Bank aims at ensuring the use of funds only for purposes for which the loan 
was granted with due consideration for economy and efficiency.14 The notion of 
economy and efficiency, requires acquisition of suitable goods and services in a most 
effective manner and on the best possible terms. It extends to achieving economy and 
efficiency in the broader procurement environment which also supports the achievement 
of other objectives, such as the development of local enterprises. In this respect, some 
have criticised the activities of the Bank as being far from efficient and economical.15  
Secondly, the Bank is concerned with providing equal opportunities for all eligible 
bidders to compete in Bank-financed projects.16 This objective effectively requires equal 
treatment of all potential suppliers through the provision of the same information and the 
application of a uniform standard of requirements for all bidders. Discrimination may 
constitute a major barrier to free trade and it is the policy of the Bank to promote equal 
treatment in opening up procurement markets that promote free trade.17 The Bank’s 
                                                          
10 Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Finance, Phase II: The New Procurement Framework (June 2015), 
available for download at http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/procurement-policy-review-consultations 
(access 3 March 2016). 
11 Ibid, p.11.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.2(a); Consultant Guidelines s. 1.4(b). 
15 T. Tucker, "A Critical Analysis of the Procurement Procedures of the World Bank," in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies 
(eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer law International, 1998), p.142. 
16 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.2(b); Consulting Guidelines s. 1.4(c). 
17 F. Ssennoga, 'Examining Discriminatory Procurement Practices in Developing Countries', (2006) 6(3) Journal of 
Public Procurement, p.222. 
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policy on non-discrimination may include conditions for participation of bidders to be 
limited to those that are essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract.18   
Thirdly, concerns for transparency in the procurement process has remained a core 
objective under World Bank procurement.19 Transparency requires that both the 
procurement entity and potential suppliers have adequate information on their rights and 
obligations with avenues to address any concerns. This ensures that no other criterion 
is introduced into the procurement process without prior knowledge of participants.20 
Transparency in Bank-funded projects is implemented through the requirement of 
publicity for all procurement opportunities. The detailed rule-based provisions of the 
Bank, serve to promote transparency by effectively limiting the discretion of procurement 
officers to making justifiable decisions. The Bank also has strict requirements on 
keeping procurement records that could provide a means for future verification of 
procurement decisions.  
The Bank is also concerned with encouraging the development of local industries.21 The 
Bank encourages participation of local suppliers in Bank-financed projects by providing 
some margin of preference for their bids.22 The margin of preference ensures that bids 
from domestic suppliers or goods manufactured domestically may be preferred over 
others in some Bank-financed projects below specified threshold values. Developing the 
local industry does not only increase competition in both domestic and Bank-funded 
procurement but also promotes the ability of local firms to participate in foreign 
contracts. However, developing local industries with preferential treatment may conflict 
with the pursuit of other objectives of the Bank including the objective of providing all 
qualified bidders with equal opportunities and promoting non-discrimination. Any 
preference given to local industries may involve discrimination in favour of the local 
industry. It will be seen that the development of local industries as an objective of the 
Bank, appears to be applied in a limited extent and necessarily balanced by the need to 
open up the procurement market to all eligible bidders and promoting non-
discrimination. 
Also, the Bank is demonstrating an increasing concern for eliminating all forms of 
corruption in procurement as an objective.23 Anti-corruption policies have become a 
major focus of the Bank in enforcing the rules in financed projects, the details of which 
will be discussed below.  
4.4   Institutional Arrangements under World Bank Procurement 
The World Bank, properly referred to as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, has 184 member states of which Ghana is one. The Bank’s headquarters 
is in USA where policy making decisions are usually taken although some 
                                                          
18 Procurement Guidelines s.1.8. 
19 Procurement Guidelines s.1.2(d); Consultant Guidelines s.1.4(e). 
20 S. Schooner, "Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law," (2002) 11 Public Procurement 
Law Review, p.106. 
21 Procurement Guidelines s.1.2(c); Consultant Guidelines s.1.4(d). 
22 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.55. 
23 Procurement Guidelines s.1.16; Consultant Guidelines s.1.23. 
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implementation decisions are taken at the regional or country level through obtaining 
appropriate clearance as will be seen below. The Bank has a country office in Ghana 
and similar to its other country offices in many other African countries, this is used to 
coordinate regional projects funded by the Bank.  
The office of the World Bank in Ghana is led by a Country Director and a Programme 
Manager who are also responsible for some other neighbouring African country offices 
of the Bank (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in particular). The Country Director and 
the Programme Manager are responsible for liaising with the Government of Ghana on 
all Bank projects and overseeing the Bank’s lending portfolio in Ghana.24 In particular, 
the Country Director is also responsible for issuing misprocurement for procurement 
conducted in violation of the rules.25 Other major institutions or units involved in carrying 
out procurement funded by the Bank are discussed below; 
4.4.1 World Bank Institutions Involved in Procurement 
Procurement Specialists: These are the Bank’s staff with expertise in procurement 
usually working with the country offices and serves as the main intermediary in 
communicating the position of the Bank to the borrower.26 The PS supports the Team 
Leader in ensuring procurement is carried out according to the Bank’s rules by granting 
no-objection approval on procurement decisions.27 PS play a key role in providing 
operational support and making recommendations on reports submitted by the Borrower 
to obtain no-objection approvals. 
4.4.2 National Institutions Involved in Procurement 
The Implementing Agency: This agency refers to a national institution which 
implements Bank funded projects. Implementing Agency is a terminology used by the 
World Bank and some other development partners when referring to the Borrower’s 
institution responsible for carrying out procurement funded by the donor. The 
implementing agency is usually responsible for preparing the project plan in consultation 
with the Bank and receives the funds on behalf of the Government of Ghana for 
implementing the project. The decision on which government institution to be appointed 
as the Implementing Agency for projects funded by the Bank is determined by several 
factors including the type of project involved and the capability of the institution to 
support the facilities needed for carrying out the project. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture with its capacity in agricultural matters, will usually be the designated 
implementing agency for farm irrigation projects funded by the Bank.28 
Project Implementation Units (PIU): This is a separate, usually stand-alone 
department created by the Bank and many other donors for implementing funded 
projects on behalf of the implementing agency. Technically, the PIU is a department 
                                                          
24 The World Bank Operations Manual, BP 11.00, Annex A. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 The World Bank Operations Manual, BP 11.00, para 3. 
28 Information obtained by the author in an interview with procurement officials at the Ministry of Finance in Ghana 
who wishes to remain anonymous.  
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under the Implementing Agency but it is often a separate Bank-funded department on its 
own. The PIU, may be housed either within or outside the implementing agency, having 
a separate budget allocated for their operations including the payment of staff.29  
In practice, PIUs may either be separate stand-alone units or integrated into the 
implementing agency, consisting of permanent domestic civil servants. PIUs in Ghana 
are often permanent departments of Implementing Agencies. For example, the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning as an Implementing Agency, has a World Bank 
Desk, with similar desks for some other donors, which are permanent departments 
under the Ministry for handling current and future projects financed by the Bank.  
Functions of PIUs are comparable with Procurement Units existing within the national 
Procurement Entity (the latter being referred to as Implementing Agency under Bank 
funded projects). However, the creation of PIUs has been largely justified by the need to 
mitigate risks in weak capacity environments such as Ghana and the need for speed in 
project implementation and disbursement of funds.30  
Staff of PIUs are made up of procurement experts selected by the Implementing Agency 
in consultation with the Bank. Experts are usually selected from the private sector as 
consultants but also from the public sector, made up of domestic public servants with 
knowledge of procurement. These public servants are usually permanent staff either 
within the specific Implementing Agency or transferred from a different government 
institution that is not concerned with the current Bank project.  
Significantly, the same procurement officers are often responsible for carrying out both 
domestic and donor funded procurement rather than states having officers specialised 
in conducting only domestic or only donor funded procurement. Where the PIU is a 
permanent unit of the implementing agency, it implies that permanent officers applying 
national rules may also remain permanent staff of the PIU. This implies that 
procurement officers who normally apply national procurement rules, are also required 
to apply World Bank rules for the Bank’s funded procurement.31  
A more practical and complex scenario exist where different donors finance projects at 
the same time and implemented by the same institution. This requires creating several 
PIUs for each project (either stand-alone or integrated units) under the same 
implementing agency. The role of such permanent government officers on the PIUs 
becomes multiple-fold; ensuring the successful project implementation according to the 
Bank’s Guidelines and according to the rules of other donors, in addition to their 
traditional role of implementing domestic procurement rules for projects funded from 
national resources.  
                                                          
29 Information obtained from an interview with a Procurement Specialist in Ghana on 21 November 2013, (information 
on file with author). 
30 Asian Development Bank, Questioning the Role of Project Implementation Units, Special Evaluation Study on 
Project Evaluation Units (Operations Evaluation Department, 2005).  
31 Information obtained by the author during a working visit and interviews in Ghana. 
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4.5   Structural Procedures under World Bank Procurement  
Bank-financed projects follow a well-documented Project Cycle. For the duration of the 
Project Cycle which could last over several years, the Bank and the borrower works 
closely together. The Procurement Cycle comprises of six stages; Identification, 
Preparation, Appraisal, Negotiation and loan approval, Implementation and supervision, 
and Evaluation.32 Particularly, the Preparation and the Implementation and supervision 
stages are important phases in terms of procurement since many, though not 
exclusively, procurement specific decisions are taken at these stages.  
The Project Preparation involves procurement planning where proposals are made for 
example, on the types of contracts and the bidding documents required.33 In principle, 
the responsibility of project preparation rests on the Implementing Agency but the 
Bank’s staff provide operational support including setting out thresholds for prior and 
post reviews. The level of Bank supervision is determined by the identified nature of 
risks and capacity of the Implementing Agency.  
After negotiations have taken place and the loan approved, the project enters the 
Implementation and Supervision stage which involves carrying out the actual 
procurement including identification of suitable suppliers. Disbursement of the loan is 
conditional on fulfilment of the procurement plan.34 
4.5.1 Harmonisation and Use of Country Systems  
The World Bank cooperates with other multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to 
standardise bidding documents, referred to as Harmonised Master Procurement 
Documents among other initiatives.35 These initiatives involve only specific participating 
donors with minimal engagement particularly with borrowers. Though this approach to 
harmonisation could create standardisation and bring greater similarity between the 
multiple procedures in Ghana, it does not eliminate parallel implementation of 
procedures. The approach rather widens the distinction between the process of 
harmonisation and the use of country systems which implies that achieving the use of 
country systems is likely to render harmonisation initiatives redundant in some cases. 
The Bank proposed a three-stage piloting programme for the use of country systems.36 
It describes use of country systems as the use of the procurement procedures 
contemplated in the domestic system and found to be acceptable to the Bank.37 Stage 
                                                          
32 For more information on the World Bank’s Project Cycle, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:20109658~pagePK
:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266~isCURL:Y,00.html (accessed 3 March 2016). 
33 The World Bank Operations Manual, BP 11.00 para 12. 
34 The World Bank Operations Manual OP 12.00 para 1. 
35 E. Nwogwugwu, 'Towards the Harmonisation of International Procurement Policies and Practices', (2005) 3 Public 
Procurement Law Review, p.139; For more information on harmonised procurement documents, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:22989220~menuPK:81
18597~pagePK:8271521~piPK:8271523~theSitePK:84266,00.html (accessed 3 March 2016). 
36 World Bank, Use of Country Procurement Systems in Bank-Supported Operations: Proposed Piloting Program 
(Operations Policy and Country Services, May 2008), available for download at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Use.of.Country.Systems.March.20.Version.for.Di
sclosure.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). 
37 Procurement Guidelines s.3.20; Consultant Guidelines s.3.12. 
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one involves assessing the overall quality such as CPAR of selected countries 
procurement system.38 Stage two involves a series of assessments to determine 
whether the domestic framework is “consistent” and “equivalent” to the Bank’s principles 
and policies such as competition.39 The Bank provides three instances where it may 
deviate from a strict interpretation of provisions in its Guidelines; a) use of domestic 
Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs) found to be consistent with the Bank’s SBDs, b) 
advertisement in national language and c) use of local currency. In all other cases, 
assessment at this stage will ensure that procurement under the domestic policies 
achieve substantially the same results as the Bank’s funded procurement. Stage three 
involves assessment on compliance, performance, capacity and fiduciary risks at the 
implementing agency level.40  
Ghana, at the request of its Government, is among four other African states involved in 
the UCS pilot programme. However, the report on Ghana’s stage I assessment show 
the need for further domestic reforms in order to qualify for stage II assessment.41 
Particular weaknesses in the report concern the need to enhance institutional 
development capacity, transparency and strengthening of procurement operations 
among others.42 Indeed, the domestic legal framework including the rules and methods 
achieved the required standards whiles the main weaknesses remain in the institutional 
framework. This finding could mean that perhaps, the Bank may use domestic rules on 
procurement methods but within the Bank’s monitoring and supervision framework to 
address the domestic institutional weaknesses. Out of a total of 20 candidate countries 
initially participating in the project, only 2 countries (Rwanda and Senegal) have 
received a conditional approval to proceed to stage III.43 It is quite clear that the UCS 
programme failed to achieve its objectives as there was no identifiable project that could 
rely entirely on country systems for its implementation.44 The Bank acknowledges the 
failure of the programme and has since discontinued its implementation.45    
Indeed, as the general assessment results show, the Bank does not actually let 
countries use their own systems as the Bank seems to insist all countries have systems 
that comply with its extremely detailed and specific requirements. The Bank however, 
asserts the policy is rather a progressive reliance on strengthened country systems.46 
This implies the use of country systems is based on conditions that existing national 
systems undergo significant reform, many of which are being financed and eventually 
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influenced by the Bank. Perhaps, the Bank’s ongoing reform programme could present 
a flexible approach to the use of country systems, moving away from its one-size-fits-all 
approach to perhaps, using domestic systems on specific procurement stages such as 
the domestic rules and procedures on procurement methods or domestic standard 
bidding documents.  
4.6   World Bank Guidelines: Scope of Application  
The Bank’s guidelines, are applicable to all contracts financed in whole or in part from 
Bank loans.47 The scope of application of the Bank’s rules with relevance for issues of 
multiplicity are as follows.  
4.6.1 Co-Financing 
A practical and complex situation of multiplicity is under co-financing where two or more 
donors combine resources to finance a project. In such cases, the Bank becomes one 
of several sources of finance for the specific project. The extent to which the Bank’s 
rules are applicable to its funded procurement in such co-financing situations is in two 
folds:  
1) Procurement under joint financing arrangement; this is a type of co-financing 
where financing of the same contracts is shared between the Bank and other co-
financiers in agreed proportions. In this case, the Bank’s rules are applicable to 
only portions financed by the Bank whilst the borrower is allowed to adopt other 
rules that may apply to the remaining portion of the contract.48 In practice 
however, the Bank do not allow the borrower to determine the rules applicable to 
the remaining portion of the contract. The Bank’s rules are made applicable to all 
contracts including those not financed by the Bank under joint financing 
arrangement.49 The procedures and responsibilities of the Bank in this case, 
generally remain the same as in situations where it wholly finances a project.  
2) Procurement under parallel financing arrangement; this is a type of co-
financing agreement where the Bank and other co-financiers finance different 
contracts under the same project. This is the most common type of co-financing 
arrangement used in Ghana but also more generally.50 This could be explained 
perhaps by the relative flexibility and less complexity in applying a single set of 
rules to a particular contract.  Under this arrangement, the project can be divided 
into different contracts and each co-financier can finance different contracts 
under the same project. Each contract may be awarded in accordance with the 
procurement rules imposed by the donor for that specific contract. The Bank’s 
rules in this respect are applicable to only portions of the project financed by the 
Bank. The responsibilities of the Bank are also limited to only portions of the 
project it finances. Since most donors have specific requirements for the use of 
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their funds which differ through for example applicability or eligibility rules, 
parallel financing arrangements are often used under co-financed projects. In 
practice, many co-financed projects in Ghana are a combination of joint and 
parallel financing arrangements.51 The Bank usually co-finances projects with a 
number of donors including the EU, African Development Bank, individual EU 
donor member states including Netherlands, UK and Switzerland. The number of 
co-financiers for a particular project usually differs and may depend on the level 
of negotiation on several issues including the extent of divergence or similarity in 
donor requirements. The Bank usually contributes the largest proportion which 
could be up to 80% of the amount particularly in cases where there are only few 
co-financiers.52  
The scenarios described above under both joint and parallel co-financing arrangement, 
increases the level of complexity in the system with regards to the application of multiple 
rules. The complex co-financing implementation arrangement is likely to place undue 
practical burden on domestic officials carrying out the procurement but also the burden 
could be felt by potential bidders. For example, procurement officials in Ghana in some 
cases, may specify the same procurement requirements on different template 
documents and formats as issued by the different co-financiers.53 Suppliers may also be 
required to duplicate the preparation of their proposals and present their offers in 
different formats as required by the different co-financiers.  
Procurement officials in both scenarios above will be required to apply different rules for 
contracts under the same project. These procurement officials are regular civil servants 
who also conduct procurement according to the domestic rules and are called upon only 
occasionally to conduct donor funded procurement so that familiarity with donor rules is 
less than perhaps expected. These officials are expected to acquire the necessary 
capacity after a short and intensive training workshops in order to fully comply with all 
aspects of the different donor requirements. The time spent in capacity building 
workshops on donor procedures may be lost in undertaking their regular duties under 
the national system. Some of these problems faced by procurement officials have been 
described as “capacity erosion” where many of the officials often become confused on 
what rules needed to be followed.54  
On the part of potential bidders, they will be required to comply with different 
requirements for each offer they make under the same project. Meanwhile, these 
potential bidders are more often than not, excluded from training programmes on donor 
procedures. They are usually left with instructions (which may not always be clearly set 
out) to follow in order to submit their bids. Moreover, procurement opportunities under 
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the same project may become fragmented and published at different locations required 
by each donor. Identification of procurement opportunities may become time consuming 
and pose extra difficulty for the participation of potential bidders.  
4.7   Procurement Methods 
The Bank’s applicable procurement methods usually depend on the nature of projects 
and indeed, not all available procurement methods under the World Bank regime are 
applied in Ghana. Discussions under this section will be limited to methods of 
procurement under World Bank regime that are applied in Ghana which may have the 
potential for causing duplications. 
4.7.1 International Competitive Bidding 
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) is the terminology used under the World Bank 
regime when referring to an open competitive method of procurement for goods, works 
and non-consultant services. It requires open and adequate notification to potential 
suppliers through formal open procedures including public notice and public opening of 
bids.55 It is the default method of procurement for goods, works and non-consultant 
services which allows participation of all eligible suppliers.56 This method is comparable 
to the “open tendering” procedure which is the default method used under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as adopted in Ghana and many other African systems.57 
Domestic preferences are allowed only under ICB procedures.58 With the agreement of 
the Bank, the borrower may grant a margin of preference for national goods and 
works.59 The World Bank provisions on domestic preferences are comparable with the 
preference scheme available under the UNCITRAL Model Law which is also available 
under the domestic law of Ghana and many African systems.60  
4.7.2 National Competitive Bidding 
National Competitive Bidding (NCB) is described as the competitive method of 
procurement normally available under the national system. NCB may be used where 
foreign bidders are not expected to express interest in the opportunities and contracts 
are unlikely to attract foreign competition due to their nature and scope.61 Advertising is 
limited to national media and bidding documents may be prepared only in national 
language whiles price quotations also in the national currency. The Bank may allow the 
use of other domestic procedures related to the NCB method such as the use of 
national bidding documents on conditions of their acceptability to the Bank. However, it 
appears that in practice, the Bank rarely uses national procedures without significant 
modifications.62 For example, the Bank’s funded NCB procedures do not allow 
preference schemes unlike the case under the domestic system. One could argue that 
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provisions relating to domestic preference under World Bank regime are perhaps 
inconsistent for allowing preferences under ICB method but not under its NCB 
procedure despite the identical principal features of both ICB and NCB including the 
participation of foreign bidders.  
In effect, the Bank’s funded NCB procedures are not applied in the same manner as 
those under the domestic system. Domestic NCB procedures are seen as a form of 
template and a basis for introducing modifications that demonstrate the principles of 
transparency, publicity and equal treatment.63 The Bank allows minimal deviation from 
its default ICB requirements. In Ghana, such deviations likely to be acceptable under 
the NCB method are the limitations on advertisement to national media and the use of 
national currency.   
4.7.3 Two-stage Bidding 
A two-stage bidding procedure is used for complex contracts such as complex 
information technology or turnkey projects, where it may be undesirable or impractical to 
prepare a complete technical specification in advance.64 The Bank may require the use 
of a two-stage bidding procedure under which firstly, unpriced technical proposals on 
the basis of a conceptual design or performance specifications are invited at the first 
stage, subject to technical as well as commercial clarifications and adjustments. 
Subsequently, the bidding documents are amended and final technical and priced bids 
are submitted at the second stage. This procedure is similar to the two-stage tendering 
procedure under the UNCITRAL Model Law65 which has been applied in Ghana66 and 
many African countries. 
4.7.4 Framework Agreements  
The Bank adopts both single and multi-supplier framework where prices are either pre-
agreed, or determined at the call-off stage through competition or a process that allows 
their revision without further competition.67 In Ghana, the Bank uses a modified version 
of the single supplier framework usually applicable under domestic system,68 but with 
due regard for NCB principles including fair and open competition.69  
The procurement methods described above could be seen as similar in many respects 
to those applicable in many other regimes including the domestic and UNCITRAL 
regimes. For example, conditions for the use of methods other than the preferred open 
competition method are largely similar in the regimes under consideration whilst any 
differences are noticeable mainly in the use of terminologies. 
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4.8   Publicity for Contracts 
Two types of notices shall be submitted to the Bank for publication; firstly, the General 
Procurement Notice (GPN)70 which is an advance notice of upcoming procurement. 
Secondly, the Specific Procurement Notice (SPN)71 which is an invitation to bid on 
readily available opportunities. Only the latter notice on readily available opportunities is 
required in Ghana as indicated above.72   
The location of both publications to be arranged by the Bank is in UN Development 
Business online (UNDB online) and on the Bank’s external website.73 Additional 
requirement for SPN publication is at least one newspaper of national circulation, official 
gazette or a widely used website.74 In Ghana, Bank-funded contract opportunities are 
usually published on the website of the PPA.75 
4.9    Qualification of Bidders 
Except where pre-qualification procedure is used, qualification generally in Bank-funded 
projects is essentially post-qualification. According to the guidelines, “…the Borrower 
shall determine whether the bidder whose bid has been determined to offer the lowest 
evaluated cost has the capability and resources to effectively carry out the contract. If 
the bidder does not meet the requirements, the bid shall be rejected and the Borrower 
shall make a similar determination for the next-lowest evaluated bidder”.76 This implies 
that only a bidder to whom the borrower wishes to award the contract shall undergo 
qualification process to determine its capability to carry out the contract.  
This position is rather different in terms of procedure under the domestic rules as 
modelled under the UNCITRAL Model Law. As provided under the Model Law, 
qualification generally is determined at any stage as part of the procurement process.77 
The post-qualification procedure under Bank-funded procurement perhaps prevent the 
need for bidders to go through the difficulty of demonstrating qualification if they might 
not win the contract. This may reduce the administrative burden on the borrower who 
will not need to qualify all bids but only bids of preferred bidders until one is determined 
to be qualified.  
4.10 Standards and Specifications  
According to the guidelines, “standards and specifications quoted in bidding documents 
shall promote the broadest possible competition while assuring the critical performance 
or other requirements…”78 Bidding documents must state in all cases that tenders that 
meet other standards, and offer at least “substantial equivalence”, will also be 
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accepted.79 Reference to specifications shall be based on relevant characteristics or 
performance requirements.80 This implies brand names, catalogue numbers or similar 
classifications may not be used unless necessary. In such cases, the use of the words 
“or equivalent”81 is required to clearly state the willingness to accept equivalent 
products.  
These provisions are similar to those required under the domestic regime and under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.82 The domestic regime in particular, emphasise the importance 
of clarity in drawing up specifications and the need to promote competition through the 
use of internationally accepted standards of specification.83 
4.11 Evaluation and Contract Award  
After a mandatory public bid opening,84 bids are examined to ensure they are 
substantially responsive to the bidding documents.85 The concept of substantial 
responsiveness implies that bids must generally conform to requirements spelt out in 
bidding documents and deviations will be allowed only to the extent that they are minor 
and does not materially depart from the terms spelt out in the bidding documents. In 
order to closely analyse the problems of multiple regimes, the issue of responsiveness 
and correction of errors in tenders will be discussed in chapter 7.  
Evaluation involves comparison of the bids to determine the lowest evaluated bid, taking 
into account the price and other relevant factors. The Bank requires factors other than 
price which will be considered in evaluation, be expressed in monetary terms where 
practicable and also allows relative weights to be given to the criteria in some cases.86 
The position is similar to those applicable under the domestic rules of Ghana and the 
UNCITRAL Model and ensures that decisions are not bias.87 
The award criterion applied by the Bank is the lowest evaluated substantially responsive 
price, which implies that the contract is not necessarily awarded to the lowest price 
bidder.88 Once the evaluation decision has been made, post-qualification will be 
conducted to determine whether the lowest evaluated price bidder is capable of 
effectively carrying out the terms of the contract. The contract will then be awarded to 
the bidder whose bid is substantially responsive and offers the lowest evaluated price. 
The Bank’s provisions on the award criteria are also similar in many respects to those 
applicable under the domestic regime of Ghana as adopted under the Model Law.89  
                                                          
79 Ibid.  
80 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.20. 
81 Ibid.  
82 See discussion in section 3.4.1. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.45. 
85 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.48. 
86 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.52. 
87 See discussions in section 3.9. 
88 Procurement Guidelines s. 2.59. 
89 See discussions in section 3.10. 
66 
 
4.12 Procurement of Consultant Services 
The Bank regards consultant services - which is generally of an intellectual nature - 
differently from the procurement of goods, works and non-consultant services. The Bank 
implements a different set of rules (Consultant Guidelines) for procurement of consultant 
services. This incorporates the Bank’s core principles including competition but does not 
use the Bank’s classic ICB method.  
As indicated earlier,90 Ghana adopts a separate set of rules for the procurement of 
consultant services mainly due to the influence of the World Bank and the 1994 version 
of the Model Law. The 1994 version of the Model Law had the separate method system 
until that was changed in the 2011 version which now allows the use of the same range 
of methods for all forms of procurement.91 The Bank places greater emphasis on quality 
service rather than price and believes that quality will not necessarily be achieved by its 
default ICB method. However, the separate methods for consultancy services could be 
seen as variations or flexibilities in the standard methods of procurement under other 
forms of procurement.92 This perhaps provides a justification for the approach adopted 
by the 2011 version of the Model Law in applying the same range of methods for all 
forms of procurement. 
The Bank’s selection procedures follow competition among shortlisted firms, based on 
the quality of proposals and, where appropriate, on the cost of the services to be 
provided.93 The detailed Bank’s rules focus mainly on Quality and Cost Based Selection 
(QCBS) as the most recommended and expected selection method. Indeed, the most 
common selection method used under Bank-financed projects in Ghana is the Quality 
and Cost Based Selection.94 However, other alternative methods such as Quality Based 
Selection (QBS) and Least Cost Selection considered to be more appropriate are also 
provided with the circumstances and conditions under which they may be used. 
The terms “selection” and “shortlisting” are terminologies used under different regimes 
referring to different but also sometimes similar procedures. In general, the terms are 
often used, though not in a strict sense, under procurement for consultant services. 
Under the World Bank, the term “selection” refers to the procedures for identifying 
qualified bidders generally, which includes choosing the most suitable bidder for 
contract award. Shortlisting on the other hand, could be seen as a stage in the selection 
procedure which involves reducing the number of permitted and qualified bidders in the 
process. This definition is similar to the use of the same terms under the domestic law of 
Ghana, probably due to the influence of the Bank’s procedures, particularly the 
procedures for selecting consultants.95 The UNCITRAL regime presents an interesting 
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comparison with no reference to shortlisting96 but prefer using “pre-selection” in referring 
to shortlisting as defined in this paper.97  
4.13 Enforcement Mechanism under World Bank Regime  
This section examines the enforcement mechanisms under World Bank funded projects 
as an important means of ensuring compliance with its rules. The section first considers 
the review procedure led by the Bank as the primary means of enforcement. The role of 
bidders in enforcing the rules of the Bank will then be discussed. Also, the possibility of 
obtaining review in accordance with domestic law will be considered, followed by 
discussions on the Bank’s provisions on exclusions. 
 The Bank’s approach to enforcement is to adopt a generally administrative oversight 
role with the use of its internal mechanisms to review and enforce compliance with the 
rules.98 A reason for the Bank’s approach could be the nature of its relationship defined 
as a non-party to the procurement contract but rather a supervisory role as part of its 
fiduciary duty to ensure proper use of funds. The Bank perhaps acts as an external 
enforcement agent with an impartial perspective in ensuring compliance with the rules. 
Moreover, the use of supplier-led review could imply delegating some of the Bank’s 
fiduciary duty to suppliers, which the Bank may be unwilling to allow so as to reduce 
some of the associated risks such as the risk of supplier and borrower arrangements to 
conceal misuse of funds. In this respect, the Bank adopts an approach to review not 
based on the dissatisfaction and grievances of bidders but rather based on reassuring 
the lender of the borrower’s compliance. The enforcement mechanisms available under 
Bank financed projects are outlined below.  
4.13.1   Bank-led Review Procedures 
Review led by the Bank itself appears to be the primary mechanism for enforcing 
compliance with the Bank’s rules. The Bank’s staff often review procurement 
documentation submitted by the implementing agency to ensure that all aspects of the 
process is in compliance with the agreed Bank’s procedures. Review conducted by the 
Bank usually takes three main forms; firstly, a prior review at specified stages of the 
procurement process where a no-objection letter from the Bank is an important piece of 
information which the implementing agency requires in order to proceed to the next 
stage of the procurement process. Secondly, a post review involving the verification of 
random sample of awarded contracts and procurement related documentation. Thirdly, 
an audit of some procurement processes.99 The description and form of review 
procedure to be conducted is determined by the Loan Agreement whilst the 
Procurement Plan and the Procurement Supervision Plan specifies the extent to which 
the review procedures shall apply.100  
                                                          
96 Arrowsmith et al, (note 8 above), p.645.  
97 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011), art. 2(h). 
98 J. F. Weiss and D. Kalogeras, 'The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Procurement for Development Assistance', 
(2005) 14(1) Public Procurement Law Review, p.10. 
99 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.13; Consultant Guidelines s. 1.16. 
100 Ibid; The World Bank Operations Manual BP 11.00 para 20.  
68 
 
In situations where the Bank finances several contracts at the same time as part of the 
same larger project - which is usually the case in Ghana - the procurement officer is 
likely to be confused with the burden of identifying which of the many contracts require 
prior or post review with different applicable threshold values and under what 
circumstances. Some procurement officers in Ghana have come to acknowledge that 
many donors including the World Bank require some form of approval at some stage in 
the procurement process irrespective of what terminology is used to describe the 
approval note.101 This situation has the potential to limit procurement officers from taking 
initiatives and adopting innovative approaches to procurement. For example, supposing 
the Bank issues approval note accompanied by its recommendations on a decision 
submitted by the procurement officer, any deviation from the Bank’s advice may result in 
cancellation of the contract. In such cases, the procurement officer may become 
reluctant to initiate decisions or adopt innovative approaches to decision making since 
such decisions may be weakened by the Bank’s approval recommendations. As a 
result, the development of local skills and expertise will be limited. 
There are some instances in Ghana where procurement documentation submitted by 
the implementing agency is determined not to comply with agreed procedures, for 
example, where contract award recommendations were made based on undisclosed 
criteria.102 The Bank in cases of prior review, may advise the implementing agency to 
make corrections and re-submit the documentation for further verification and approval. 
Many of the cases of non-compliance in Ghana generally, appear to be considered as 
minor deviations which could be corrected.103 However, such minor deviations have the 
potential of causing significant delays in project implementation. Though the decision to 
cancel the loan is not a common practice, the thread of action remains a powerful 
weapon to guard against the occurrence of breaches.104  
The Bank’s review process in Ghana involves close consultation and collaboration with 
the implementing agency throughout the procurement process. The implementing 
agency may continually seek the Bank’s advice through several informal lines of 
communication (which are not legally required) even before submitting procurement 
documentation for approval.105 These consultations allows the implementing agency to 
implement the rules correctly and minimise errors. An adverse effect however, could be 
overreliance and perhaps the transfer of significant decision making to Bank staff as 
discussed above. For the Bank, it could imply that review of such documentation need 
not be thorough since the Bank may already be aware of the information on the 
documentation through previous frequent communication. 
The review procedure of the Bank is comparable, to some extent with the enforcement 
role of the PPA under the domestic system, particularly the prior approval of specified 
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procedures including single source procedures and the use of procurement audits under 
the domestic system. A major difference is that, whiles prior approval by the Bank is 
usually required at several stages in the procurement process, prior approval by PPA is 
a one-off approval which occurs at a specific stage, usually before the procurement 
begins.106 Apart from the Bank’s power to cancel the loan as its weapon for 
enforcement, other differences in the regimes are seen in the level of support and 
guidance for the institutions undertaking the procurement.107  
4.13.2   The Role of Bidders in Law Enforcement 
Bidders have the responsibility to raise any issues concerning the bidding documents or 
any other issues on the procedure to the implementing agency.108 Bidders are also free 
to notify the Bank on correspondence with the implementing agency where such 
communications relate to a complaint or inaction.109 In such cases, the Bank has 
internal measures for dealing with the complaints as will be seen below.  
It is quite unclear what kind of comments or advice is given by the Bank and what kind 
of actions the implementing agency is required to take in respect of complaints. It is 
envisaged that the possible actions may be in the form of clarifying and correcting the 
mistakes identified. In Ghana, bidders sometimes call on the implementing agency (who 
intend seek advice from the Bank) to clarify some information relating to the bidding 
documents or the procurement procedure in general.110 However, supposing such 
clarifications in fact, point out violations caused by the implementing agency who may 
be acting on the advice from the Bank and the available form of corrective measure is 
unlikely to ensure application of the Bank’s core principles of fairness and equal 
opportunity for aggrieved bidders. How does the Bank address such situations? 
Moreover, supposing the practical situation of bidders wanting to make complaints to 
the Bank or have some kind of redress on issues other than those relating to the bidding 
documents as expressly allowed by the Bank, how are those other issues addressed? 
The Bank’s rules appear to have no specific provision addressing such situations. The 
informal role of bidders adopted by the Bank implies that aggrieved bidders have no 
specific challenge rights and remedies. This could be a result of the carefully drafted 
relationship of the parties involved as indicated above. The final contract award usually 
includes challenge rights, often through arbitration with possible remedies for only 
bidders who actually signed the procurement contract but not for bidders aggrieved from 
the time leading to the procurement contract.111 For bidders aggrieved from the time 
leading to contract awards, remedies are generally not available. The Bank is also able 
to avoid further communication with bidders apart from acknowledging receipt of 
complaints.112 In this respect, one could argue that there is no real benefit of fairness for 
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bidders and participation in Bank-funded procurement may become a risk for bidders 
which they could incorporate into bid prices. This may create a disincentive for bidders 
to participate in Bank-funded projects.  
Where the Bank allows complaints to be submitted, it is at the discretion of bidders 
whether or not to send their complaints to the Bank. Submitting complains to the Bank 
has some benefits since the Bank established internal arrangements for handling such 
complaints.113 Moreover, the threat of the bank declaring misprocurement where such 
complaints are determined to be violations may force the implementing agency to 
resolve the complaint as indicated above. In cases of prior review, the Bank will not 
issue its no-objection letter until complaints have been satisfactorily resolved.114 This 
procedure could ensure that complaints from bidders are given the necessary attention 
if not effectively resolved. Despite the limitations with this procedure such as the lack of 
time frame for complaint resolution, the procedure still provides a better option for 
bidders to get their complaints resolved.  
It appears that the role of bidders in enforcing compliance with the rules under Bank-
funded procurement is significantly limited. In Ghana, very few complaints have been 
received from bidders,115 perhaps due to the strict review procedure conducted by the 
Bank or rather due to the absence of enforceable complaint rights and remedies. Where 
these complaints are raised, they are usually resolved at an early stage, sometimes 
through the frequent communication between the institutions as discussed above 
without necessarily using the Bank’s formal internal procedure.116 An aggrieved bidder 
is likely to go only as far as getting a meeting arranged with the Bank which is only 
intended for the bidder to ascertain the grounds on which his bid was not selected.117 
Any issues raised by bidders in this respect is likely to draw the attention of the Bank to 
probably tighten its oversight duty and further reinforce the Bank’s review procedure.   
4.13.3   Possible review under Domestic Law 
Introduction  
It was noted that the Loan Agreement has the status of a treaty agreement which is 
governed by international law and as such, the Government of Ghana cannot rely on 
national legislation as a reason not to fulfil its obligations under the Loan Agreement.118 
However, there appears to be some gaps and overlaps in the rules which create the 
possibility for enforcing the Bank’s rules based on domestic law. This possibility may not 
be uncommon given the fact that some domestic rules have precedence over the 
Bank’s Guidelines as will be seen below and domestic rules could also become relevant 
                                                          
113 The World Bank Operations Manual BP 11.00 Annex E. 
114 Ibid, para 8. 
115 A World Bank procurement staff in Ghana who wishes to remain anonymous, indicated during an interview with 
the author that he witnessed just one complaint from a bidder over the past two years. It should be noted however 
that the Procurement Specialist is not involved with every World Bank project in Ghana over the period stated, (28 
November 2013). 
116 Ibid.  
117 Procurement Guidelines Appendix 3 para 15; Consultant Guidelines Appendix 3 para 15. 
118 See discussions in section 4.2. 
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where applicable foreign rules are unclear or have no specific provisions on a subject 
matter.119  
The Constitution of Ghana as the sovereign domestic law provides the authority on 
which other laws, including national regulations and international agreements may be 
derived.120 The Constitution has precedence over the Procurement Act of Ghana and 
the Loan Agreement as the basis for implementing the Bank’s rules. This implies that 
Constitutional provisions relevant to procurement cannot be displaced by requirements 
in the Loan Agreement and the Procurement Act since the former provides the authority 
for the application of the latter. This is confirmed in a Supreme Court ruling in Ghana 
which held that laws including international law, regional and municipal laws which are 
found to be inconsistent with the Constitution cannot be binding on the State whatever 
their nature.121  
Review Based on Domestic Constitutional Principles 
The general principles of administrative justice enshrined in the Constitution of Ghana 
provide that “administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and 
reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons 
aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek 
redress before a court or other tribunal.”122 This provision subjects acts of administrative 
authorities in Ghana to challenge by aggrieved persons. This implies implementing 
agencies under Bank-funded projects could be challenged by aggrieved bidders under 
the Constitution of Ghana. The significance of this provision lies in the fact that suppliers 
have a general right to challenge breach of the Bank’s rules in the High Courts through 
a judicial review process.123  
A more specific situation where bidders could also rely on the Constitution of Ghana to 
seek redress is provided in Article 181(5) where “this article (requiring parliamentary 
approval for government loans) shall… apply to an international business or economic 
transaction to which the Government is a party as it applies to a loan.” A bidder relying 
on this provision may be required to demonstrate 1) the existence of a contract for a 
transaction, funded with a loan to which the Government is a party and 2) such contract 
having the nature of an “international business”. In respect of the first requirement, 
perhaps only the successful bidder who actually signed the procurement contract could 
rely on the provision. The reverse situation where the Government of Ghana as a party 
to an existing contract, relied on this provision to seek cancelation of the contract was 
seen in a case law discussed under Chapter 3.124  
                                                          
119 J. H. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis', (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law, p.310-340. 
120 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), art. 2. 
121 NPP v Attorney-General (1996-97) SCGLR 729. 
122 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (note 120 above), art. 23. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See discussions in section 3.11.8.  
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4.13.4   Provisions on General Exclusion 
The Bank’s rules have detailed provisions which exclude the participation of persons 
from its funded procurement on grounds for lack of integrity including professional 
misconduct and corruption. The Bank may also exclude participation of persons on 
grounds other than corruption such as non-fulfilment of tax obligations as will be seen 
below.  The jurisdiction of the Bank’s enforcement regime may be limited to its fiduciary 
interest and determines the extent of application to projects funded by the Bank. This 
limitation, to some extent, creates situations where enforcement of specific domestic 
rules become less effective as will be seen below. 
4.13.4.1 Exclusions on Grounds for Corruption 
The World Bank Anti-Corruption Policy 
Anti-corruption is core to the Bank’s agenda and as it builds on experience, the Bank 
continually reforms its strategy to better deal with corruption as will be seen below. The 
Bank’s anti-corruption policy is based on four key strategies; i) providing assistance to 
states that ask for help in preventing corruption, ii) contributing to the international effort 
against corruption iii) incorporating its concerns for corruption directly into country 
analysis and lending decisions and iv) preventing corruption in Bank-financed 
projects.125 As part of its policy implementation, the Bank established a formal sanctions 
procedure126  and also provides assistance to Ghana, in the form of funds and technical 
assistance for implementing anti-corruption strategies. The Bank supports Ghana in the 
fight against corruption not necessarily concerned with Bank-funded operations. For 
example, the Bank supports capacity building of national institutions and civil society 
groups including the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), which is a coalition of 
both public and private sector anti-corruption institutions.127 Also, the Bank facilitated the 
initiation of Ghana’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) and was 
instrumental in preparing the first NACAP in Ghana.128 
At the international level, the Bank is part of an International Task Force on anti-
corruption working towards a consistent and harmonised approach to fighting corruption 
in the activities of participating MDBs.129 Following the development of a Uniform 
Framework for Preventing Corruption, a Mutual Enforcement Agreement which allows 
cross debarment was adopted and includes; i) a common set of definitions for 
sanctionable conducts and ii) common principles and guidelines for investigating 
allegations of corruption.130 Cross debarment is an agreement among the MDBs to 
                                                          
125 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 (2000). 
126 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.16; Consultant Guidelines s. 1.23. 
127 The Bank has consistently provided financial support for the activities of GACC since 2000. For more information, 
see the website of GACC.  http://www.gaccgh.org/ (accessed 3 March 2016). 
128 Ghana, 2012-2021 National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (December 2011). 
129 A publicly accessible web portal is created with information on the joint activities of participating MDBs. The 
participating MDBs include the African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group. For more 
information, see http://lnadbg4.adb.org/oai001p.nsf/Home.xsp (accessed 3 March 2016). 
130 Ibid; N. Seiler and J. Madir, 'Fight against Corruption: Sanctions Regimes of Multilateral Development Banks', 
(2012) 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law, p.37; F. A. Fariello and C. Daly, 'Suspension and Debarment: 
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mutually enforce each other’s debarment sanctions.131 In this respect, the Bank may 
exclude from participation in its funded projects in Ghana, firms debarred by other MDBs 
as part of its cross-debarment commitments.  
Exclusion for Corruption  
As indicated above, the Bank’s rules have detailed provisions for excluding the 
participation of persons in its funded procurement on grounds for corruption, fraud and 
other misconducts.132 In this respect, the Bank has its own list of firms excluded on 
grounds for corruption from participation in its funded projects.133 The Bank may also 
exclude persons debarred for corruption by other MDBs under its cross debarment 
commitments as indicated above. The debarment sanction promotes its policies against 
corruption as indicated above.  
However, the Bank may not exclude bidders debarred under Ghana’s domestic law from 
participation in projects funded by the Bank.134 This position is contrary to provisions on 
debarment under the domestic law of Ghana which exclude bidders debarred under all 
regimes from participation in procurement funded by national resources.135 Though the 
Bank’s position provides a wide supplier eligibility for the its projects with the likely 
benefit of competition, the wider effect on domestic anti-corruption policies and for that 
matter, the Bank’s policy on helping States such as Ghana in the combat of corruption 
may be minimal. 
The World Bank usually allows domestic authorities to require suppliers participating in 
donor-funded procurement to comply with domestic rules on anti-corruption through the 
use of integrity pacts.136 Integrity pacts are agreements that secure the commitment of 
suppliers not to engage in corrupt activities. These are part of the Bank’s anti-corruption 
measures which ensures that suppliers comply with domestic anti-corruption rules. 
However, this policy does not prevent suppliers already debarred under domestic law 
from participating in Bank funded project. 
In exceptional cases and at the discretion of the bank, it may exclude participation of 
persons debarred for corruption under domestic law on conditions that debarment is 
issued by appropriate judicial authority to the satisfaction of the Bank.137 However, this 
exceptional case may have limited practical effect in Ghana due to the nature of the 
regulatory framework of procurement in Ghana. Firstly, according to the Procurement 
Act of Ghana as noted in Chapter 3, the duty to issue debarment sanctions is allocated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Coordinating the Fight against Corruption among MDBs: The Past, Present and Future of Sanctions', (2013) 45 
George Washington International Law Review, p.253. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Procurement Guidelines s. 1.16; Consultant Guidelines s. 1.23. 
133 For World Bank listing of ineligible firms and individuals, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266&contentMDK=64069844&menuPK=116730&pageP
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134 Procurement Guidelines s. 3.3; also see C. Yukins, ‘Suspension and Debarment: Cross-Debarment: A 
Stakeholder Analysis’, (2013) 45 George Washington International Law Review, p.219. 
135 See discussions in section 3.11.9. 




to the PPA as an administrative authority.138  As indicated earlier,139 PPA does not 
maintain its own list of debarred bidders but rather provides reference to the World 
Bank’s list of debarred bidders with little clarification as to whether the reference 
imposes a duty on procurement entities to take the list into account in decision making 
or to serve merely as guidance, though the latter is envisaged. Secondly, even where 
PPA issues debarment sanctions and creates its own list of debarred persons, its 
authority as administrative rather than judicial as required by the Bank, may render 
debarment issued by PPA unacceptable to the bank. In this respect, enforcement of 
policies issued by domestic authorities may become ineffective.  
The overall effect of the Bank’s anti-corruption policy on the domestic system could be 
two folds; on one hand, a potential negative effect from the content of its rules where 
enforcement and compliance with domestic policies become weak; and on the other 
hand, a potential positive effect from its other policies, particularly its policies aimed at 
assisting Ghana on developing a potentially harmonised and sustainable national anti-
corruption strategy as indicated above. A large proportion of procurement in Ghana is 
conducted under the rules of the Bank and any negative impact from its requirements 
could have significant effect on domestic policies relating to corruption and criminality. 
The potential for the Bank’s requirements to undermine domestic policies is applicable 
to other donors as will be seen.  
4.13.4.2 Other General Grounds for Exclusion 
As noted above, regimes including the World Bank and the domestic regime of Ghana 
usually exclude persons on grounds for corruption from participating in procurement. 
Other grounds for exclusion, apart from corruption, may be failure to fulfil tax and social 
security obligations. As indicated earlier,140 the domestic rules of Ghana indeed exclude 
the participation of persons on grounds for failure to fulfil tax and social security 
obligations in procurement funded from domestic resources. This provision secures the 
generation of revenue for the domestic regime through taxation to enable it finance 
development projects.  
However, the Bank’s rules have no explicit provision excluding persons on grounds for 
failure to fulfil tax and social security obligations. This implies the Bank may not exclude 
persons who fail to fulfil their tax and social security obligations from participating in its 
funded projects. Though the Bank’s consultant guidelines require negotiations with the 
winning bidder to include clarifications on the bidder’s tax liabilities,141 there is no 
indication of what the nature of such clarification might be, particularly whether or not it 
may include previous tax liabilities. This implies bidders who fail to fulfil their tax and 
social security obligations under the domestic system which do not involve the use of 
the Bank’s funds, may be allowed to participate and enforce their rights in World Bank 
funded projects. 
                                                          
138 See discussions in section 3.11.9. 
139 Ibid. 
140 See discussions in section 3.8. 
141 Consultant Guideline s. 2.29 
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This situation on one hand could benefit bidders with enhanced participation rights and 
likely competition in the procurement process as envisaged by the Bank’s rules 
discussed above. On the other hand, however, the policy may work against domestic 
development objectives which may outweigh the intended benefits. The ability to 
enforce domestic rules, particularly on tax obligations may be limited because a large 
proportion of procurement is implemented under World Bank rules. This could result in 
loss of revenue for the State and the inability to finance its own development projects. 





Chapter 5: Procurement under EU External Aid 
5.1   Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is an active donor in Ghana and several other developing 
countries. Over the past 10 years for example, African states were the most significant 
recipients of EU development assistances which amounts to 4.9 Billion US Dollars in 
2011.1 Development assistance for African states is perhaps enhanced by EU’s political 
commitment to reduce poverty and provide better aid as set out in its policy statement 
referred to as the European Consensus on Development.2 For example, in Ghana, EU 
alone contributed 10% of total foreign aid received from Ghana’s multiple donors.3 EU 
funding activities in Ghana are concentrated within 11 sectors, with significant focus on 
governance, environmental and infrastructure development.4  
EU external aid as used in this chapter refers to aid provided by the EU institutions, 
sometimes referred to as community aid. EU external aid is usually made up of 
contributions from its individual member states. For the purposes of this research, 
reference to EU external aid does not include aid granted directly by individual member 
states. Aid from member states is often granted through bilateral relations and subjected 
to different sets of rules and procedures set out by the member state concerned. This 
aid is usually administered and implemented through separate and perhaps less 
coordinated channels as will be seen below. This arrangement clearly leads to 
multiplicity of regimes in Ghana and raises further complications in the system, the 
details of which will not be discussed in this research.  
Moreover, not all member states may have an interest in establishing bilateral relations 
with Ghana through foreign aid. However, the EU remains one of Ghana’s major trade 
partners and many EU member states including the UK, Germany, Netherlands and 
Denmark have established bilateral relations with Ghana for several reasons. These 
relations could arise based on trade or perhaps other ties including historical, solidarity 
or geographical proximity. For example, UK has an established trade and historical ties 
with Ghana through colonial rule. 
EU external aid is developed on both thematic and geographical basis, which is 
financed from the EU General Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) 
respectively. Aid to Ghana is financed mainly on geographical basis from the EDF - 
which is an instrument for cooperation between the EU, represented by the European 
Commission (the Commission) and a group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
                                                          
1 EU Donor Atlas 2012, http://development.donoratlas.eu/ (accessed 3 March 2016). 
2 The European Consensus on Development, 2005 (2006/C 46/01). This is a Joint statement by the Council and the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and 
the Commission on EU Development Policy, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ar12544 (accessed 3 March 2016). 
3 OECD Statistics, www.oecd.org/dac/stats (accessed 3 March 2016).  
4 Ibid  
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states5 through a series of successive agreements, with the latest revision concluded in 
Ouagadougou (Partnership Agreement).6 Apart from the EDF, Ghana also benefits from 
some thematic programmes funded through the EU General Budget. For example, 
programmes aimed at promoting participation of women in domestic governance issues 
are funded through the EU General Budget.7  
As the case with other donors, aid beneficiaries including Ghana are required to apply 
procurement rules provided by the EU for implementing funded projects. These rules 
are significantly different in many respects, from the procurement rules applicable within 
the EU internal market.8 This chapter outlines the regulatory framework of procurement 
funded by the EU in Ghana with a focus on the EDF as the main funding instrument. 
Procurement funded through the EU General Budget has been extensively discussed in 
other literature9 and will also be relevant in Ghana as a result of harmonisation of the 
rules of both funding instruments as will be seen below. The role of this chapter is to 
examine the rules and procedures for EU external aid in Ghana as one of the multiple 
regimes applicable in Ghana. The significance of EU external aid regime is seen in its 
large volume of funding in Ghana as indicated above which results in the frequent 
application of its rules in Ghana.  
The chapter first outlines the legal framework for EU external funding, followed by an 
outline of its objectives and institutional arrangements. The structural procedures of the 
regime will then be considered with a discussion of its harmonisation policies and the 
practice of tied aid. The procurement methods under the regime including the applicable 
selection and awards procedures will then be discussed. The chapter will conclude with 
a discussion on the enforcement mechanism under the regime.   
5.2  Legal Framework 
The legal basis for the implementation of EU external aid procurement rules under EDF 
programmes is derived from the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement including its Annexes 
signed in Cotonou and revised in Ouagadougou.10 Particularly relevant is Chapter 4 
(Articles 19A-31) of Annex IV of the Agreement, where Article 19C (1) provides that 
“contracts shall be implemented according to the Community rules and, the standard 
procedures and documentation set and published by the Commission for the purposes 
of implementing cooperation actions with third countries and in force at the time the 
procedure in question is launched.” With this provision, the applicable rules under EU 
                                                          
5 The ACP Group comprises 78 countries. South Africa does not benefit from the EDF due to its peculiar situation 
although it belongs to the ACP Group. 
6 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 is in force for a period of 20 years, 
running from 2000 to 2020. It was revised for the first time by the Agreement signed in Luxemburg on 25 June 2005 
with the second and latest revision signed in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 (OJ 2010 L287/3). Consultations are 
ongoing towards the development of a new partnership between the EU and ACP countries after 2020. For more 
information, see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ (accessed 3 March 2016).   
7 For the list of projects implemented by the EU delegation in Ghana, see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm (accessed 3 March 2016). 
8 For analysis of the key differences between the procurement rules applicable within the EU internal market and 
those applicable to EU external aid, see P. Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s Guide, (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), Chapter 10. 
9 Ibid. 
10 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (note 6 above).  
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General Budget are stated to apply and for that matter, aligned with the rules under EDF 
programmes.  
The Partnership Agreement also defines the nature of relationship between the parties; 
the ACP state awards the contract and it is supervised by the EU or the EU may act on 
behalf of the ACP state in the award of contracts as will be seen below. The Partnership 
Agreement has the status of an international agreement, which in principle, is not 
subject to the domestic law.11 In this respect, the express exclusion on the application of 
domestic procurement law to externally funded procurement in Ghana as discussed in 
chapter 2, also guarantees the application of EU external aid rules in Ghana.  
The Partnership Agreement is a series of successive agreements with the latest being 
the 10th EDF cycle and the 11th EDF cycle is currently under negotiations.12 As 
envisaged in Article 19C (1) of Annex IV, different rules may apply under the different 
EDF programme cycles as determined by the time of launching the procurement 
procedure.  
For the purposes of implementing the Partnership Agreement, Financial Regulations 
have been adopted for the EDF programme cycle, currently the 10th EDF13 and 
applicable together with the rules and procedures adopted by decision of the ACP-EU 
Council of Ministers. Particularly, the Annex of that decision provides the rules and 
procedures for implementing the partnership Agreement.14 These regulations provide 
specific rules on the procedure for awarding contracts including the allocation of 
responsibilities as will be seen below. Several other rules which are not directed 
specifically at procurement may also be relevant and applicable to procurement funded 
under EU external aid in Ghana.15   
At the project implementation level, specific working tools have been developed to 
consolidate and simplify the legal terms and contracting procedures. The consolidated 
rules, known as the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions 
(PRAG), and includes its Annexes and standard form documents, referred to as Tender 
Dossiers. These rules are also applicable to aid financed from the EU General Budget 
with some variations and are publicly available on the Europe Aid website.16 The 
Practical Guide, revised for its relevance to the current 10th and forthcoming 11th EDF 
cycles, is essentially a guiding tool that compiles and explains the fragmented legal 
instruments applicable to procurement funded from both the EU General Budget and the 
EDF. These rules are applicable to the procurement of goods referred to as supplies, 
                                                          
11 See ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, (note 6 above), art. 91. 
12 The 10th EDF runs from 2008-2013 and the 11th EDF runs from 2014-2020. 
13 Council Regulation 370/2011 amending Regulation 215/2008 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10 th 
EDF as regards the European External Action Service. 
14 Decision 2/2002 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers regarding the implementation of Article 28, 29 and 30 of Annex 
IV to the Cotonou Agreement (OJ 2002 L320/1). 
15 For a list of other regulations applicable to EU external aid, see Chapter 7 of PRAG. 
16 Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG), publicly available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/prag/document.do (accessed 3 March 2016). 
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works and services including consultant services in Ghana, either financed in whole or 
in part from the EDF.17   
5.3   Objectives 
The underlying purpose for implementing EU external aid rules is to secure effective use 
of funds. In pursuance of this, Article 19C (2) of Annex IV under the Partnership 
Agreement provides that “where a joint assessment shows that the procedures for 
awarding contracts and grants… are in accordance with the principles of transparency, 
proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination and preclude any kind of conflict 
of interest, the Commission shall use these procedures.” In this respect, some 
fundamental principles governing the application of EU external aid rules in Ghana 
could be identified as discussed below. 
Firstly, the EU external aid rules are concerned with the principles of transparency as 
well as equal treatment and non-discrimination of eligible suppliers as outlined above. 
These principles are similar to those under the domestic system of Ghana and also 
found in other donor regimes including the World Bank as discussed earlier.18  
An objective of EU external aid is to encourage the development of local industries in 
Ghana and other ACP states as expressed in the provisions on preferential 
treatments.19 As it is under the World Bank regime, preference may be given to 
domestic suppliers or locally manufactured goods below specified threshold values 
under EU funded projects as a means of encouraging participation of local suppliers.20  
A significant difference in the objectives of the regimes however, is the requirement of 
the principle of proportionality under EDF programmes which is not explicitly required 
under the World Bank nor the domestic system of Ghana. The principle of 
proportionality as applied under the EU internal market21 requires that contract 
requirements are both necessary and relevant to the contract under procurement.22 This 
means requirements in a procurement process shall be proportional to the size and 
technicality of the required goods and services. For example, qualification and 
accreditation requirements may not be well above the level necessary in order to 
perform the contract.     
5.4   Institutional Arrangements under EU External Aid 
The institutional structure under EU external aid is complex which largely reflects 
perhaps, the complex policies and institutional arrangements within the EU internal 
market. The EU, with its 28 member states is represented by the European Commission 
when implementing EU funded programmes in Ghana. The Commission with its 
                                                          
17 Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG), section 1. 
18 See discussion in section 3.2; section 4.3. 
19 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, (note 6 above), art. 26 of Annex IV. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Treaty on European Union (TEU), art. 5(3). 
22 On the general principles of proportionality under EU law see N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in 
European Law (Kluwer Law International, 1996), p.115.  
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headquarters in Brussels has the financial responsibility for operations carried out under 
EDF funds in Ghana.23   
The Commission carries out its mandate under different management systems; firstly, it 
may implement projects by itself or through an appointed agency who acts on behalf of 
the Government of Ghana under centralised management system.24 Secondly, it may 
delegate implementation to the Government of Ghana under decentralised management 
approach.25 The latter approach is considered the default option.26 In practice however, 
the management approach varies from one sector to another or even among ACP 
states depending on a number of factors including the available domestic procedures 
and capacity of the domestic system. As a result, EU’s concept of decentralised 
management in Ghana is rather a partial decentralised management. This means only 
specific agreed upon tasks within the procurement process are carried out by the 
decentralised authorities, whiles the Commission maintains management control.  
The specific institutions engaged in EU external aid procurement in Ghana are in two 
categories; EU institution or its delegated agencies on one hand and some national 
institutions that have been assigned duties under EU funded projects as discussed 
below.  
5.4.1 EU Institutions Involved in its Funded Procurement 
 At the country level, the Commission is represented by the EU Delegation to Ghana, 
led by the Head of Delegation as will be seen below. With a country office in Ghana and 
similar establishments in many other ACP states, EU Delegations represent the EU in 
the ACP states, not only on development cooperation but also on other EU foreign 
policies including political and security issues. Within the EU Delegation in Ghana, staff 
members are drawn from two main institutions; the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) with a more political mandate on one hand and the Commission’s directorate, 
the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation Europe Aid (DEVCO), which 
has a focus on development cooperation. The internal structure of EU Delegations with 
their functional challenges is simplified for the purposes of this research.27 The main 
actors involved in procurement are the Head of Delegation and the Contract and 
Finance unit and their functions discussed below. 
Head of Delegation: The Head of Delegation represents the European Commission in 
Ghana and communicates the position of the EU to the Government of Ghana.28 
Procurement related duties of the Head of delegation include approval of procurement 
documentation submitted by the contracting authority as will be seen below.29 The Head 
                                                          
23 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, (note 6 above), art. 34 (1) of Annex IV. 
24 Ibid; PRAG section 2.2. 
25 Ibid, art. 34 (1) (b) of Annex IV; PRAG section 2.2. 
26 Ibid, art. 34 (2) of Annex IV. 
27 For more information on the complex structure and challenges of the EU Delegation in Ghana, see C. V. 
Rasmussen, Striving for Complementarity and European Development Cooperation: Evidence from Burkina Faso and 
Ghana, (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013:17) 
28 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, (note 6 above), art. 36 (1), (4) of Annex IV. 
29 Ibid, art. 34 (d) of Annex IV. 
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of delegation works closely with domestic authorities on many issues including 
launching of tender invitations and sitting as an observer in tender openings.30 In 
practice however, many of the duties of the Head of Delegation are usually sub-
delegated to other internal units as will be seen.  
Finance and Contracts Section: This is a department within the office of the EU 
Delegation to Ghana which plays a key role in facilitating implementation EU funded 
projects in Ghana. The department usually acts as sub-delegated authority and 
supports the Head of Delegation to perform its procurement related duties.31 For 
example, the department makes recommendations to the Head of Delegation for the 
approval of procurement documentation and represents the Head of Delegation at 
tender openings. The department collaborates with the contracting authority and 
manages communications between the Head of Delegations and the contracting 
authority.  
5.4.2 National Institutions Involved in EU Funded Procurement  
National Authorising officer (NAO): This refers to the domestic institution created 
specifically to support EU funded procurement as required by the EU under the 
Partnership Agreement. The NAO represents the Government of Ghana on 
development cooperation with the EU.32 The duty of the NAO is to coordinate 
programmes financed by the EU and its member states including preparing tenders.33 In 
practice however, the NAO is less involved in coordinating projects financed by 
individual member states, perhaps due to the challenges of the vast divergence in 
implementation modalities of member states.34  
In Ghana, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, led by the Minister, serves as 
the designated NAO. The role is sub-delegated to the fourth deputy NAO who has the 
daily operational responsibilities and heads the ACP-EU unit, which is a department 
created specifically to handle projects financed by the EU institution. The unit has 
internal divisions that mirror the structure within the EU Delegation in Ghana.35 There 
are several other similar donor departments created within the same ministry aimed 
specifically at managing projects funded directly by individual EU member states and 
other donors. However, the ACP-EU unit operates quite independently from these other 
similar donor departments.36 The ACP-EU unit is made up of permanent national civil 
servants who are perhaps, burdened with other duties when performing functions under 
the domestic system. 
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The NAO acts as the contracting authority and has responsibilities including tender 
publication and evaluation. In practice, the implementation duty of the NAO is often sub-
delegated to more appropriate departments who often rely on project implementation 
units (PIUs) to conduct the procurement. For example, projects for improving rural 
farming methods are usually sub-delegated to the department responsible for 
agriculture. Essentially, the NAO is often not the contracting authority and even where 
the Ministry of Finance is the sub-delegated contracting authority, the unit responsible 
for implementing the project may often be a separate department with its own personnel 
and operations.  
The approach whereby implementation duties of the NAO is sub-delegated to more 
appropriate departments could be explained perhaps by an attempt to integrate the role 
of the NAO into the decentralised system of procurement that exist under the domestic 
system. In this regard, projects are implemented by the relevant departments and 
internal approval is often required in accordance with the domestic institutional 
requirement which is based mainly on threshold values prior to obtaining approval from 
the NAO.37   
Project Implementation Units (PIUs): PIUs under EU aid programmes have 
traditionally been stand-alone units, usually with separate budgets and often 
accountable directly to the Head of Delegation.38 However, there appears to be a 
gradual integration of PIUs into the national system as part of a reform process, 
motivated perhaps by aid effectiveness commitments as will be seen below. The 
responsibilities and composition of the PIU is similar in many respects to those identified 
under the World Bank system discussed above.39  
The role of the NAO is comparable to the functions of PPA as the institution responsible 
for coordinating procurement activities under the domestic system as discussed in 
Chapter 2. However, there is little indication on the involvement of the PPA in the 
activities of the NAO and procurement funded by the EU in general.40 This could result 
in duplicated institutions and procedures. This may place functional constrains on 
domestic institutions and limit the impact of capacity development. The current location 
of the NAO within the ministry responsible for finance may have benefits including 
facilitating disbursement of funds and serving as a single point of contact on EU 
development programmes. However, its institutional disconnection with comparable 
domestic institutions, may pose challenges for the effectiveness of development 
projects. For example, supposing the functions of the NAO are assigned to the PPA, the 
EU aid regime will usually provide funds for strengthening the institutional capacity of 
PPA to support EU funded projects. Such capacity provided could also benefit 
                                                          
37 Information obtained during an interview with a procurement official at the NAO office in Accra (25 November 2013) 
who wishes to remain anonymous. 
38 See note 44 below. 
39 See discussions in section 4.4.1.  
40 Information obtained during an interview with a procurement official at the NAO office in Accra (25 November 2013) 
who wishes to remain anonymous. 
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procurement funded from domestic resources with a wider impact of donors’ capacity 
building programmes.  
5.5  Structural Procedures under EU External Aid 
EU assistance to Ghana usually begins with a series of documented research and 
consultations, referred to as programming. An important document in this respect is the 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP),41 which usually covers the period of the EDF cycle, 
currently a period of five years under the 10th EDF. The 11th EDF cycle which is 
currently under negotiation will cover a period from 2014-2020.42 An implementation 
plan, referred to as the National Indicative Programme (NIP), provides details of precise 
programmes to be funded including the timescale for implementation and how the 
objectives will be fulfilled.43 The latter document is subject to mid-term and annual 
review where changes could be made during the operational period. 
5.5.1 Harmonisation and Use of Country Systems 
EU member states are encouraged to coordinate individual funding activities to 
complement each other.44 Through its code of conduct, member states are encouraged 
to reduce fragmentation of aid and concentration within specific sectors.45 For example, 
with concentration ratio of 55% within 11 sectors in Ghana by 2011,46 EU donors 
commit to focus engagement on not more than three sectors and to limit the number of 
active donors to a maximum of three to five sectors. 
Coordinating donor activities generally, could reduce the number of donor procedures 
for example by allowing donors to agree on common procedures to be used. However, 
those agreed upon procedures are unlikely to be those normally applied under the 
domestic system and the burden of applying rules of donors in addition to domestic 
rules may not be eliminated. 
One could question the role of EU institution as an additional donor to its member states 
rather than solely coordinating the funding activities of member states. Though this 
approach may benefit the domestic system as an additional source of funding and 
perhaps represent other EU member states with no individual relations with Ghana, the 
adverse effect on multiplicity may outweigh any benefits. EU institution as a donor 
regime in addition to its member states clearly duplicates procurement procedures. This 
                                                          
41 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, Article 2 of Annex IV; the CSP and NIP for the 10th EDF is publicly downloadable 
at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/search/library/ (accessed 3 March 2016). 
42 For more information on programming for 2014-2020, see A. Herrero, G. Galeazzi and F. Krätke, “Early 
Experiences in Programming EU aid 2014-2020: Charting the Agenda for Change”, (ECDPM Briefing note, 
September 2013); S. Görtz and N. Keijzer, “Reprogramming EU Development Cooperation for 2014-2020: Key 
Moments for Partner Countries, EU Delegations, Member States and headquarters”, (ECDPM Discussion paper, April 
2012). 
43 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, Article 4 of Annex IV. 
44 EC, Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid Provided by The 
European Commission: A Backbone Strategy (July, 2008). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work-plan-
reforming-technical-cooperation-and-project-implementation-units-external-aid-provided_en (accessed 3 March 
2016). 
45 EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (May, 2007). Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0072:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 3 March 2016). 
46 OECD Statistics, www.oecd.org/dac/stats (accessed 3 March 2016). 
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situation perhaps, reflects the reality on the nature of EU and its member states as 
different actors and the practical challenges it may face in addressing the issue of 
multiplicity.  
5.5.2 Tied Aid and Visibility 
Tied aid is a feature of EU external aid and requires that eligible tenderers and their 
goods originate from EU and ACP member states.47 Tied aid and other exclusions do 
not only create negative economic effects,48 but also has effects on multiplicity of 
regimes in the domestic system. For example, where citizens or products from other 
countries are excluded from procurement funded by the EU, other donor regime may be 
encouraged to practice tied aid in order to provide business opportunity for its citizens or 
products excluded under other regimes. This creates significant administrative burden 
on the usually unskilled domestic officers responsible for applying the multiple rules. As 
a result, the pursuit of domestic policies including efficiency through simplification of 
procedures may be undermined. 
Duplication of procedures may not only be a result of the different eligibility 
requirements. The desire to promote individual image or diplomatic ties and to 
demonstrate this before the international community could also result in duplicating 
procedures. This is a feature particularly of the EU external aid regime where for 
example, the rules explicitly require visibility of funded projects.49 For example, EU may 
fund only projects it considers unique and to which it could assign names that reflect its 
identity. This practice may encourage donors to maintain their rules as a way of 
distinguishing themselves in terms of their uniqueness from other donors. As a result, it 
may become difficult for donors to co-finance and implement projects collectively.  
5.6   Substantive Procedural Requirements 
5.6.1 Procurement Procedures 
Procurement procedures available under EU funded projects in Ghana are the open 
procedure,50 restricted procedure,51 negotiated procedure,52 framework contracts,53 
dynamic purchasing system,54 competitive dialogue,55 and single tender procedure.56 
The basic principle in awarding contracts is competitive tendering which ensures respect 
for the awarding requirements and to obtain quality at best possible price.57 Not all 
available procedures under EU external aid regime will be of practical relevance in 
                                                          
47 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, Article 20 of Annex IV; For a comprehensive analysis of tied aid under EU 
external aid regime, see A. La Chimia, Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO 
Law, (Hart Publishing, 2013), Chapter 6.  
48 Ibid.  
49 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, Article 12 (3) of Annex IV; PRAG section 2.3.5. 
50 PRAG section 2.4.2. 
51 Ibid, section 2.4.3. 
52 Ibid, section 2.4.4. 
53 Ibid, section 2.4.5. 
54 Ibid, section 2.4.6. 
55 Ibid, section 2.4.7. 
56 Ibid, section 2.4.8. 
57 Ibid, section 2.4.  
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Ghana due to the nature of the domestic procurement environment. For example, as 
envisaged by the PRAG, the dynamic purchasing system58 as a completely electronic 
process of purchasing common user items may only have future relevance since Ghana 
is still at the early stages of developing e-procurement facilities as indicated above.   
The rules applicable to open procedure59 under the EU aid regime, provides a narrow 
distinction between international and local open procedures, based mainly on the 
threshold value and the degree of publicity required. Local open procedures are used 
under specified lower threshold values where publication in the ACP countries and on 
the Europe Aid website is required.60 International procedures on the other hand, are 
used for contracts with higher threshold values with additional publication in the Official 
Journal of the EU.61 This procedure is similar in content and substance to those under 
the domestic regime and the World Bank regime discussed earlier.62 The policy 
consideration for the use of the method also appears to be similar in all the regimes and 
regarded as the default method where specified conditions apply to the use of other 
methods.  
There are however, differences in terminologies which are used interchangeably in 
some cases, when referring to the same things. For example, the terms competitive 
tendering, open procedure and competitive bidding are used under the different regimes 
when referring to the same open type of procurement method. In all the regimes under 
review, a similar distinction is usually made between international and national 
competitive type of procurement which is often determined by the threshold value of the 
contract and the degree of publicity required. In effect, the content and substance of the 
rules are similar in the regimes and the rules will practically be applied in the same 
manner in all the regimes under review.  
Notable is the use of multiple supplier framework agreement as a type of contract under 
EU external aid in Ghana.63 This form of contract is not available under the domestic 
system even though a simple single-supplier framework agreement is currently operated 
under a pilot scheme. Procurement entities under EU funded projects are allowed to use 
multiple supplier frameworks with the approval of the Commission.64 The requirement to 
apply multiple supplier frameworks in Ghana may raise concerns on the capacity and 
skills of domestic procurement officers to support implementation of framework 
agreements above the level of those required under the domestic system. The author 
has no evidence of the use of these frameworks in practice. However, the rules provide 
no exemption in this respect and domestic officers will be required to apply the 
framework where it offers the best means of achieving the objectives of the 
procurement. The use of such frameworks on one hand, may result in inefficiencies 
                                                          
58 Ibid, section 2.4.6. 
59 Ibid, section 2.4.2. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62 See discussions in sections 3.5.1; section 4.7.1. 
63 PRAG section 3.4.1. 
64 PRAG section 3.4.1.1. 
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through delays in procurement where domestic procurement officers are required to 
take some time off their normal duties to attend training sessions tailored at 
implementing the multiple-supplier frameworks in order to satisfy requirements under 
the EU external aid regime. On the other hand, it could provide procurement officers 
with useful skills where the knowledge gain could be applied to procurement funded by 
national resources.  
The rules under EU aid regime also allow the use of restricted method of procurement65 
which in many respects, is similar in content and in terminology with the restricted 
procedure under World Bank rules and the rules applicable under the domestic 
system.66 However, the restricted method of procurement is used for different types of 
contracts under the different regimes even though the terminology and content of the 
rules are the same. For example, the restricted procedure under the domestic regime is 
used for the procurement of goods, works and non-consultant services. Under EU 
external aid regime however, the procedure often appears to be used for contracting 
consultant services which is also referred to as technical assistance.67 As indicated 
earlier,68 procurement of consultant services under the domestic law follows a distinct 
set of rules - selection procedure with consecutive negotiations - which is largely similar 
to the World Bank method of engaging consultants.      
5.6.2 Standards and Qualification  
Tender documents, referred to as tender dossiers under EU regime provides all the 
information including the description of requirements necessary for suppliers to offer 
compliant bids. The description of requirements, referred to as technical specification 
(for works and supply contracts) or terms of reference (for service contracts), provide 
instructions to tenderers on the minimum standards required. The general principle 
requires technical specifications to be clear with no unjustified obstacles to 
competition.69 Where brand names and other origins are used in specifications, entities 
shall include the word “or equivalent”.70 These standards are similar in many respects to 
those required under the domestic regime and also in other donor regimes including the 
World Bank as discussed.71  
The process of identifying qualified tenderers generally is referred to as selection 
process under EU aid regime, and has a similar connotation under the domestic and 
World Bank regime.72 The suitability of suppliers for contract award is determined 
through the use of selection criteria - referred to as qualification criteria under the 
domestic regime. Selection criteria shall be pre-disclosed in the tender document and 
                                                          
65 Ibid, section 2.4.3. 
66 See discussions in section 3.5.2; section 4.7.3. 
67 This information is obtained from an anonymous procurement official in Ghana (25 November 2013); a basic 
search for published contract awards funded by the EU in Ghana also confirms this trend. 
68 See discussions in section 3.11. 
69 PRAG section 2.6. 
70 Ibid, section 4.3.2; section 5.3.2.  
71 See discussions in section 3.4.1; section 4.10. 
72 See discussions in section 3.11; section 4.13. 
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shall include financial, technical and professional capabilities.73 The rules allow 
qualifications to be ascertained at different stages of the procurement process where for 
supply contracts for example, only successful tenderers’ qualification may be verified.74  
Entities are required to prepare shortlist of tenders, where too many tenders obtain the 
minimum selection criteria.75 The term “shortlisting” is used under EU aid regime with 
similar connotation under the World Bank and the domestic regimes as discussed 
earlier.76 
5.6.3 Evaluation and Award of Contracts   
After a mandatory public opening,77 tenders satisfying the pre-disclosed requirements 
are accepted and non-conforming tenders shall be rejected.78 However, tenders 
containing minor errors may be accepted and included in the evaluation.79 The issue on 
correction of error and how it is treated under the different regimes will be discussed in 
chapter 7.  
Evaluation of tenders is carried out through comparison and ranking of tenders with the 
view to recommending a tender for contract award. Representatives of EU Delegation in 
Ghana, the contracting authority and the NAO are also members of the evaluation 
committee either as observers or voting members.80 According to the PRAG, two award 
criteria are available under EU aid regime; a) the automatic award procedure, where 
award is made to the tenderer quoting the lowest price81 and b) the best-value-for-
money procedure, which is the most economically advantageous tender.82 
The terminology for these award criteria are quite different from those used under the 
domestic regime. However, the content of the rules and their manner of application are 
the same in both regimes. The term automatic award procedure corresponds with the 
lowest price criterion under the domestic regime whiles the best-value-for-money 
procedure or the most economically advantageous tender corresponds with the lowest 
evaluated tender criterion under the domestic system. These criteria are also found 
under the World Bank and UNCITRAL regimes which reflect substantial similarity in the 
regimes despite the use of different terminologies.     
5.7   Enforcement Mechanism  
5.7.1 Review by the Commission 
The EU Commission carries out its mandate either by acting as the contracting authority 
or decentralising the procurement function to the domestic authority. However, the 
                                                          
73 PRAG section 2.4.11.1.2; section 2.4.11.1.3. 
74 Ibid, section 2.4.11.1.1.  
75 Ibid.  
76 See discussions in section 3.8; section 4.12. 
77 PRAG section 3.3.10.2. 
78 Ibid, section 3.3.10.3. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid, section 2.8. 




domestic authority acting as the contracting authority is not economically free in its 
decisions but subject to supervision and scrutiny by the Commission.83 The supervisory 
duty is carried out firstly, through a prior review procedure where procurement decisions 
are verified and approved at various stages of the procurement process.84 Secondly, a 
post review may be carried out where verification of procurement decisions occurs after 
the decisions have been implemented.85 These procedures constitute the Commission’s 
formal means of enforcing compliance with the rules, an approach which is similar to the 
World Bank’s review system discussed in chapter 4. 
5.7.2 Role of Bidders in Enforcement  
The rules under EU external aid regime provide that “where a candidate, tenderer or 
applicant believes he has been adversely affected by an error or irregularity allegedly 
committed as part of a selection or procurement procedure, he may file a complaint to… 
(specified authorities).”86 This implies bidders under EU external aid regime may 
exercise specific enforcement rights, which contrasts significantly with the approach 
under the World Bank regime. The formal enforcement role of tenderers under EU 
external aid regime could be explained perhaps by the importance of suppliers in 
enforcing procurement rules in general as seen in the regime for its internal market 
which regulate the member states and the EU institutions themselves.   
However, aggrieved bidders under EU external aid regime must come to terms with the 
multiple review forums and the different applicable rules. The choice of review forum is 
usually determined by the nature of the review itself and the legal relationship between 
aggrieved persons and the contracting authority. 
Where the Commission acts as the contracting authority either on its own behalf or on 
behalf of domestic authorities, complaints may be sent to the person who took the 
contested decision for administrative review.87 Alternatively, appeal may be sent to the 
relevant geographical director in the EU headquarters in Brussels.88 The rules are silent 
on the nature of remedies available under this review process though an amicable 
resolution of disputes is envisaged.  
Moreover, aggrieved tenderers may also launch complaints in accordance with 
procedures under EU law as set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).89 This provision gives rise to two courses of action; firstly, complaints to 
the European Ombudsman against the Commission on grounds of maladministration is 
open to tenderers who are European citizens, persons residing or having their 
registered office within the EU.90 This provides an administrative review and the 
                                                          
83 P. Kalbe, ‘The award of contracts and the Enforcement of claims in the context of EC external aid and development 
cooperation’, (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review, p.1223. 
84 PRAG section 2.2, para 4. 
85 PRAG section 2.2, para 5. 
86 Ibid, section 2.4.15.1. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid, section 2.4.15.3. 
90 Ibid, section 2.4.15.2; The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article 228. 
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authority of the Ombudsman is limited to mediating and seeking amicable resolution of 
disputes.91 The Ombudsman cannot overturn or order the correction of decisions of the 
Commission.92 Moreover, mediation procedures are usually perhaps too slow for 
procurement matters where rapid resolution of disputes is necessary to ensure effective 
remedy. 
Secondly, tenderers may also bring complaints to the European Court of Justice for a 
judicial review on annulment of the Commission’s decision93 or failure to act,94 with an 
application for compensation of damages suffered in the case of non-contractual 
liability.95 The courts have broad powers to invalidate or overturn decisions of the 
Commission and award damages including loss of profit. Application to these review 
authorities is generally not sequential, and it gives aggrieved suppliers some discretion, 
perhaps based on the nature of relief being sought, as to which forum to commence its 
application.  
5.7.3 Review under Domestic Law 
Where the domestic regime acts as the contracting authority, complaints may be 
brought directly to the contracting authority with the view to resolving the issue 
administratively.96 Furthermore, aggrieved tenderers may also launch ordinary actions 
“in accordance with the conditions and deadlines fixed by the national legislation of the 
contracting authority”.97 This provision allows the application of review procedures in 
accordance with domestic law. The specific reference to the application of national 
legislation implies that the review system under EU external aid rules do not apply to 
situations where the Commission is not the contracting authority. In this respect, the EU 
external aid rules are replaced by the application of the domestic legislation. A key issue 
for consideration is what national legislation does the rules refer to and what national 
legislation is usually applied by domestic contracting authorities?  
Firstly, the Constitution of Ghana is the supreme national legislation which is applicable. 
Indeed, the Constitution allows review of decisions based on the general administrative 
principles of justice which are applicable to procurement as will be discussed below.98 
Such review may commence before the High Courts of Ghana in accordance with its 
procedures with the available remedies as discussed in section 3.11.8 above.  
Secondly, it is submitted that the Public Procurement Act is applicable and indeed, it is 
the national legislation usually applied by the contracting authority as discussed 
above.99  
                                                          
91 For further information on the mandate of the European Ombudsman, see 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm (accessed 3 March 2016). 
92 Ibid.  
93 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article 256 and 263. 
94 Ibid, article 265. 
95 Ibid, article 268 and 340. 
96 PRAG section 2.4.15.1. 
97 Ibid, section 2.4.15.3. 
98 See discussions in section 8.5.  
99 See discussions in section 2.2; section 3.11. 
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Review procedures under the Public Procurement Act allow three-tier review as 
discussed earlier.100 This implies the possibility for the Complaints Panel as an 
administrative review authority, to receive complaints from aggrieved tenderers. Though 
this possibility is not recognised in practice, it is argued that the jurisdiction of the PPA 
to receive complaints in this respect is derived from its mandate under the Procurement 
Act as the fundamental national legislation applicable to procurement in Ghana. Review 
in accordance with the Procurement Act is the procedure usually applied in Ghana. The 
jurisdiction of the PPA in this respect however, may not be clearly inferred from the 
provisions under the PRAG, particularly with the use of words such as “ordinary 
actions”101 which could give rise to the general interpretation perhaps for actions that 
are generally of judicial nature.  
In practice, there are no records of complaints to the PPA relating to EU funded 
projects,102 perhaps due to the general assumption of inadmissibility by aggrieved 
tenderers or perhaps an outright rejection of such complaints by the PPA as 
inadmissible.      
The distinction between centralised and decentralised management for the purposes of 
launching complaints is not clear cut, largely due to the control and powers of the 
Commission to intervene in the procurement process even where it does not act as the 
contracting authority. Where the domestic authority acts as the contracting authority, the 
EU Delegation provides substantial operational assistance and indeed is required to do 
so by preparing and running the tender procedures as indicated above. In such cases, it 
could be difficult to identify who the actual decision maker at a particular stage of the 
process might be. For example, supposing the Commission does not share the views of 
an aggrieved tenderer against a decision of the domestic authority and refuses to 
intervene on behalf of the tenderer when asked to do so; or the Commission in assisting 
the domestic authority, informs a tenderer on the ineligibility of goods supplied which 
were later found to be eligible, can the aggrieved tenderer take any action against the 
Commission?  
The general position adopted in such cases is based on the division of powers and 
duties between domestic authorities and the Commission under the Partnership 
Agreement; a Contracting Authority’s decision may not be replaced by a decision taken 
by the Commission.103 However, some evidence of case law from the European Court of 
Justice suggests that complaints may be brought in limited instances against the 
Commission even where the domestic authority acts as the contracting authority.104 
However, the extent to which and under what circumstances such complaints may be 
successful remains largely uncertain. 
                                                          
100 See discussions in section 3.11. 
101 PRAG section 2.4.15.3. 
102 Information obtained in an interview with an official at the PPA office in Ghana (26 November 2013).  
103 PRAG section 2.2, para 13 ; Geotronics SA v. Commission, [1995] ECR II-2795, case T-185/94. 
104 New Europe Consulting Ltd Vs Commission (1999) ECR II-02403, case T-231/97; For a comprehensive analysis 
of these issues, see Kalbe, (note 83 above), p.1217-1267. 
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5.7.4 Provisions on General Exclusions  
As indicated above,105 participation in procurement under EU external aid is not open to 
all qualified candidates. Apart from the specified exceptions,106 general exclusion 
clauses are strictly enforced. It may be difficult to perceive any unique benefit of the 
general exclusions to the domestic system apart from the substantial gains for the donor 
including the potential to boost economic activities within donor countries.  
Apart from exclusions based on the origin of tenderers and their goods and other 
general eligibility criteria, EU rules provides that tenderers will also be excluded from 
participation if they are convicted of fraud, corruption or unprofessional misconduct by a 
judgement of a competent authority of an EU member state, where such offences are 
construed within the meaning of provisions under EU Law.107  
This implies tenderers convicted under the domestic laws of Ghana may generally be 
allowed to participate in procurement funded by the EU. This position is similar to the 
case under the World Bank regime discussed earlier108 and it is likely to exist under 
other donor regimes. This practice by multiple regime could imply the ineffectiveness of 
domestic policies on preventing criminality including fraud and corruption which may 
have significant deteriorating effect perhaps on the general level of security and 
accountability in the domestic system.  
 
                                                          
105 See discussions on section 5.5.2. 
106 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, article 22 of Annex IV. 
107 PRAG section 2.3.3. 
108 See discussions in section 4.13.4. 
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Chapter 6: USA Development Aid Procurement 
6.1   Introduction  
Apart from the United Kingdom, US is the second largest bilateral donor in Ghana with a 
disbursement of USD 255 million in 2012,1 through its 51 aid agencies in Ghana.2 This 
chapter examines the procurement procedures of US foreign aid regime as one of the 
distinct and large donor regimes operating in Ghana. Large donors such as the US also 
have the potential to influence smaller donors due to the volume and nature of their 
spending. Discussions on US aid regime are significant due to the volume of its 
operations in Ghana which may have implications for domestic development and the 
potential to influence smaller donor regimes. 
The US foreign aid regime in Ghana operates through multiple initiatives under different 
aid agencies such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), each with its own specific mandate and 
operating procedures.3 USAID and other US aid agencies usually implement perhaps 
overlapping and conflicting policy programmes which is formulated by both the 
executive and the legislative arms of US government in Washington. Indeed, this 
creates multiplicity of institutions and procedures whose detailed discussion is 
constrained in this research. For the purposes of this analysis, only procurement 
procedures of USAID will be considered. USAID has been a leading US development 
agency with an established presence in Ghana since the latter’s independence, with 
funding activities across several sectors including health and education.  
This chapter will begin with discussions on the legal framework under US aid regime 
and then consider the objectives of US development assistance. We then focus on 
procurement under USAID with discussions on its institutional as well as structural 
arrangements. We then discuss the use of country systems where recent reforms at 
USAID will be relevant, followed by analysis of the substantive procurement procedures 
as well as its remedies regime.  
6.2   Legal Framework 
The primary legislative instrument for regulating procurement is the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR),4 which provides the uniform policies and procedures for 
procurement5 under all executive agencies including USAID. The Foreign Assistance 
Act (FAA)6 is also a permanent foreign aid instrument, particularly Part I, which covers 
most bilateral economic and security assistance programmes. The Agency for 
                                                          
1 See www.foreignassistance.gov (accessed 3 March 2016). 
2 OECD, Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid More Effective by 2010, (2008). 
3 C. Tarnoff and M. L Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, (Congressional Research 
Service, 2012), p.21. 
4 Information available at http://www.acquisition.gov/far/ (accessed 3 March 2016). 
5 The term “acquisition” as used under the US system, has the same meaning as “procurement” used throughout this 
thesis.  
6 Information available at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/faa.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). 
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International Development Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR), as provided in the Code of 
Federal Regulations,7 serves as USAID’s supplement to the FAR. The Code of Federal 
Regulations, particularly tittle 22 CFR 228 also provides the fundamental regulations on 
the source, origin and nationality, including the geographic codes for commodities and 
services procured which is relevant for USAID funded procurement.  
The AIDAR and the FAR provide the legal basis on which procurement is conducted by 
USAID. The AIDAR serves as the mandatory reference point for the operational policy 
documents of USAID, referred to as the Automated Directives System (ADS),8 where 
particularly Chapter 302 deals with procurement conducted directly by USAID. 
Procurement conducted by domestic officials, referred to as the host country, is 
governed by Chapter 305 of the ADS and supplemented by USAID’s internal guidelines 
referred to as the Country Contracting Handbook.9  
These provisions, in addition to the agency specific Standard Bidding Documents 
(SBDs), are made part of the Financing Agreement and constitute the legal framework 
under US aid funded procurement. The Financing Agreement has the status of a treaty 
agreement which is governed by international law and has implications as those 
discussed under World Bank and EU regimes.10  
A feature of the legal framework for US foreign aid regime is fragmented rules and 
complex policies. The general framework is stipulated in a number of legislative 
instruments whiles specific procedural requirements which allow deviations from the 
general policy principles through exemptions or waivers, are elaborated in the rules of 
the individual aid agencies. This complexity has the potential to create difficulties arising 
from identifying the applicable law on a particular procurement opportunity which could 
deter potential suppliers. The complexity may also constrain efforts at engaging civil 
societies and the general public in the procurement process since standards against 
which accountability or transparency could be demanded may be difficult to understand. 
6.3   Objectives 
The objectives of US development assistance as stated in section 101 of the FAA 
includes the alleviation of poverty and integration of developing countries into an open 
and equitable international economic system. In practice however, several other 
objectives including good governance and national security have become key 
objectives.11 Indeed the objectives of US development assistance continue to evolve in 
reflecting the changing approach to development financing, which is a feature also 
identified under the EU external aid regime discussed in chapter 5. 
                                                          
7 See The Code of US Federal Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 7. 
8 Information available at http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/agency-policy (accessed 3 March 2016). 
9 See http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/305_0.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). 
10 See discussions under section 4.2; section 5.2.  
11 OECD, Development Assistance Committee Peer Review of USA, (2011), p.24-26, available at 




The fundamental principles guiding USAID procurement procedures are competition 
and transparency through publicity of opportunities.12 US funded procurement rules 
require competition to ensure value for money.13 The provisions also place emphasis on 
publicity to ensure transparency.14 Transparency ensure that potential bidders have 
open and adequate information on their rights and obligations. Transparency also limit 
the discretion of procurement officers to ensure that decisions are justifiable. 
Transparency may also serve a monitoring function by ensuring that procedures are 
recorded to provide a means for verification. 
Publicity requirements also promote fairness and equal opportunities. The objective of 
fairness and equal opportunity implies that potential suppliers are offered equal 
treatment through a uniform standard of requirements and the same level of information 
to all potential suppliers at a particular time and place.  
USAID also appears to pursue the objective of developing local industries in Ghana 
through the use of preference schemes, referred to as local method of procurement.15 
However, the effect of the preference scheme may be limited since some other US 
donor agencies such as the MCC explicitly prohibit the use of preference schemes 
under its funded procurement.16 This objective is similar to those applied under the 
World Bank and the EU regimes discussed earlier.17   
6.4   Procurement under USAID 
6.4.1 Institutional Arrangements under USAID 
Under the policy guidance of the US Secretary of State, USAID operates in Ghana 
through its country mission office, which also houses the West African regional mission. 
USAID has similar country offices in other African countries, which is coordinated by the 
Bureau for Africa as the regional office. The several departments within the mission 
office in Ghana represents the various programmes managed by the mission. The head 
of the mission in Ghana has responsibility among others, for approving the procurement 
process and for determining the suitability for using the host country’s procurement 
systems as will be explained below.18 The approval duties of the head of Mission are 
supported by several other USAID’s internal officers including the Contracting Officer 
who is responsible for monitoring the selection and award process.19 
A clear distinction is made between USAID-direct contracts on one hand, where USAID 
acts as implementing agency and controls the procurement process;20 and the Host 
Country Contracts (HCC), also referred to as Government to Government contracts 
                                                          
12 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305. 3.2; Chapter 305.3.3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Host Country Contracting Handbook Chapter 2 section 2.5.8. 
16 This information is available at https://www.mcc.gov/pages/business/guidelines (accessed 3 March 2016). 
17 See discussions in section 4.3; section 5.3. 
18 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.2(g). 
19 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.2(e). 
20 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 301.3.1.1. 
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(G2G) on the other hand, where the Government of Ghana acts as implementing 
agency.21 USAID in this case, acts as financier with reserved rights of approval rather 
than acting as contracting party.22  
In practice, the Government of Ghana rarely assumes procurement responsibility and 
USAID often implements its projects, either on its own behalf or on behalf of the 
Government of Ghana, often relying on external agencies and other third parties such 
as civil societies and other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).23  
The benefit of this approach perhaps is the relief for the procurement officer who do not 
have to apply additional donor rules, or rather the donor’s relief from rigorous 
enforcement mechanism through approval and monitoring duties, which could eliminate 
delays in the procurement process and ensure efficiency. However, the argument for 
the benefits may be weak when considering the long term potential implications for the 
domestic system. Significantly, the approach does not eliminate multiple rules system. 
Suppliers for example, will still have the burden of identifying applicable rules for each 
opportunity irrespective of who bears implementation responsibility. The domestic 
system also loses ownership and control over domestic developments which prevents 
the development of local expertise.  
6.4.2 Structural Procedures under USAID 
USAID’s programmes begin with the development policy strategies, in alignment with 
key US government policies such as the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) and the 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).24 At the country level, it has 
developed a five year strategy, referred to as the Country Development Cooperation 
Strategy (CDCS).25 The CDCS shall reflect USAID and host country priorities through 
engaging national stakeholders such as local civil societies and other donors.26 USAID 
usually develops a Project Appraisal Document (PAD) which forms the basis for project 
implementation. Monitoring and evaluation is a key part of the project cycle to ensure 
accountability but also to build on knowledge in improving future projects.27 
6.4.2.1 Use of Country Systems and USAID Reforms 
USAID usually requires the use of its own rules for many of its funded programmes. In 
Ghana, only 1% of USAID funds provided in 2010 relied on some domestic 
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 C. Dunning, Is Local Spending Better? The Controversy over USAID Procurement Reform, (Centre for American 
Progress, 2013); Also, information obtained by the author from some Procurement Officers in Ghana who wishes to 
remain anonymous, confirms this position. 
24 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 200 .3.5.1; USAID, Program Cycle Overview, 2011, p.4, available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacs774.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). 
25 Information on Ghana’s CDCS is available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Ghana_CDCS_fy2013-17.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, p.11; USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 200.3.5.5. 
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procedures.28 However, recent USAID policy reforms as will be seen below are likely to 
encourage the use of country systems.  
A distinction needs to be made between host country contracting on one hand and use 
of country systems on the other. Host country contracting requires USAID’s certification 
that the Government of Ghana is able to carry out procurement duties in accordance 
with USAID’s rules. Use of country systems on the other hand, involves a rigorous 
assessment of the domestic system in order to approve the use of domestic 
procurement procedures for USAID funded projects. 
USAID launched a policy reform in 2010, referred to as USAID Forward. These reforms 
arguably, emerged from two major high level documents; the Presidential Policy 
Directive on Global Development and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review which defined the broad development goals to be pursued as discussed above. 
Implementation and Procurement Reform (IPR) with the possibility of using country 
systems was identified as central to the reform, believing that strengthened local 
institutions with their ultimate responsibility for country development could achieve 
sustainable results.29 A key feature of the reform is a series of rigorous assessments of 
domestic systems under the Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework 
(PFMRAF).30  
Ghana is among 30 countries qualified for a risk assessment of their systems.31 
Assessment results on Ghana show progress in some government departments with a 
major deficiency in the country’s preparedness for the use of country systems.32 
However, recommendations have been provided to address the deficiencies. 
6.4.2.2 Tied Aid and Eligibility rules under USAID Procurement 
Participation in procurement funded by USAID is based on eligibility and not opened to 
all qualified suppliers. Strict source and nationality rules under 22 CFR 288 are 
supplemented by USAID agency specific policies to ensure that procedures meet 
requirements of the FAA. The practice and implications of tied aid under USAID is 
similar to those under other regimes discussed earlier33 and has also been extensively 
discussed in other literature and will not be repeated in this section.34  
6.4.3 Substantive Procedural Requirements under USAID  
6.4.3.1 Procurement Procedures 
As indicated above, the fundamental principle under USAID procurement, subject to 
specific waivers, is competitive bidding through publicity.35 The available procurement 
                                                          
28 OECD, Aid Effectiveness: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, (2011), Chapter on Ghana, p.8. 
29 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 220.1; Dunning, (note 23 above), p.4. 
30 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 220. 
31 USAID Forward Progress Report, (2013), p.22. 
32 USAID, USAID Forward, Implementation and Procurement Reform Achievements, (February 2012), Issue 3, p.4. 
33 Seed discussions in section 5.5.2. 
34 A. La Chimia, Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO Law, (Hart 
Publishing, 2013), Chapter 7. 
35 See discussions in section 6.3; USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.3.3. 
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methods include open competition, competitive negotiation, two-stage bidding and 
single source procurement.36 Subject to approval by the head of Mission, the two-stage 
method may be used under certain conditions including for complex and diverse 
procurements where it is impossible to develop adequate specifications.37 The available 
procurement methods under USAID rules and the conditions for their use including 
approval requirements are similar in many respects to those under the domestic and 
other donor regimes as discussed in previous chapters.38   
USAID allows several modifications to the procurement methods through the use of 
waivers which provide significant flexibility in the extent to which competition is 
achieved. This level of flexibility is not available under the domestic rules in Ghana, 
perhaps due to the lack of skills and expertise of domestic officers which could lead to 
misuse of flexibilities.  
Moreover, competitive negotiation, referred to as informal competitive bidding under 
USAID regime, is used differently in Ghana. The method is similar in content and 
manner of application to the domestic method for engaging consultant services.39  In 
other words, differences in the rules lie mainly in the appearance and the use of 
terminology.  
6.4.3.2 Standards and Qualification  
USAID’s tender documents establish the criteria against which all bids are judged 
equally. As a general principle, specifications shall be precise and complete, with all 
information necessary for suppliers to prepare bids which can be evaluated on common 
basis.40 Though USAID provides little guidance on applicable standards of criteria, there 
is a detailed list of what information shall be included in tender documents.41  
The process of identifying qualified bidders generally is referred to as the selection 
process under USAID. Where it is deemed necessary to reduce the number of qualified 
bidders, a shortlist of bidders is prepared.42 The content of these procedures and the 
terminologies are similar to those under the domestic and EU regimes as seen above.43  
6.4.3.3 Evaluation and Award of contracts  
Evaluation is conducted following a public opening of bids.44 Under procurement for 
consultancy services, technical proposals are first evaluated followed by the financial 
proposals.45 Evaluation is carried out by assigning weights to the pre-disclosed criteria 
                                                          
36 Host Country Contracting Handbook Chapters 1, 2, 3. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/agency-policy 
(accessed 3 March 2016). 
37 Ibid, Chapter 2 section 3.6.6.1.  
38 See discussions in section 3.5; section 4.7; section 5.6.1. 
39 See discussions in section 3.10. 
40 Host Country Contracting Handbook, Chapter 2 section 4; Chapter 3 section 4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, Chapter 1 section 3.4.3; Chapter 2 section 3.7; Chapter 3 section 3.6.4. 
43 See discussions in section 3.8; section 5.6.2.  
44 Ibid, Chapter 2 section 3.8.4; Chapter 3 section 3.6.6. 
45 Ibid, Chapter 1 section 3.4.4. 
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where the bids are ranked according to their rated weight.46 Negotiations on price are 
then carried out with the highest ranked bidder with a view to award the contract.47  For 
goods, works and non-consultant services, bids shall be deemed responsive and 
reasonable in price.48 The bids shall be adjusted to reflect any non-price factors 
considered in evaluation, and given monetary value to arrive at an evaluated bid.49 
These procedures and requirements are similar are similar in many respects to those 
discussed under the domestic and other regimes under review. 
Changes to bids may be allowed in exceptional situations.50 In order to closely analyse 
the issues of multiplicity, a case study on the specific issue of correction of bids after 
bids have been opened, will be examined in the next chapter.  
The award criteria under USAID is the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.51 This 
simply refers to the lowest priced compliant bid. These provisions appear different 
through the use of different terminologies but are in fact the same in content and 
manner of application to those discussed in the regimes under review.52 The lowest 
responsive bidder refers to lowest price criterion which is also available under the 
domestic regime of Ghana.  
6.4.4 Enforcement Mechanism under USAID 
6.4.4.1 Review by USAID 
As financier, USAID reserves the right to approve procurement decisions of domestic 
contracting authorities at any stage of the procurement process.53 Prior approval is often 
required at specified stages where the contract amount is anticipated to exceed USD 
250 000.54 For lower value contracts, it could be a prior or post review at the discretion 
of USAID’s head of mission.55 USAID may also require approval of contracts not funded 
by it, but which have substantial impact on the activities of USAID.56 The provision is 
silent on what decisions may constitute substantial impact on USAID’s funding activities. 
However, co-financed contracts for instance, may fall under such category. It may also 
imply that some projects financed solely from domestic resources may require USAID 
approval. Mandatory clauses which generally limits the liability of USAID, are often 
written into every USAID funded contract.57 
Approval requirements under USAID are similar to those under many other donor 
regimes including the EU discussed in Chapter 5. Where non-compliance is detected, it 
may lead to significant delays in the process or even loss of funds.  
                                                          
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid, Chapter 1 section 3.5.1. 
48 Ibid, Chapter 2 section 3.8.4; Chapter 3 section 3.6.7 
49 Host Country Contracting Handbook, Chapter 2 section 3.8.4; Chapter 3 section 2.6.7. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 See discussions in section 3.9; section 4.11; section 5.6.3. 
53 Ibid.  
54 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.3.1.1. 
55 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.3.1. 
56 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.3.1.3. 
57 USAID Operational Policy (ADS) Chapter 305.3.7. 
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The authority of USAID to require approval of projects for which it does not provide 
funds, appears to extend the limit of its powers beyond funded projects. This approach 
could interfere with the pursuit of domestic objectives. It could also present potential 
difficulties for collaborative procurement with other donors as the case under co-
financing discussed in Chapter 4.  
An important consideration is whether or not there are domestic legislations that could 
prohibit such approval requirements. The domestic rules which deals with the interaction 
between domestic and donor rules states that its provisions apply to “procurement with 
funds or loans taken or guaranteed by the State and foreign aid funds except where the 
applicable loan agreement, guarantee contract or foreign agreement provides the 
procedure for the use of the funds.”58  The rules further states that “notwithstanding the 
extent of the application of this Act to procurement, procurement with international 
obligations arising from any grant or concessionary loan to the government shall be in 
accordance with the terms of the grant or loan.”59 These provisions define the scope of 
application of the domestic legislation. Significantly, it does not deal with the issue of 
approval requirements beyond funded projects. This implies that approval of the kind 
required by USAID may not be prohibited under the domestic legislation.  
However, even where domestic legislation explicitly prohibits any approval requirements 
beyond donor funded projects, it may still not prevent donors from requiring approval 
beyond their funded procurement. This could be explained by the authority of donors to 
withdraw funding for non-compliance with their funding requirements and the status of 
the Financing Agreement as a treaty where domestic legislation cannot be a reason for 
noncompliance with the treaty agreement as discussed above.60 
Though approval of the kind required by USAID may appear to concern the suitability of 
domestic institutional and enforcement arrangements, it could determine the direction 
and nature of development under the domestic system. For example, supposing USAID 
funded an initial programme to enhance participation of Ghana’s military in regional 
peacekeeping operations. A subsequent funding with domestic resources to upgrade 
and equip Ghana’s military could be considered as sensitive or having a substantial 
impact on USAID’s funding activities which requires USAID’s approval. As a result, the 
scope of domestic development may be prevented from addressing national security 
concerns. The resulting ill-equipped military may create vulnerability and limit the ability 
of the domestic system to defend its territory and sovereignty during international 
conflicts. Though such authority has not been exercised in practice, its mere existence 
with the authority of USAID to implement projects on its own behalf and on behalf of 
Ghana, could prevent the initiation of some essential projects in Ghana either in 
collaboration with donors or solely funded from domestic resources. This could constrain 
the freedom of domestic authorities to determine the kind and nature of development 
required and this could limit the scope and direction of domestic development.  
                                                          
58 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 14(d). 
59 Ibid, s. 96. 
60 See discussions in section 6.2. 
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6.4.4.2 Role of Bidders in Enforcing USAID Rules 
Bidders under USAID funded projects play some role in submitting complaints on 
procurement misconducts which is necessary to clarify the complex procedures and to 
address other concerns of bidders. Bid protests or bid challenge as a terminology used 
under the US regime, is a formal supplier review procedure which allows grievances of 
bidders to be addressed, usually as supplementary mechanism to review conducted by 
the donor itself. Bidders under USAID projects may bring complaints on a wide range of 
issues as compared to the limited scope provided under the World Bank regime 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
It should be noted that procurement conducted directly by USAID, either on its own 
behalf or on behalf of the host country, is subject to a separate formal complaints 
procedure administered by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), an 
independent agency in the US that investigates federal government expenditure.61 
Discussions under this section will focus on situations where the host country acts as 
contracting authority to implement USAID funded projects in which case complaints to 
GAO may not be admissible. 
Aggrieved bidders under USAID procedures may direct their complaints, referred to as 
protests, to the host country contracting authority.62 As the financier, USAID will not be 
directly involved in resolving these complaints.63 However, contract award 
recommendations submitted for approval shall include documentation on complaints 
received and how they are resolved, and USAID will not approve contract award 
recommendations where complaints are not resolved.64 USAID provides no procedural 
guidance on how complaints should be resolved but rather requires resolution of 
complaints in accordance with the contracting authority’s own policies and procedures.65    
It is unclear how USAID may become aware of unresolved complaints prior to receiving 
the contract award recommendation. The provisions are silent on whether any form of 
complaints perhaps informal, could be sent directly to USAID. For example, supposing 
the contracting authority in its submission, did not include documentation on how it 
resolved complaints brought against it where in fact, it deliberately ignored the complaint 
or resolved it unsatisfactorily. In such cases, USAID may approve the award 
recommendation based on its lack of knowledge on unresolved complaints. Moreover, 
where post review is used and approval of documentation occurs after contract award 
and perhaps contract already performed, it is unclear what course of action is available. 
These situations perhaps, demonstrate the lack of effective remedy where aggrieved 
bidders may be denied a fair treatment but also a missed opportunity for USAID to 
enforce compliance with its rules. 
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62 Host Country Contracting Handbook, Chapter 1 section 3.4.7; Chapters 2 section 3.8.5. 
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In practice however, some aggrieved bidders in Ghana may send informal complaints to 
USAID in addition to complaints sent to the contracting authority.66 USAID is under no 
obligation to act on those complaints but it may informally make recommendations to 
the contracting authority on how to resolve the complaint. 
The rules are silent on possible appeal procedures which implies the possible use 
appeal procedures available under the contracting authority’s policies and procedures 
as will be explained below. Indeed, obtaining effective remedy may depend largely on 
the diligence of the domestic contracting authority and the inadequacy of the general 
supplier review mechanism under USAID may provide little incentive for participation in 
its funded procurement.  
6.4.4.3 Possible Review under Domestic Law  
As indicated above, USAID requires complaints be resolved in accordance with the 
contracting authority’s own domestic policies and procedures.67 This may include 
procurement manual used by the institution and other internal reporting policies for 
resolving complaints. These internal review procedures are largely based on and in fact, 
should be found consistent with the domestic procurement rules. This possibility for 
review in accordance with domestic law is similar, though limited to those available 
under other regimes including the World Bank and EU regimes.68 The difference lies in 
the possibility of using domestic procedures other than the review process, such as 
procurement methods which are not available under USAID as will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
6.4.4.4 Rules on General Exclusions  
As indicated above, not all qualified suppliers are allowed to participate in USAID 
funded procurement. Significant exclusions clauses apply for example to geographical 
codes with an outright prohibition on procurement of some specified commodities.69  
A specific form of exclusion under USAID relates to fraud and corruption where 
suppliers convicted of criminal offences, under suspension or debarment sanctions in 
accordance with the laws of US, may be excluded from USAID funded procurement.70 
This implies that sanctions issued in accordance with the domestic law of Ghana may 
not be recognised under USAID funded procurement and suppliers convicted for fraud 
and corruption or debarred in accordance with domestic law may be allowed to 
participate in USAID funded procurement. This situation may render domestic policies 
aimed at controlling corruption ineffective which could have significant adverse 
implications on the level of corruption, particularly in aid dependent countries such as 
Ghana where major development projects are usually financed through aid 
                                                          
66 Information obtained by the author from an official in USAID country office in Ghana who wishes to remain 
anonymous (3rd December 2013). 
67 See discussions in section 6.4.4.2. 
68 See discussions in section 4.13.3; section 5.7.3. 
69 Host Country Contracting Handbook, Chapter 3 section 2.5. 




procurement. These exclusions are similar to those discussed in other donor regimes 
including the World Bank and EU regimes.71  The  effect of these exclusions imposed by 
multiple donors may significantly limit the effectiveness of domestic policies. 
                                                          
71 See discussions in section 4.13.4; section 5.7.4. 
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Chapter 7: Case Study on Multiplicity in the Specific Issue of Correction of 
Errors in Tenders 
7.1 Introduction  
As indicated earlier,1 donors usually require aid recipients such as Ghana to follow 
procurement rules and procedures provided by the donor which is intended to ensure 
the proper use of their funds. This chapter presents a case study on the issue of 
multiple procurement regimes in one specific area – correction of errors in tenders once 
accepted tenders have been opened. The purpose of the case study is to illustrate the 
sort of issues that may arise when applying different rules under different regimes in 
relation to the conduct of different stages of the procurement process. One specific area 
has been selected for detailed analysis since is not possible to deal in detail with all the 
areas in this context. However, the issues identified in this chapter may be applicable to 
other areas that are the subject of regulatory rules.    
The practical importance of the specific issue of correcting tenders lies mainly in the 
complexity of the process which offers different approaches that could be adopted by 
procurement officers to obtain similar results. It is an area where a number of different 
policy objectives in procurement must be considered and traded off, and it is something 
that is important in practice and regulated by legal rules in all the regimes under study. It 
is also a highly technical stage that could be exposed to significant potential for abuse. 
For the supplier, it is a critical stage in determining its success or failure to continue its 
bid for the procurement contract.  
This chapter first outlines how correction of errors is regulated under the domestic 
regime in Ghana. Correction of errors under the World Bank, the EU external aid and 
the US regimes respectively, will subsequently be discussed. It will conclude with 
analysis of the nature of interaction and the possible policy implications.   
7.2 Correction of Error under the Domestic Regime  
As a general rule under the Procurement Act, tenders shall meet requirements set out in 
the tender documents as pre-disclosed to tenderers.2 In this respect, “no change in a 
matter of substance in the tender, including changes in price and changes aimed at 
making an unresponsive tender responsive, shall be sought, offered or permitted.”3 This 
position generally, prohibits correction of errors as a way of preventing ambiguities in 
tenders which might be interpreted in different ways so as to give undue advantage to a 
supplier at the discretion of the procurement officer. Prohibition of correction of errors 
could also provide a means to deterring suppliers from making mistakes in tenders to 
ensure maximum compliance with the rules. However, due to considerations on 
balancing these requirements with other policy objectives, the rules distinguishes 
                                                          
1 See discussions in section 4.2; section 5.2; section 6.2. 
2 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 58(1). 
3 Ibid, s. 57(2). 
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between changes that affect the substance of tenders from those that do not as will be 
discussed below.  
As an exception to the general rule, correction of errors is permitted in two main 
situations:  
 Correction of arithmetic errors:4  arithmetic errors such as omissions or 
inconsistency of figures could create ambiguities and may become the subject of 
legal challenge if accepted without correction. The Procurement Act provides that 
“notwithstanding subsection 2 [on prohibiting changes to tenders], the 
procurement entity shall correct purely arithmetical errors that are discovered 
during the examination of tenders”.5 This provision clearly allows changes to 
tenders to be made and limits the scope of such changes to specific types of 
errors; purely arithmetic errors. In this respect, the rules require the correction of 
purely arithmetic errors. These are usually those errors not affecting the 
responsiveness of tenders since responsiveness appears to be determined prior 
or perhaps during the correction of any arithmetic errors as will be seen below. In 
this respect, correction of errors cannot make a nonresponsive tender become 
responsive.  
The Standard Tender Documents to be sent to suppliers provide some 
clarification on the scope of correcting arithmetic errors by stating that “(i) If there 
is a discrepancy between the unit price and the total price…, the unit price shall 
prevail and the total price shall be corrected. (ii) If there is a discrepancy between 
words and figures, the amount in words will prevail.”6 Thus it appears that, if the 
error is not obvious in the sense that it is not clear what the right figure should 
be, inconsistencies shall be considered and corrected in the manner prescribed 
above. Such narrow scope for correction limits the discretion of the procurement 
entity in making judgements and ensures some certainty in application of the 
rules. This may be relevant, particularly in developing countries including Ghana 
where procurement officers with the best of intentions could still misuse such 
discretion due to their limited skills in procurement.   
 Errors or oversights capable of being corrected:7 These relate to errors or 
oversights such as the omission of sections of the tender document, which may 
be corrected to meet the formal requirements of the tender without affecting its 
content or substance. The procurement entity may also waive such minor errors, 
which allows the tenders to be regarded as responsive despite the deviations.8 In 
such cases, the deviations shall be quantified to the extent possible and taken 
into account during evaluation.9 This provision could encourage maximum 
                                                          
4 Ibid, s. 57(3). 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ghana, Standard Tender Document (Information to Tenderers), clause 26.2. 
7 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 58(2). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, s. 58(3). 
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participation of suppliers to ensure competition. An essential criterion is that such 
correction shall not touch on the substance of the tender.10 However, there is 
little guidance and, therefore, it is open to different interpretations on what it 
means for corrections to touch on the substance of tenders.11 As discussed 
below, this situation provides scope for misinterpretation and perhaps potential 
for abuse.  
It could be argued that corrections not touching on the substance of the tender 
may be allowed to affect the subject matter so long as such corrections do not 
change the tender to become responsive.12 For example, supposing a tender 
contains an error in stating the capacity of a classroom as “0” in a contract for the 
construction of a classroom, where only the price is the award criteria. 
Subsequent clarification from the tenderer indicated an intended classroom 
capacity of “30”. In this case, correction of the tender may be allowed since it 
does not affect the substance of the tender though touching on the capacity of 
the classroom as the subject matter. However, supposing the capacity of the 
classroom is also award criteria, correction in this case may not be allowed since 
the correction does not only affect the subject matter but also touches on the 
substance of the tender.  
The argument above, considers the effect on the award criteria in determining 
whether or not the substance of the tender is affected. Thus, where correction 
does not affect the award criteria, it could perhaps be considered as not touching 
on the substance of the tender and, therefore, may be permitted. This provides a 
wide scope for correcting errors though little room for abuse could be envisaged. 
The benefits could be a fair treatment of tenderers, which allows a wide 
participation to ensure competition, with the potential for obtaining value for 
money. 
The 2011 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law serves as the current version of the 
1994 Model Law on which the domestic procurement law in Ghana was modelled.13 The 
2011 Model Law also provides limited scope for correcting faulty tenders where similar 
wordings of the text of the provisions to those under the domestic law are identified. In 
this regard, the Model Law permits correction in the two situations outlined above.14  
However, correction of errors under the 2011 Model Law does not apply to all cases. As 
clarified in the Guide to enactment of the Model Law, the procurement entity is not 
permitted to correct errors where firstly, such correction introduces substantive change 
to a tender, particularly where a nonresponsive tender will otherwise become 
                                                          
10  Ibid, s. 58(2). 
11 Ghana’s Standard Tender Documents in section II, 26.5, provides some clarification on when minor errors could be 
waved. 
12 S. Arrowsmith, Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (University of Nottingham, 2010), P.70. 
13 The procurement law in Ghana was modelled on the 2004 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law 
has subsequently been updated in 2011 to include current developments and international best practices. 
14 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, (2011), art. 16(2); 43(b). 
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responsive.15 Secondly, correction of errors is not permitted under some methods of 
procurement including request for quotation and request for proposal methods.16 
In Ghana, it appears that correction of errors is generally permitted under all methods of 
procurement.17 Some limited clarification is provided in the Procurement Manual of PPA 
which states that “where a Tender is determined to be substantially responsive, the 
Evaluation Panel may waive, clarify or correct any non-conformity, error or omission, 
which does not constitute a material deviation...”18  This seems to imply differently from 
the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law. 
7.3 Correction of Error under World Bank Regime  
The rules on correction of bids19 under the World Bank are provided in the Procurement 
Guidelines and the Consultant Guidelines.20  Generally, bids (referred to as tenders 
under domestic regime) are required to be substantially responsive, thus containing no 
material deviations and bidders shall neither be permitted nor invited to correct or 
withdraw material deviations once bids have been opened.21 The Guidelines make a 
distinction between material and non-material deviations and clearly prohibits changes 
to be made to material deviations. This provision is quite different in wording but 
appears rather similar in substance and content to the provision under the domestic law 
in Ghana as will be seen below.  
The differences are in the emphasis placed on the extent of deviation in tenders from all 
requirements, rather than the effect on the substance of the tender which is an issue of 
wording or choice of words. However, the substantive content of the rules remains the 
same. It is also likely that the application of these rules could lead to similar results 
though this is uncertain. This uncertainty lies mainly in the use of quite vague 
terminologies such as “substance of a tender” or “material deviation” under the multiple 
regimes. There is little clarification on the exact intended meaning of these 
terminologies, which provides the potential for different interpretations and perhaps 
potential for abuse, which is rather unintended. For example, it is unclear what 
constitutes the substance of a tender and whether or not a correction that affects the 
award criteria could be considered as affecting the substance of the tender as illustrated 
above. Several interpretations of these terminologies could be adopted and allows 
different procurement officers to take perhaps slightly different interpretative approach 
even under the same procedure, which might lead to some differences in the outcome 
of the rules.  
                                                          
15 Guide to Enactment of the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 16 para 6. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ghana, Public Procurement Manual, section 6.11 point 1. 
18 Ibid, section 4.14.2. point 6. 
19 The terms ‘bids and tenders’, which corresponds with bidders and tenderers, are used interchangeably in this 
section to denote the different terminologies adopted by the different regimes under review. 
20 Guidelines on Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (January, 2011) covering procurement of goods, 
works and non-consulting services and Guidelines on the Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank 
Borrowers (January, 2011) covering procurement of consultant services. 
21 World Bank, Procurement Guidelines para 2.48. 
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However, the Guidelines require correction of errors in certain situations. Specifically, it 
provides that “the bid price read out at the bid opening shall be adjusted to correct any 
arithmetical errors. Also…. adjustments shall be made for any quantifiable non-material 
deviations or reservations”.22 These provisions require correction of errors and limit the 
scope of such corrections firstly, to arithmetic errors and secondly, to other types of 
errors that do not materially deviate from the requirements. The latter provides a wide 
duty for correction particular with the uncertainties in the interpretation of the term 
“material deviation”. For example, the submission of 2 copies of tenders instead of the 
required 3 copies may be considered as non-material deviations that do not touch on 
the substance of the tender. The required corrections may be those affecting formal 
requirements with little effect on the tender itself. In Ghana it would be at the discretion 
of the procuring entity to decide whether to allow such formal corrections, as we have 
seen.   
Under the World Bank, correction is required whenever there is an error whiles this is 
not the case under the domestic system. This may suggest a narrow interpretation of 
the concept of touching on the substance as under UNCITRAL Model Law. The fact that 
the Bank’s provisions impose a duty on procurement officers to correct tenders under 
both situations prevent the use of discretion and leads to less abuse.  
Thus we can see that the content of the rules is generally similar in many respects to 
those under the domestic law in Ghana though there are some individual differences. As 
regards the similarities, both regimes impose a duty to correct arithmetic errors. The 
main difference is that whilst the World Bank regime imposes a duty to correct errors in 
all cases, the domestic regime merely allows discretionary correction in cases where 
errors are minor and do not touch on the substance of the tender.   
The World Bank’s Guidelines are silent on the possibility of notifying bidders of any 
corrections or whether bidders shall give consent to corrected bids. Notification of 
corrections to bidders is envisaged since according to the Guidelines, clarification may 
be sought to assist in bid evaluation.23 In the case of giving consent to corrected bids, 
the absence of the opportunity for bidders to give their consent on corrected bids or the 
lack of clarity thereof, could result in a bidder rejecting an award offer based on its 
dissatisfaction with corrected bid. This position is different from those under the 
domestic regime where the rules impose explicit obligation to seek consent of bidders is 
imposed.24   
7.4 Correction of Error under EU Aid Regime 
EU external aid to Ghana is funded mainly from the European Development Fund 
(EDF), a specific budget composed of contributions from member states, which is made 
available to Ghana through the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement of Cotonou as 
                                                          
22 World Bank, Procurement Guidelines para 2.50. 
23 Ibid, para 2.47. 
24 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 57(4). 
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amended in Ouagadougou.25 Rules on correction of tenders are provided in the 
Practical Guide (PRAG),26 a document with detailed explanation of the rules as a 
compilation of the severally scattered legal instruments applicable to procurement under 
EU external aid. 
According to the PRAG, tenders are required to comply with three distinct categories; 1) 
Administrative compliance,27 2) technical compliance28 and 3) financial compliance.29 All 
three categories shall be satisfied and “where the content of a tender is incomplete or 
deviates substantially from one or more of… (requirements set out above), laid down in 
the tender dossier, the tender will be automatically rejected”.30 Notwithstanding the strict 
appearance of the above provisions, only substantial deviations shall be rejected, which 
is similar in content and wording to those found under World Bank regime. The rules are 
also similar in content but not in wording to those under the domestic law in Ghana. 
Particularly, the domestic provisions allow a waiver of non-material deviations31 which 
has similar effects as non-substantial deviations as provided under the EU external aid 
regime and the World Bank regime.  
As an exception to the general rule under the EU regime, correction of errors is 
permitted in specific situations where the evaluation committee is firstly, required to 
“correct any obvious arithmetic errors without penalties to the tenderer”.32 Secondly, 
other minor formal and technical errors may be corrected or waived.33 The former 
creates a requirement to correct errors and limits the duty to correct errors to obvious 
arithmetic errors. The latter provides a waiver of minor formal and technical errors at the 
discretion of the procurement entity, where tenders may be accepted despite not 
satisfying all requirements. In the example in which an entity receives 2 copies of tender 
instead of required 3 copies, correction would be at the discretion of the entity as the 
case in Ghana rather than a duty to correct the error as under the World Bank.  
However, it is unclear how other minor errors falling outside the categories explicitly 
provided may be treated. It is envisaged that clarifications may be sought from suppliers 
and if the deviation is not substantial, the tender can be accepted.  For example, in the 
case of arithmetic errors that are not obvious (not clear on the face of it as to what the 
right figure should be), corrections could be made by seeking clarification from 
suppliers. Also, any inconsistencies, for example, in the unit and total prices or 
                                                          
25 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 20005 as revised first time by the Agreement 
signed in Luxemburg on 25 June 2005 and second time by the Agreement signed in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 
(OJ 2010 L287/3).     
26 Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG), publicly available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/prag/document.do?locale=en (accessed 3 March 2016). 
27 Ibid, section 3.3.10.3 part 1. 
28 Ibid, section 3.3.10.3 part 2. 
29 Ibid, section 3.3.10.4. 
30 Ibid, section 3.3.10.3 part 2. 
31 See discussions under section 7.2. 
32 PRAG, section 3.3.10.4; section 4.3.9.5; section 5.3.9.5. 
33 Ibid, section 3.3.10.3 part 1 para 1; part 2 para 2. 
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ambiguities resulting from arithmetic errors are required to be corrected by seeking 
clarification from the bidder.34 
Contrary to the domestic rules in Ghana however, only the successful tenderer under 
EU funded projects is notified of corrections, if any, in its tenders, which is 
communicated in the award notice.35 The situation above is likely to create confusion for 
the procurement officer who is responsible for procurement under both regimes. One 
could argue that this approach perhaps has similar effects as those under the domestic 
system where corrections are made with prompt notice and in agreement with the 
tenderer. A tenderer under EU external aid regime may reject a contract award offer 
based on dissatisfaction with corrections made in its tender which had not been 
communicated earlier. In such cases the evaluation committee could have had the 
chance of rejecting the tender whose correction has not been accepted at an earlier 
stage of the process to allow its comparison of only accepted tenders, a result perhaps 
of an efficient system. The benefits of such an approach, however, could be the 
elimination of any opportunity for the tenderer to communicate its updated price with the 
potential for preventing abuse and ensure integrity.  
Irrespective of the similar effects of the rather different approaches, the very minor 
nature of differences in procedures may complicate the burden and confusion for 
procurement officers to deal with.  
7.5 Correction of Errors under USAID 
Generally, bids shall be responsive in the sense that it “complies with all terms and 
conditions of the tender without material modification”.36 Bidders shall not be allowed to 
modify nonresponsive bids once bids have been opened.37 These provisions distinguish 
material modification from those regarded as non-material and further prohibits any 
changes to material deviations. These provisions are similar to those under the World 
Bank and EU regime but quite different in wording from those under the domestic rules 
discussed above. However, the content of the rules is similar and its application may 
have similar effects as those under the domestic rules.  
As an exception to the general rule, it is allowed to waive minor informality in a bid 
which does not constitute material modification.38 USAID rules permit a waiver of minor 
informal errors at the discretion of the procurement entity, where tenders may be 
accepted despite not satisfying all requirements as the case under the domestic system. 
However, it is unclear how other minor errors such as arithmetic or technical errors 
falling outside the scope of those explicitly provided may be treated. It is envisaged that 
clarifications may be sought from suppliers and bids without material modification may 
                                                          
34 Tideland Signal Ltd Vs Commission of the European Communities (2002) E.C.R. II-3781, (T-211/02); also see 
analysis of the case in P. Kalbe, ‘EC-external aid: some comments on the Tideland case’, (2003) 12(2) Public 
Procurement Law Review, NA22-NA27. 
35 PRAG, section 3.3.12. 





be accepted.39 These provisions are also similar in many respects to those under the 
World Bank, the EU and the domestic system of Ghana as discussed above. 
7.6 Nature of Interaction and Policy Considerations  
Application of the multiple rules in Ghana as outlined above, presents significant issues 
of interaction between the rules. This may have several policy implications particular in 
Ghana where the same procurement officer is usually responsible for conducting both 
domestic and donor funded procurement as indicated above. It is required of the same 
procurement officer to carefully identify even the very minor differences in the applicable 
rules and take all factors into account whenever he conducts procurement funded by the 
different regimes. Significantly, some policy issues could be identified which may have 
potential implications as outlined below.  
7.6.1 Similar Policy Rules but Different Terminologies  
The policy of the rules on correction of errors in all regimes under review are generally 
similar but only expressed in different terminologies. The mere use of different 
terminologies or choice of words such as “material deviation” as under the World Bank, 
EU and domestic regimes or “effect on the substance of tenders” as under UNCITRAL 
could make the rules appear different on the face of it. However, the content or 
substance of the rules and the manner in which they are applied are basically the same 
across the different regimes. In other words, the rules are simply different ways of 
expressing how to do basically the same things to achieve the same results. In fact, in 
all the regimes the exact meaning of the words used is rather uncertain, even though 
the basic idea of identifying errors that can be corrected without creating scope for 
abuse or giving an unfair advantage to a tenderer is the same. For example, all the 
regimes allow only a limited scope for correcting errors, which are generally minor in 
nature. This allows some balance between the achievement of sometimes conflicting 
policy objectives such as value for money and equal treatment.  
However, some isolated cases of differences in the rules of the regimes exist which may 
be considered generally as insignificant. These differences are usually caused by the 
complexity of the multiple rules system as will be explained in the next section and the 
different levels of detail in the rules. For example, unlike the domestic regime, the EU 
and US regimes, the World Bank imposes an outright obligation, with no discretion 
whatsoever to correct errors identified [in which cases – only certain types of errors]. 
This difference relates to the level of detail in the rules in expressing how much 
discretion should be given to procurement officers. In other words, the policy effect of 
these isolated differences are largely the same as will be explained further in section 8.2 
below. 
7.6.2 Complex Procedures 
A significant feature of the multiple rules system is the level of complexity generated by 
the different ways of expressing how to do basically the same things. Though rules of 




the different regimes are largely similar, they provide different levels of detail and 
degrees of flexibility in addressing specific issues of concern for each regime. There is 
no uniform approach to expressing how the generally similar policy objectives may be 
achieved. For example, an issue of complexity and perhaps a source of confusion for 
the same officer responsible for applying the multiple rules in Ghana is the issue of 
details on whether an obligation or discretion in the correction of errors is available, 
which is approached differently in the regimes under consideration. While the World 
Bank imposes an outright obligation to correct all errors identified, the domestic regime, 
the EU and US regimes imposes an obligation to correct errors in some cases but also 
allows the use of discretion in some other cases. For example, supposing the 
procurement entity receives a total of seven bids. Three of the bids conform to all 
requirements and are regarded as responsive while the remaining four bids contain 
some form of minor deviations which is considered as not materially departing from the 
terms of the solicitation document.  
On one hand, the procurement entity under the World Bank regime has a duty to first 
consider and correct the errors in the four bids containing minor deviations, though it 
already has three other conforming bids from which best value bid could be selected. 
This approach involves procedural costs and could constrain the achievement of 
efficiency in Ghana as an essential policy objective, particularly where bids with minor 
deviations do not offer best value even after they have been corrected. However, this 
approach places more emphasis on the possibility of achieving better value and 
competition through equal opportunity for bidders by ensuring that all bids with or 
without minor deviations are equally considered. For the procurement officer, failure to 
identify and comply with such an obligation which is otherwise discretionary under the 
domestic system may have significant consequences including possible loss of funds. 
On the other hand, the procurement entity under the domestic regime or the US regime, 
who already has three conforming bids, could decide to choose the winning bid from 
only the conforming bids and disregard those with minor deviations. The procurement 
entity may only correct minor deviations as a matter of necessity, perhaps where the 
corrected tender could offer best value or where failure to correct errors may render all 
tenders non responsive which otherwise could lead to a re-tender process with time and 
cost implications for the procurement entity. This approach has the potential to secure 
the objective of efficiency and value for money through time and cost savings for the 
procurement entity.  
Relevant to the duty to correct errors is the issue of whether such a duty creates an 
obligation towards tenderers who may have deliberately or otherwise created the 
error.40 This issue is relevant in addressing potential litigation where a tenderer may rely 
on the duty to correct errors that the procurement entity became aware of or should 
have become aware of during examination. Though imposing such duties on 
                                                          
40 S. Arrowsmith, Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (University of Nottingham, 2010), p.81. 
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procurement entities could prevent contractual consequences such as rendering the 
contract void, it may be relevant for states to consider the extent to which such a duty 
imposes an obligation towards tenderers.   
The differences in the level of detail of the rules and the different manner in which the 
similar policy options are implemented, generates a complex multiple rules system 
which could result in some isolated cases of differences in the policy effects as will be 
further discussed in section 8.2 below. 
7.6.3 Scope of Regulatory Policy  
As indicated above, the issue of correcting errors in tenders is one of practical 
importance where a number of different policy options require consideration and indeed 
typical of the kind of issues subject to regulatory rules. However, the issue is one of the 
least well addressed areas in the regulatory policy of all the regimes under 
consideration, which could be particularly problematic in general. This approach 
contrasts the generally large volume of regulatory provisions addressing other equally 
important areas of procurement such as publicity of rules and award criteria.  
Moreover, the regimes under consideration provide different levels of detail on the issue 
of correction of errors in the generally limited regulatory policy rules. The regimes 
usually focus their regulatory rules on specific areas of concern and provide sometimes 
vague and unclear rules on how other types of errors may be treated. For example, the 
EU regime requires correction of obvious arithmetic errors in addition to allowing a 
waiver of other minor formal and technical errors as indicated above. However, it is 
unclear how other minor errors falling outside the scope of those explicitly provided may 
be treated, though it is envisaged that clarifications may be sought from suppliers. The 
generally limited regulatory rules and differences in the level of details allow the possible 





Chapter 8: Potential Policy Implications of Multiple Regimes 
8.1   Introduction  
As noted from earlier discussions on individual regimes, multiplicity of procurement 
regimes – the application of different sets of procurement rules and systems set by 
donors in addition to existing domestic rules on procurement - presents significant 
issues arising from the different areas of those rules’ interaction with each other. The 
nature of this interaction, particularly with the domestic rules, is determined by several 
factors including the volume and type of projects to be funded, the frequency in 
application of the rules and the general procurement environment.1 The interaction with 
domestic law as a result of multiplicity may have considerable implications for the policy 
options that are available to the State in driving development in its domestic economy. 
A distinction need to be made between the mere existence and operation of many 
different donor regimes in Ghana and the existence and application of different sets of 
procurement rules and procedures by the different regimes. This thesis and chapter 
focus on the latter, which is the existence and application of multiple rules by the 
different regimes – referred to as multiplicity of regimes or parallel implementation of 
rules. The mere existence of different donors does not necessarily imply the application 
of different sets of rules. The different donors could decide to place their funds in a 
single pool to which a single set of rules apply. In such cases the existence of many 
donors does not result in the application of different sets of rules and may not 
necessarily raise many of the issues of multiplicity under discussion. Simply having 
many different donors could provide benefits including different sources of funds which 
could generate competition on the donor market and allow the domestic system some 
leverage to obtain favourable terms of agreement. A disadvantage however, could be 
the challenges of coordinating the different sources of funds with the usually low 
capacity in beneficiary states such as Ghana. However, as we have seen, this is in any 
case not the position in Ghana where, in fact, the different donors apply their own sets 
of procedural rules. 
As will be seen, all regimes under consideration share the fundamental objective of 
developing the domestic economy. This could be seen through requirements aimed at 
ensuring procurement procedural effectiveness such as competition, transparency and 
efficiency, or by promoting domestic development through procurement and other 
related outcomes. However, significant variations exist among the regimes with regards 
to the degree of emphasis placed on specific objects in a particular procurement, which 
is usually necessary to ensure some balance in the achievement of other, perhaps 
conflicting objectives. For example, the objective of promoting local industries through 
perhaps preference schemes may require a balance with the sometimes conflicting 
                                                          
1 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli, and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.18-22; P. R. Schapper, J. V. Malta and D. L. Gilbert, ‘An analytical framework for 
the management and reform of public procurement’, (2006) 6 Journal of public procurement, p.4; R. Dibie, ‘Public 
Sector Management Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in A. K. Kalu (eds), Agenda Setting and Public Policy in Africa 
(Ashgate publishing, 2004), p.87-113. 
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objective of promoting competition through non-discrimination and equal opportunities. 
Most of the differences in the regimes relate not to different objectives but rather 
difference in the details on the way of doing basically the same thing to achieve the 
same results. In other words, these differences are usually accidental rather than 
deliberately formulated. However, the mere differences in the way of doing the same 
things could result in perhaps unintended immediate or long term implications for the 
domestic system.  
This chapter draws on previous discussions of the thesis to analyse the themes arising 
from the nature of interaction between the regimes and to highlight some of the possible 
policy implications resulting from multiplicity. The significance of this analysis is to 
provide understanding of the policy issues on multiplicity, which may inform policy 
making and also provide potential directions for further research on the issues of 
multiplicity, perhaps through empirical investigation. 
The chapter first examines the complexity of the rules at section 8.2 and then considers 
the implications of multiple regimes for procurement officials in section 8.3. 
Subsequently, implications of multiple regimes for capacity building will be discussed in 
section 8.4. The next discussion in section 8.5 will focus on the relevance of national 
rules to donor-funded procurement which will be divided into four sub-sections for 
detailed analysis; the difficulties arising from the application of domestic constitutional 
principles of enforcement and conflict of interest rules will be discussed in sub-sections 
8.5.1 and 8.5.2 respectively, analysis will then move to the difficulties arising from the 
application of domestic rules expressly allowed in the rules of donors and the 
implications for those other domestic rules that may be applicable to donor funded 
procurement in subsections 8.5.3 and 8.5.4 respectively. The next discussion in section 
8.6 will focus on the implications of the approach to remedies systems under the 
multiple regimes. Subsequently, section 8.7 will focus on the implications of multiple 
regimes for the exclusionary grounds in procurement which will be divided into two sub-
sections for closer analysis; sub-section 8.7.1 will discuss the implications of exclusion 
for corruption and other general grounds will follow in sub-sections 8.7.2.   
8.2   Complex Procedures with Different Terminologies 
Procurement rules in all regimes under consideration demonstrate significant complexity 
with bureaucratic procedures, which perhaps becomes too difficult to apply without 
making some form of error. The content of the rules is generally large in volume and 
provide different degrees of flexibility and detail in addressing specific issues of concern 
for the particular regime. For example, the World Bank regime has a dedicated - about 
fifty pages - set of rules, supplemented by its internal guidelines with detailed provisions 
to regulate how it engages consultants who are an important aspect of its operations.2 
The rules are also usually fragmented where different pieces of regulations address 
different areas of procurement as the case under EU and US aid regimes.3  
                                                          
2 See discussions in section 4.2. 
3 See discussions in section 5.2 and 6.2. 
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The complexity also poses significant burden and time constraints on identification and 
application of the appropriate set of rules, which may have adverse implications for 
procurement lead time. Within the same donor regime, multiple rules and procedures 
may apply, depending on the time and nature of the project or the duration of the 
financing agreement. For example, EU regime usually applies different sets of rules to 
its different funding cycles under the same Partnership Agreement as previously 
discussed.4 The situation becomes even more complicated under co-financing 
arrangements discussed in section 4.6.1. As it is the case in Ghana, a number of donors 
may agree on using a single set of rules on a portion of the project – as joint financiers - 
whiles other individual donors’ rules are applicable to the remaining portion of the same 
project – as parallel financiers. In this case, different sets of rules are applicable to even 
the same types of contracts under the same project. These complex arrangements 
could be a source of undue administrative burden which may place excessive constrain 
on scarce domestic resources and could have the potential of limiting the effect of 
policies on efficiency and simplification of procedures in the domestic system. 
Complexity in the rules is also seen in the use of procurement methods and tendering 
procedures which usually appears to be different from one regime to the other. The 
difference in appearance however, usually has little effect on the similarity in the content 
of the rules. The manner of application and the substantive content of the multiple rules 
are often the same and applied in a similar manner as illustrated by the case study on 
correction of tenders in Chapter 7.  
Different and sometimes vague terminologies are also used by the different regimes 
when referring to the same things. This results in the lack of clarity and presumably 
confusion in the multiple rules and creates complexity in the system. For example, the 
World Bank procurement rules identifies a supplier who is participating in a procurement 
process as a “bidder” whiles the domestic procurement rules in Ghana refers to the 
same supplier as a “tenderer”.5 Also, the terms “bid protest” and “bid challenge” is used 
interchangeably under US aid regimes in the same way as “complaints” or “review 
system” is used under the domestic and EU regimes when referring to the same 
procedures or systems that allows aggrieved suppliers to file complaints.6 One can also 
see the use of the terms “implementing agency” under World Bank regime; “contracting 
authority” under EU aid regime and “procurement entity” under the domestic regime in 
Ghana when referring to the same institution responsible for conducting the 
procurement.7 These terminologies may be considered as technical terms with(out) 
geographical or historical association with specific regimes, which appear to be different 
on the face of it, but used across different regimes in a rather similar manner, perhaps 
interchangeably even within specific regimes. The different terminologies, the choice of 
legal clauses in the rules and the manner in which the rules are drafted, contribute to 
some uncertainties in interpretation as the case of “effect on the substance of tenders” 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 See section 3.4.1; section 4.9.  
6 See section 3.11; section 5.7; section 6.4.4. 
7 See sections 2.2.1.2; section 4.4; section 5.4. 
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and “material deviation” discussed in Chapter 7 and renders the rules perhaps overly 
complex. 
Although the rules are similar in many respects, there are some minor differences which 
could be considered as insignificant. However, these insignificant differences could lead 
to different outcomes in some isolated cases. The difference in outcomes, despite the 
minor nature of the differences, could be the result of complexities created by the 
differences in approach to expressing how the same things should be done as 
discussed in section 7.6.1. In other words, it is the complexity of the system and not any 
intended differences in the rules themselves that creates the different outcomes. Other 
possible causes could be issues unrelated to the procedures and content of the rules, 
such as the disconnection between institutions involved in the procurement as will be 
discussed below. In other words, the differences in the regimes do not exist solely in the 
use of different terminologies as discussed above. 
The complexity in the system described above, may also create difficulties for effective 
community participation in the procurement process. For example, civil societies and the 
general public may not easily understand requirements and standards in the rules to 
actively participate in the procurement process. The difficulty in identifying the 
appropriate rules and understanding the standards against which to demand 
accountability and transparency may work against domestic policies and those of 
donors that encourage accountability and good governance. This may serve as a 
disincentive for the general public in enforcing the rules. In some cases, community 
participation in procurement may be achieved only at a higher cost of public education 
to enable them understand the complex rules, which may not be necessary where the 
rules were simplified. 
As noted earlier, the domestic regime has policies to simplify its procurement rules and 
streamline procedures through for example, the current proposals for amendment of the 
procurement rules.8 However, the complexity imposed by the multiple systems may 
constrain the achievement of domestic policies on simplification and streamlining 
procedures. It is acknowledged that some donor regimes including the US and the 
World Bank regimes are also undergoing major reforms to internally streamline 
procedures or harmonise the rules with the domestic regime.9 However, the impact of 
such streamlined procedures of individual donor regimes will be limited because of the 
other regimes who are not involved in the policy reforms. In this respect, the effect of 
individual policies on streamlining procedures without coordination with all other relevant 
regimes will be limited.   
8.3   Application of Multiple Rules by Single Individuals 
As discussed in previous chapters, the multiple systems in Ghana usually require a 
single procurement officer to implement projects funded from domestic resources in 
addition to those funded by the various donors in accordance with their respective 
                                                          
8 See section 2.2.1.  
9 See section 4.5; section 6.4.2. 
117 
 
rules.10 This is rather different from the situation where states could have procurement 
officers specialised in implementing either solely projects funded from domestic 
resources or solely donor-funded projects. As a result, a single procurement officer is 
responsible for implementing multiple procurement rules for different projects and 
maintaining different timescales for preparing multiple, and perhaps duplicating project 
reports to meet each donor’s specific requirements. These procurement officers are 
usually regular public servants who often implement the domestic rules and may 
perform other duties under the domestic system.  
The above situation imposes an enormous and unnecessarily burdensome task on a 
single procurement officer in a developing country such as Ghana where constraints of 
procurement capacity and skills are inherent problems. The situation is exacerbated by 
the complex co-financing arrangements in the system where different sets of rules are 
applied to different or perhaps similar contracts within the same project as discussed in 
Chapter 4. These procurement officers may find it difficult to become familiar with some 
of the donors’ rules due to the irregular nature of donor-funded projects in Ghana as 
could be explained perhaps by the unreliable flow of donor funds. The above situation is 
indeed a repetitive administrative burden on procurement officers, which may have 
significant adverse implications for procurement lead time and efficiency in the system. 
Moreover, the multiple systems require the single procurement officer to take perhaps 
undue care and caution when applying the different rules. As indicated in Chapter 7 on 
the issue of correction of tenders, procurement rules of the different regimes are similar 
and any difference in the regimes is rather insignificant. However, the procurement 
officer who is applying these rules must be careful to identify the appropriate differences 
in the rules in every case and apply any minor difference in the rules accordingly.  
The very insignificant nature of differences in the multiple systems and the duty to 
identify and apply any such differences appropriately, is a source of confusion and 
complexity for the procurement officer as explained further below. It is acknowledged 
that some rules of donors are aligned with the domestic rules, which allows procurement 
officers to apply donors’ rules in the same manner as required under the domestic rules. 
However, where some other rules under the multiple system are not aligned, it becomes 
counterproductive and effectively neutralises any policy effect or potential benefits to be 
gained. In this regard, individual donor efforts on policy reforms may require active 
engagement with the rest of the regimes in the system.      
The minor difference in the rules could also lead to laborious administrative tasks for 
procurement officers, which could create unnecessary confusion and render the 
procurement function unattractive as will be seen below. Procurement officers, who are 
usually domestic civil servants, may have other duties imposed under the domestic 
system. These officers could only occasionally conduct donor funded procurement 
depending on when donor funds become available. The procurement officer may not be 
equally familiar with all the rules of the different regimes due to the irregularity of donor-
                                                          
10 See section 4.4.2; section 5.4.2.  
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funded projects. This may create some confusion and frustration for the procurement 
officer who genuinely believes he has properly applied any minor differences under the 
multiple regimes. Non-compliance with the rules as a result of the confusion appears to 
be a major focus of capacity building, which is on compliance with donor procedural 
rules rather than the competence of officers to achieve value adding outcomes as will 
be explained below. Such confusion could arise where differences identified in one 
regime are mistakenly applied to other regimes. This phenomenon referred to as 
capacity erosion,11 may be a result of the confusion in identifying and applying minor 
differences in the regimes appropriately. Indeed, capacity erosion is a problem in aid-
dependent developing countries such as Ghana where the issue of multiplicity is 
prevalent.  
In some cases, a group of procurement officers, usually in the minority, may be able to 
assimilate the differences in the rules which may even serve as a means for improved 
procurement skills of those individual officers. However, the majority of procurement 
officers fall outside this category, especially in developing countries where facilities and 
policies to stimulate the development of procurement skills are usually not available. 
Failure to identify and apply these insignificant differences appropriately will constitute 
non-compliance which may attract rather significant consequences. The procurement 
process may experience substantial delays as a result of donors’ refusal to grant 
approval or perhaps due to pending complaints from aggrieved suppliers. Donors may 
also have recourse to a number of other actions including withholding funds. Genuine 
efforts at avoiding the consequences of non-compliance may result in a focus on 
ensuring compliance rather than value for money. Procurement officers may become 
too conscious to comply with requirements of individual regimes instead of focusing on 
the achievement of value for money as a paramount object of the domestic system.     
8.4   Implications for Capacity Development   
As indicated in previous chapters, even in the absence of multiple systems, capacity 
constraints are inherent problems in many developing countries such as Ghana.  
Multiple regimes may provide some benefits in ensuring proper implementation of 
particularly complex donor projects in states such as Ghana where procurement 
capacity is deficient. For example, the use of individual donors’ procedures could 
mitigate fiduciary risks of donors and provide assurance of expected outcomes in order 
to meet accountability obligations to lenders and taxpayers. It may also bypass 
domestic bureaucracies to ensure that projects are measurable, delivered on time and 
demonstrate the evidence of project outcomes. For the domestic system, benefits could 
be a faster service delivery or perhaps less constraint on existing domestic capacity and 
resources.  
However, the adverse effects of multiplicity may become more pronounced in the long 
run, with the potential to offset any benefits. In other words, the multiple system could 
                                                          
11 P. Trepte, ‘Building Sustainable Capacity in Public Procurement’, in S. Arrowsmith and R. Anderson (eds), The 
WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Chapter 12. 
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sabotage efforts of donors to assist the domestic system in developing domestic 
capacity. As noted in previous chapters, donors’ institutional structures tend to bypass 
existing domestic institutions established to perform similar functions thereby causing 
duplication.12 These multiple institutions created by donors usually attract competent 
civil servants from the public sector which reduces the capacity in those domestic 
institutions needed to implement procurement funded from domestic resources. In some 
other cases, donor agencies are connected with selected domestic institutions at 
different levels in order to meet specific project needs.13 Moreover, some institutions 
relevant for donor-funded procurement such as the NAO under EU regime have less 
clearly defined responsibilities which results in duplicating functions.14 These 
institutional arrangements demonstrate an unsystematic coordination between the 
entities involved in procurement. The interest and concentration of donors on specific 
areas of intervention also renders development priorities of the domestic system 
ineffective and tends to drain existing domestic institutional capacity. For example, 
supposing several donors in Ghana are concentrating on projects relating to good 
governance and regulatory reform. Donors will usually depend on senior project staff 
who are familiar with the way the public sector functions and the key people within it. 
Such senior project staff is likely to be found in the public sector within the civil service. 
Competent domestic civil servants are usually offered higher salaries and other benefits 
which encourage them to join the donor project teams, creating capacity gaps within 
domestic institutions. Where the competence of these officials is inadequate for the 
specific donor project, they undergo specialist training relevant for the funded project. In 
this respect, domestic officials may lack the skills needed to implement specific projects 
funded from domestic resources in other areas such as healthcare and food production.  
The lack of strategic coordination between entities could limit institutional performance 
and impact on the proper implementation of well-defined procurement policies. These 
institutional challenges tend to weaken existing administrative capacity in the domestic 
system and renders policies on capacity building less effective.   
The current focus of capacity building, largely on compliance requirements, is aimed at 
equipping institutions and personnel engaged in donor-funded procurement through 
training programmes.15 However, such capacity may be lost after donor projects have 
successfully been implemented. In some cases, the capacity training may not be 
transferable or may be incompatible with domestic requirements due to the specificity of 
donors’ demands. As a result, the domestic system may not benefit from previous 
knowledge on capacity building to conduct procurement beyond donor-funded projects. 
In this regard, multiplicity may not promote policies on sustainable capacity building and 
any policy on capacity development may not provide desired long term results.  
                                                          
12 See discussions in section 4.4; section 5.4; section 6.4.1. 
13 Ibid; see also J. Ruche and E. Garandeau, The Mali Donors’ Public Procurement Procedures: Towards 
Harmonisation with the National law, (OECD, 2000), p.14. 
14 See discussions in section 5.4. 
15 See discussions in section 4.5; section 5.5.  
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One needs to make a clear distinction between compliance capacity building16 on one 
hand – where capacity building focuses on ensuring compliance with individual donors’ 
rules - and competence capacity building on the other hand – where the focus is on 
skills and competence to achieve desired procurement outcomes. Non-compliance with 
the multiple rules and procedures by procurement officers does not necessarily mean its 
lack of skills and competence in achieving value outcomes. The existing low skills and 
competence of procurement officers in Ghana is worsened by requirements to comply 
with multiple rules. The focus on building compliance capacity for a set of donors’ rules 
may be less relevant for another and may not build on the knowledge and competence 
of procurement officers to achieve efficient procurement outcomes. The complex nature 
of the rules to be applied by the same procurement officer, may significantly constrain 
existing low capacity. The occasional application of some donor rules mean that 
compliance capacity may not be enough for each new project since the procurement 
officer is likely to forget or be confused on the manner of application of one set of rules 
with another as discussed above. As a result, both competence and compliance 
capacity building may be required for each new project which perhaps works against the 
fundamental purpose of capacity development. 
Moreover, some procurement requirements of donors which are usually beyond those 
required under the domestic system may also have implications for policies on capacity 
building. Some donor procedures require specific skills and technologies that are 
usually neither permitted under the domestic rules nor obtainable within the domestic 
context of procurement. For example, the multiple supplier framework agreements 
under the EU external aid regime, is not available under the domestic rules as 
discussed earlier.17 The domestic system operates a rather simple, single supplier 
framework agreement which is usually in the form of Service Level Agreements. Also, 
the use of e-procurement under the World Bank’s rules is not available under the 
domestic rules. The domestic context of procurement in Ghana is also less supportive of 
e-procurement and private sector entities in Ghana for example, could only to a limited 
extent, make use of e-procurement facilities.  
A potential benefit of such high donor requirements however, is that, it could trigger the 
development of new technologies and procurement skills for the benefit of the domestic 
system. For example, the use of multiple supplier frameworks under EU external aid 
regime could lead to the development of unique expertise for domestic officials through 
the transfer of skills, which could be relevant for procurement funded with domestic 
resources. This could improve local capacity and generate domestic support to drive 
reform of the procurement system from within the domestic regime. Also, Ghana is 
currently implementing an e-procurement system as part of an e-Ghana project that will 
support the use of e-procurement.18 The e-Ghana project, funded mainly by the World 
Bank, could provide a platform for both private and public sector engagement in e-
procurement.       
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 See section 5.6.1.  
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8.5   Relevance of Domestic Rules to Donor-Funded Procurement  
As indicated earlier, procurement rules of donors are applicable in Ghana and are 
usually made part of the Financing Agreement, which forms the contract between the 
donor and the Government of Ghana.19 The Financing Agreement has the status of an 
international agreement, which is governed by the law of treaties under international 
law.20 As a result, the Government of Ghana cannot rely on national regulations as a 
reason for not implementing its international obligations including obligations under the 
Financing Agreement.21 However, there are gaps and overlaps in the nature of 
relationship between international law and constitutional law in Ghana, which may have 
implications for the relevance of domestic rules to procurement usually governed by the 
rules of donors. 
Ghana operates a dualist legal system as inherited from the British through colonial rule, 
whereby the Constitution is sovereign in the hierarchy of laws of the land.22 The 
Constitution is regarded as the supreme law from which other national laws and 
international agreements are derived.23 This means the Constitution has precedence 
over the Financing Agreement as the basis for implementing rules donors in Ghana. 
Rules of donors could have precedence over national legislations other than the 
Constitution to the extent that the two conflict. The Constitution empowers the President 
to execute treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of the State24 which “shall 
be subject to ratification by an Act of Parliament or resolution of Parliament …”25 In this 
respect, legislative or executive action is needed to give effect to obligations arising out 
of international agreements and such obligations cannot go against constitutional 
principles. This imposes a legal obligation on national authorities not to conclude 
agreements that contravene constitutional principles. The sovereignty of the 
Constitution implies that the courts will generally apply international agreements when 
they have been incorporated into domestic law.26 In such cases, the text of the 
international agreement will usually be relevant in the interpretation of the statutory 
language under the various theories of domestic jurisprudence.27  
As a result of the nature of relationship between international law and constitutional law 
of Ghana, procurement- related provisions under the Constitution of Ghana will have 
precedence over procurement rules of donors to the extent that the two conflict. For 
example, supposing the Constitution requires the Energy Commission in Ghana to 
establish a state-owned-enterprise as the sole supplier of oil and other sources of 
energy in Ghana as a measure to protect national security, performance of the State’s 
                                                          
19 See discussions in Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
20 M. Meireles, “The World Bank Procurement Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Enforcement Mechanism and of 
the Application of Secondary Policies in Financed Projects” (2006), Unpublished PhD thesis, available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/pprg, p.41.  
21 Ibid.  
22 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), art. 2; art. 11. 
23 Ibid, 
24 Ibid, article 75(1). 
25 Ibid, article 75(2). 
26 NPP v Attorney-General, (1996-97) SCGLR 729. 
27 Ibid.  
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obligations under its financing agreement with some donors who usually require non-
participation of state-owned-enterprises in their funded procurement, could be rendered 
inapplicable. In this respect, procurement officers who are usually required to apply both 
sets of rules, may find themselves in difficult situations and may not be able to use 
donor funds in support of some essential development projects.  
However, where there is an apparent conflict between donor requirements and national 
legislations other than the Constitution, the latter may be rendered inapplicable for 
reasons as discussed above. For example, the Procurement Act of Ghana recognises 
the precedence of external rules over its provisions and explicitly allows their application 
to donor-funded procurement as indicated above. The Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960 
(Act 29), is also a national legislation applicable to procurement funded from domestic 
resources particularly on corruption.28 However, the World Bank rules on corruption may 
have precedence over provisions under the Criminal Code of Ghana where there is 
apparent conflict between the two. National legislation may still play an important role in 
enforcing the rules of donors particularly where there is no direct conflict between the 
two. For example, the World Bank may rely on provisions under the domestic legislation 
to sanction violations of the World Bank rules on corruption. The authority of the World 
Bank is limited to ensuring that its funds are used properly. The Bank does not have the 
authority to prosecute persons engaged in corruption under its funded procurement and 
will usually refer such cases to domestic authorities to be dealt with in accordance with 
domestic law.  
The situation raises further complexities when there are several external regimes 
interacting with the domestic regime. The different external regimes may provide 
different norms that conflict with different aspects of domestic legislation which creates 
more difficult legal problems. The remaining part of this section provides further 
discussions on the problems arising from the nature of interaction and their possible 
impacts.  
8.5.1 Difficulties Arising from the Application of Domestic 
Constitutional Principles on Enforcement  
Problems arise from the application of the general administrative principles under the 
Constitution which provides that “…persons aggrieved by the exercise of acts and 
decisions of administrative bodies shall have the right to seek redress before a court or 
other tribunal.”29 This provision allows decisions of administrative institutions and their 
officials to be challenged by aggrieved persons in the Courts of Ghana.  
One could argue that constitutional principles as stated above applies to rules that have 
legally binding and enforceable character whiles donors’ rules have a character of 
administrative instructions. However, as discussed in previous chapters,30 the rules of 
donors are usually incorporated into the financing agreement which becomes part of 
                                                          
28 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 93 (2). 
29 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 23. 
30 See discussions in section 4.2; section 5.2; section 6.2. 
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obligations imposed on the state. Moreover, the rules of donors are in fact, relied upon 
and enforced as if they were binding on the state.31 Non-compliance with the rules 
provides donors with recourse for action including cancellation of funds which constitute 
a powerful enforcement tool.32 Though there is no case law in this specific respect, the 
courts in Ghana are usually prepared to consider not only the non-binding status of 
donor rules but also the actions of the State and its intentions to be bound by such 
external rules as the case in other fields of international law including human rights and 
environmental law.33 It is deduced from the above general rules that decisions under 
donor rules are subject to challenge by aggrieved persons by means of judicial 
proceedings in the Courts of Ghana.  
Significantly, this implies suppliers have a general right to challenge decisions under 
donors’ rules in the Courts of Ghana. For example, a breach of the World Bank’s 
guidelines by a procurement entity in Ghana is subject to challenge by aggrieved 
suppliers in accordance with domestic law in the Courts of Ghana. The significance of 
this rule lies in the recognition of the rights of suppliers to enforce compliance with rules 
of donors. Moreover, formal rights of suppliers to challenge is usually not available 
under donors’ rules as will be discussed below. The right to challenge donors’ rules 
under the domestic law reinforces the general directive principles of domestic state 
policy, including the principles of equality and fairness as enshrined in the Constitution 
of Ghana for the protection of all citizens.34 It also supports the objective principles of 
fairness and equal treatment provided in the rules and procedures of donors applicable 
in Ghana as seen above. 
The nature of remedies available to aggrieved suppliers is based on the jurisdiction of 
the Courts in Ghana. The courts have powers to offer a wide range of remedies 
including damages and annulment of contract as discussed under the domestic 
regime.35 However, the court’s is likely to have little financial implication for donors since 
many donors including the World Bank, exclude financing of expenditures arising from 
procurement misconducts.36 In this respect, funds received from donors could not be 
used to settle procurement disputes. As a result, scarce domestic resources may need 
to be drawn upon for the settlement of disputes.   
However, there is the problem of drawing the line between decisions attributable solely 
to domestic authorities and those ordered by donors as discussed earlier.37 Even where 
donors are responsible for the conduct of procurement as the case with some donors in 
Ghana,38 decisions of donors may be challenged under domestic law. Though donors 
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37 See discussions in section 5.7.2. 
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have immunities against law suits under domestic law, such immunities oblige them to 
provide appropriate modes for settling particularly non-contractual claims of private 
persons.39 The concept of immunity depends on how effective alternative dispute 
mechanisms provided by donors are in limiting the adverse effect of immunity upon the 
evolving views on the fundamental right to a fair trial.40 In this respect, a waiver of 
immunities of donors could be relied upon to challenge decisions of donors.41 This 
challenge right may be exercised through contractual relationship or liability in tort and 
such rights may be protected based on several grounds including public policy, fair 
dealing or misrepresentation.42  
8.5.2 Difficulties Arising from the Application of Domestic Rules on 
Conflict of Interest 
Difficulties also arise from the application of domestic rules on conflict of interest to 
procurement funded by donors. Domestic rules on conflict of interest enshrined in the 
Constitution are applicable to donor-funded procurement in Ghana. Conflict of interest 
rules impose obligations on public officers in the conduct of public duties and requires 
that “a public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest 
conflicts or is likely to conflict with the performance of the functions of his office”.43 This 
provision set out the standards of conduct for public officers in avoiding potential conflict 
of interests. The significance of this provision lies in the fact that rules of donors usually 
do not deal with possible sanctions on public officers who engage in procurement 
misconducts. In other words, regulation of issues on conflict of interest with regards to 
domestic public officials has received little attention from donors. Donors usually have 
limited recourse when government officials engage in misconducts arising from donor-
funded procurement. In extreme cases, donors may cancel funds for the procurement. 
In other cases, donors may refer findings of misconduct to national authorities to be 
dealt with under domestic law as discussed in the section above. In this respect, donors 
may rely on provisions under domestic law to ensure compliance with their rules. The 
nature of this interaction is based largely on the contractual relationship between donors 
and the domestic system as sovereign parties and seeks to avoid interference of donors 
in domestic affairs but rather provides alternative recourse for action as indicated 
earlier.44 However, even where the rules of donors explicitly impose sanctions on 
domestic public officials who engage in procurement misconduct, the constitutional 
principles on conflicts of interest will still apply to procurement usually governed by 
external rules.   
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8.5.3 Difficulties Arising from the Application of Domestic Rules 
Explicitly Permitted by the Rules of Donors  
Problems also arise from the fact that donors explicitly allow application of some 
domestic rules to specific stages in the process of procurement funded by donors. As 
discussed earlier, donors rarely rely entirely on domestic procedures for the conduct of 
their funded procurement.45 The explicit permission to use some domestic rules allows 
these rules to supplement the rules of donors. 
For example, the use of domestic methods of procurement such as national competitive 
method is expressly permitted under World Bank and EU funded procurement as 
discussed above.46 The World Bank also permits the use of framework agreements 
available under the domestic law.47 The significance of these provisions is the possible 
use of other related domestic procedures including review procedures as will be 
explained below. Moreover, the use of domestic review procedure is explicitly required 
under procurement funded by donors such as the EU.48 In this case, applicable EU rules 
are displaced. However, even where domestic review procedures are not explicitly 
allowed in the rules of donors, review in accordance with domestic law will still be 
available based on the general administrative principles on enforcement discussed in 
section 8.5.1 above.  
8.5.4 Difficulties Arising from the Possible Application of Other 
Domestic Rules 
Difficulties also arise due to the possible application of domestic rules in situations other 
than those explicitly permitted by donors discussed above. These situations may arise 
due to complexities in the interaction between regimes. In some cases, the applicable 
rules of donors may be unclear on what course of action could be taken or the rules 
may simply have no provision to address the subject matter as will be seen below. In 
this case, it may become necessary to rely on some domestic provisions in resolving 
issues in the multiple system. Some situations which may allow the use of domestic 
procedures are as follows.  
Firstly, the express requirement for entities to resolve complaints on donor-funded 
procurement provides the possibility for applying domestic review procedures before 
entities for donor-funded procurements. In many cases, the rules of donors provide little 
guidance on how entities may arrive complaint decisions. However, the effective 
resolution of complaints is usually a pre-condition for donors to grant approval of 
contract award.49 Donors may recommend possible course of actions. There is 
however, little information on the nature and scope of donor recommendations. Entities 
are likely to refer to their own review procedures under the domestic law for guidance. 
The implication is the availability of administrative review specifically before entities in 
accordance with domestic law. Donors may not prevent entities from applying domestic 
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46 See discussions in section 4.7.2; section 5.6.1. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See discussions in section 5.7.3. 
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review procedures since they support requirements under the rules of donors as 
discussed above. 
Secondly, application of domestic methods of procurement to donor funded projects 
implies the possible use of domestic procedures in some stages other than review stage 
discussed above. For example, the World Bank’s application of NCB as a domestic 
method of procurement could mean that entities may follow domestic NCB rules on 
publicity and evaluation of tenders when conducting procurement funded by the Bank. A 
procurement process is usually made up of several stages and some domestic rules 
may apply to specific stages of the process.  
8.6   Implications for Remedies Systems 
The nature of interaction between the multiple regimes presents challenges for the 
enforcement of procurement rules. The complexities in the application of multiple rules 
may create a system of multiple remedies where aggrieved suppliers can potentially 
challenge the same decision in different review forums and obtain the same or multiple 
remedies. For example, supposing a supplier is aggrieved by a breach of evaluation 
rules under EU aid rules where a domestic entity acts as implementing agency. In 
accordance with domestic law, the aggrieved supplier could challenge such decision 
before the procurement entity with appeal to the PPA and the High Courts of Ghana in a 
sequential manner. The aggrieved supplier could also arguably challenge the same 
decision in accordance with EU rules before the European Ombudsman and the 
European Court of Justice where it believes the European Commission has influenced 
the decision.50 It is not a common practice for aggrieved suppliers in Ghana to challenge 
the same decision in different forums and it is not clear whether or not the courts will 
grant the remedies.51  
The nature of remedies available to aggrieved suppliers depends largely on the 
applicable procurement rules and the review forum where the complaint is initiated. 
Although alternative review forums may provide the benefit of reinforcing the rights of 
aggrieved suppliers and ensure compliance with the rules, the multiple system in Ghana 
operate as parallel forums rather than alternative review forums. The remedies systems 
of donors have seen less of the generally detailed and lengthy nature of the rules of 
donors on other areas of regulation. For example, there is less detail and clarity on the 
remedies system under the World Bank’s rules compared to other areas of regulation 
such as publicity and correction of errors in tenders as discussed in previous chapters.52 
In some cases, the rules of donors provide no explicit remedies and aggrieved suppliers 
may need to identify possible chances of obtaining remedies under the domestic law as 
discussed above.53 In some other cases, the rules of donors simply refer aggrieved 
suppliers to the domestic remedies system as the applicable rules.54 
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8.7   Implications for Exclusionary Grounds 
Exclusions to participation in procurement which are applicable under donor funded 
procurement as indicated,55 have significant implications for domestic policies. For 
example, exclusions based on origin of goods and services is a common practice 
particularly among bilateral donors such as the EU and the US.56 The remaining part of 
this section discusses the implications of exclusions and other eligibility criteria.  
8.7.1 Exclusion on Grounds of Corruption 
As indicated above,57 regimes under review have rules which exclude participation of 
persons on grounds of fraud, corruption and other criminal offences. These are positive 
exclusions, referred to as debarment which could ensure integrity in government 
business. Donors have taken a broad approach, not only to fight corruption in their 
funded procurement, but also to assist states such as Ghana on its domestic anti-
corruption policies.58  
Nonetheless, multiplicity of regimes presents significant threats to the effectiveness of 
domestic anti-corruption policies. As indicated earlier, the domestic regime has 
provisions on positive exclusions where tenderers under sanctions for fraud, corruption 
and other criminal offences issued under any regime are excluded from participation in 
procurement funded from domestic resources.59 For example, suppliers debarred for 
corruption under donors’ rules shall be excluded from procurement funded with 
domestic resources.  
However, suppliers debarred under domestic laws of Ghana may still have a general 
right to participate in donor-funded procurement as discussed below. Exclusion on 
grounds for corruption and other criminal offences under donor-funded procurement is 
generally limited to sanctions issued through a judgement of a competent authority – 
usually the courts - in accordance with the rules of donors or in accordance with the 
national rules of the donor country.60 The rules of donors usually require as benchmark, 
conviction for corruption and criminality based on concepts such as due process and 
transparency as defined in the rules of donors.61 This implies that persons debarred 
under domestic concepts of corruption may be allowed to participate in donor-funded 
procurement. Moreover, there is a practical difficulty for the Ghanaian courts in applying 
concepts of fraud and corruption in accordance with external rules.  
In exceptional cases and subject to specific conditions, some donors including the 
World Bank may exclude suppliers debarred under domestic law from participating in its 
funded procurement.62 These conditions provide that the debarment sanction shall be 
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issued by appropriate judicial authority and acceptable to the donor perhaps through a 
review.63  
In practice, these exceptional cases may have limited effect in Ghana due to the nature 
of the procurement regulatory framework. Firstly, the domestic legislation on 
procurement empowers PPA as the body with the authority to issue debarment 
sanctions in Ghana.64. However, PPA has not yet issued any debarment sanctions since 
its ten years of existence as indicated earlier.65 Secondly, even where PPA actively 
imposes debarment sanctions, its authority as an administrative rather than a judicial 
body as required by donors, may render the debarment sanction unacceptable to 
donors. In other words, the administrative authority of PPA to impose debarment 
sanctions may not be considered acceptable for the purposes of donor-funded 
procurement in Ghana. As a result, suppliers who may be debarred by PPA could be 
allowed to exercise their rights and participate in procurement funded by donors which 
offers perhaps more attractive high value contract opportunities due to the large 
proportion of procurement funded by donors in Ghana. Domestic anti-corruption policies 
may become ineffective.  
In some cases, as explained earlier,66 some donors including the World Bank may 
require persons participating in donor-funded procurement to comply with domestic 
rules on anti-corruption through the use of integrity pacts. These measures ensure that 
suppliers comply with domestic anti-corruption rules and abstain from corrupt practices 
during the process of procurement funded by donors. However, this measure does not 
prevent persons already debarred for corruption under domestic law from participating 
in donor-funded procurement. Though donors encourage compliance with domestic 
anti-corruption rules in funded procurement, donors may not generally accept 
debarment decisions arising from domestic rules. This could undermine the sovereignty 
of the state in enforcing law and order through sanctions within its territory. This could 
have wider implications for the effectiveness of regionally coordinated policies of the 
domestic system such as the anti-corruption policies of the African Union and the 
Community of West African States. Fulfilment of obligations imposed under these 
regional policies may be frustrated by the effect of the multiple debarment policies of 
donors. This could also have implications for donors’ assistance on domestic anti-
corruption polices. 
8.7.2 Other General Grounds for Exclusion  
As indicated above,67 many procurement regimes usually exclude participation of 
suppliers on grounds for lack of integrity including corruption. A ground for exclusion 
other than corruption is failure to fulfil tax and social security obligations. Under the 
domestic law of Ghana, goods and services are subject to taxation and a supplier will be 
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excluded from participating where it has not “fulfilled its obligations to pay taxes and 
social security contributions…”68 This provision ensures the enforcement of domestic 
rules relating to tax and social security obligations and allows only suppliers with 
integrity to participate in procurement. The provision also secures generation of revenue 
for the domestic government through taxation to enable it finance domestic 
development and perhaps become less reliant on donor funds. However, many donor-
funded goods and services benefit from tax exemptions, which may undermine the 
quality of tax generation in the domestic system.69 Moreover, suppliers who fail to fulfil 
their tax and social security obligations under the domestic system may be allowed to 
participate and enforce their rights in procurement funded by some donors as discussed 
in previous chapters.70 For example, a supplier who does not fulfil its tax obligations 
under the domestic rules of Ghana may be allowed to participate in World Bank funded 
procurement.71 
This approach could also be explained by the operational boundary of donors imposed 
by their fiduciary duty. The authority of donors to ensure proper use of funds do not 
extent to regulating non-fulfilment of domestic tax obligations which does not involve the 
use of donors’ funds. However, these arguments may be less convincing when 
considering the long term implications for the domestic system and the fundamental 
purpose of development assistance. After the second world war where development 
assistance found its origin, the underlying concern was the need to respond to problems 
of poverty and underdevelopment through nurturing domestic capabilities so that 
developing countries can take charge of the pace and direction of their own 
development.72  
Multiplicity of regimes create ineffectiveness of domestic tax policies which may 
contribute to the loss of revenue for the State to finance domestic development. The 
loss of tax revenue is a major issue in South Africa where Black Economic 
Empowerment policies have been adopted to address historical inequalities.73 The issue 
of tax revenue is also relevant in Ghana as another developing African country where 
public procurement represents a significant proportion of government tax revenue.   
 
                                                          
68 Ghana, Procurement Act, s. 22(1)(d). 
69 See discussions in section 4.13.4; section 5.7.4; section 6.4.4.4; also see J. Boyce and S. Forman, Financing 
Peace: International and National Resources for Post-Conflict Countries and Fragile States, (World Development 
Report 2011), Background Paper. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 OECD, Sustainability in Development Programmes: A Compendium of Evaluation Experience, Selected Issues in 
Aid Evaluation 4 (OECD, 1989), p.17; D. Ellerman, Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
9.1   Introduction  
As set out in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis was to examine the issues of multiple 
procurement rules in Ghana, arising from the application of both domestic rules and 
other external rules for donor funded procurement in Ghana. The research sought to: (1) 
identify the nature of the interaction of the different procurement regimes operating in 
Ghana; and (2) identify and analyse the policy implications arising from the interaction of 
the multiple regimes. The objective of the research was to provide information on the 
issue of multiple regimes and its policy implications, to inform policy making in steering 
procurement reforms. It will also enhance understanding on the nature of interaction 
between the multiple regimes and provide potential directions for further research. 
In order to answer the research question and satisfy the above objectives, the research 
set out with a case study analysis on the rules and practice of the major regimes in 
Ghana (Chapter 3-6). The research also examined the manner of interaction between 
the regimes and the possible policy implications (Chapter 8). In order to study more 
closely the issue of multiplicity, further analysis was conducted in a case study on the 
specific issue of correction of tenders as one of the complex stages in the procurement 
process (Chapter 7).   
9.2   Reflections on the Research 
For many decades, developing countries such as Ghana have relied on foreign aid to 
undertake major development projects. Foreign aid has however been widely criticized 
as an ineffective instrument for development.1 The different modalities for aid delivery 
have received a fair share of the criticism. The process of acquiring goods and services 
financed by foreign aid - referred to as aid procurement - could be located in this 
context. A large proportion of foreign aid to Ghana is delivered through aid 
procurement.2 In this respect, any little improvement in aid procurement could have 
significant positive impact on the effectiveness of development aid. In the context of 
effectiveness in development aid procurement, the policy and practice of multiple 
procurement regimes, where rules of donors are applicable in addition to existing 
domestic rules, deserve considerable attention.  
The issue of multiple procurement regimes is prevalent not only in Ghana but also in 
many other developing countries where donors provide assistance. The rules of donors 
are applied parallel to existing domestic rules on procurement. In Ghana, domestic 
procurement rules explicitly allow application of the rules of donors to procurement 
funded by the latter as discussed above.3 The application of multiple rules is often 
justified by unreliable domestic systems which could not provide assurance for donors 
                                                          
1 A. Alesina and D Dollar, 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?', (2000) 5(1) Journal of economic growth, p33-
63; D. Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa  (Penguin, 2009).;W 
Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid, vol. 1 (The MIT Press, 2008). 
2 Further information is available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ (accessed 3 March 2016). 
3 See discussion under section 2.5.1. 
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on the proper use of funds. Indeed, the high level of corruption and the lack of integrity, 
particularly in aid dependent developing countries such as Ghana, could present 
significant risks to the activities of donors.  
However, the long term implications of multiplicity for the domestic system need a 
careful consideration. Moreover, the practice of multiplicity seems to suggest other 
reasons for its application such as promoting the interests of donors and minimising 
their reputational risks. For example, some donors require visibility of their procurement 
activities with unique identification of the source of funds as seen above.4 However, 
these risk mitigating measures seem to have little effect on the uniqueness of donors in 
terms of the content of their procurement rules.  
This study has shown that, essentially, procurement rules of the multiple regimes in 
Ghana are largely similar with only some minor differences which are insignificant. In 
this respect, the content and substance of the rules under the various regimes in Ghana 
are similar to each other. Differences in the rules are usually insignificant and are merely 
in the appearance of the rules and such differences largely reflect the manner in which 
the rules are formulated.   
While the many similarities in the rules of the multiple regimes could reinforce 
international best practices and facilitate harmonisation of procurement rules, 
differences in the regimes could also provide useful insights into the diverse regulatory 
approaches that could be adopted to achieve similar results, particularly under complex 
and technical procurement projects. In the context of Ghana and perhaps in some other 
developing countries however, arguments for the benefits of the differences in the rules 
and procedures are weak. The nature of interaction and the possible implications of 
multiplicity discussed in this research indicate that the long term adverse implications 
may offset any potential benefits. Multiplicity is a constraint on the effectiveness of 
governance policies of the domestic system including policies on integrity and the rule of 
law. Multiplicity also frustrates the effectiveness of donor policies aimed at assisting the 
domestic system to achieve development objectives including anti-corruption, thereby 
limiting the impact of development aid.  
Firstly, it has been seen at section 8.2 that the multiple procurement system creates a 
significantly high level of complexity in the procurement rules. This complexity arises 
from the application of different sets of largely similar rules with different terminologies 
and different ways of doing basically the same things. This has resulted in a situation 
where the rules may become unduly difficult to understand and implement. The 
complexity in the system could frustrate any policies on simplification by any individual 
regime in the system. As a result, domestic procurement reforms and other policies on 
simplification of procedures, without the engagement and coordination with other 
regimes in Ghana may have limited effect. 
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Secondly, it has been shown at section 8.3 that multiplicity of rules imposes undue 
administrative burden on procurement officers which could make the procurement 
profession unattractive. As noted earlier,5 Ghana decentralised its procurement function 
with the aim of improving efficiency and to allow the identification of capacity needs for 
development. However, the duty imposed on the same procurement officer to 
implement the rules of donors in addition to regular implementation duty under the 
domestic system, raises concerns on the effectiveness of policies on efficiency and 
capacity building in Ghana. The problem is further complicated by the co-financing 
arrangement of donors in Ghana where a single procurement officer could be 
responsible for implementing several and different sets of rules at the same time as 
discussed earlier.6 Implementation of different sets of rules, either at the same time or 
one after the other, is required under different financing arrangements which becomes a 
source of confusion for procurement officers and could drain the existing low capacity. 
Furthermore, it was noted at section 8.4 that multiple procurement systems also 
frustrate the effectiveness of policies aimed at dealing with the inherent lack of capacity 
in Ghana. Domestic capacity building on one hand, may become a stage in a process to 
ensuring ownership of development whereby domestic officials could be equipped with 
the knowledge and skills necessary to manage their own development process. On the 
other hand, ownership of the development process may form part of a capacity building 
programme where domestic officials are fully engaged at the onset of projects in order 
to identify and design capacity and development needs. The latter approach perhaps 
acknowledges that capacity building and ownership are learning processes that may 
develop overtime.  
However, the approach to capacity building in Ghana appears to focus on ensuring 
compliance with rules rather than building competence and skills of domestic officials to 
make value adding decisions. Non-compliance with the rules of donors may arise due to 
the confusion caused by the very minor nature of differences in the several rules to be 
applied by a single procurement officer – referred to as capacity erosion. This form of 
non-compliance could be addressed through policies on simplification rather than what 
appears to be the current focus of capacity building policies under donor funded 
procurement. These capacity building policies of donors are unsustainable and less 
supportive of domestic capacity needs beyond funded projects.  
A broad approach to capacity building may be needed to deal with the issue of 
competence and skills of procurement officers on one hand, whiles simplification and 
harmonisation policies are likely to reduce non-compliance with the rules on the other 
hand. Initiatives of donors and the domestic system on the use of country systems could 
be located in this context. The use of country systems is likely to eliminate the problem 
of multiplicity in Ghana which could reduce the confusion and burden on suppliers as 
well as procurement officers. Indeed, many donors including the World Bank and the EU 
have indicated the possibility of relying on domestic systems for their funded 
                                                          
5 See discussion in section 2.2.1.2. 
6 See section 4.6.1.  
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procurement which is preceded by a series of assessments on the health of the 
domestic system.7 However, results of assessments conducted so far have been 
discouraging as indicated in previous discussions.8 Whether or not a broad approach, if 
any, to the use of country systems may be required, perhaps through its use at specific 
stages of the procurement process rather than across the whole procurement process 
or even in the entire project, the findings in this research are relevant for those debates.  
Moreover, it was noted at section 8.5 that some domestic rules are relevant and indeed 
applicable to procurement usually governed by the rules of donors. This situation arises 
due to the gaps and overlaps in the nature of relationship between regimes the 
complexities in their interaction with one another.9 Some domestic rules, particularly 
procurement related provisions under the Constitution, has precedence over the rules of 
donors.10 In some other cases, the applicable rules of donors may be unclear on what 
course of action could be taken or the rules may simply have no provision to address 
the subject matter. In this case, it may become necessary to rely on domestic rules to 
resolve issues in the multiple system. 
An important consideration for multiplicity is whether the domestic rules have adequate 
provisions to regulate the practice and interaction between multiple regimes in Ghana. 
Gaps and overlaps in the interaction between the multiple regimes could generate 
undue complications and uncertainties in the applicable rules or in the extent of 
application of the rules. Indeed, the domestic rules have provisions that deal with the 
interaction between the multiple regimes as outlined in previous discussions.11 
However, these domestic provisions are inadequate to guarantee legal certainty and 
efficiency in the system. The nature of interaction between the regimes in Ghana as 
analysed in this study,12 demonstrate the inadequacy of domestic provisions to regulate 
and support the practice of multiplicity in Ghana. In other words, domestic rules may not 
support or prevent duplication of procedures in the system. This inadequacy could be 
seen in two main respects.  
Firstly, domestic provisions do not allocate procurement responsibilities in an efficient 
manner to support the practice of multiplicity in Ghana. Responsibility for procurement 
under the regimes in the multiple systems is usually imposed on a single procurement 
officer with adverse implications for efficiency and capacity development as discussed 
above.13 The allocation of procurement responsibility to domestic institutions and 
personnel for the conduct of donor funded procurement is incidental rather than 
systematic. In this regard, institutional functions are usually duplicated and resource 
capacity of the domestic system may not be appropriately supported.14 The complex 
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9 See discussions in section 4.13.3; section 5.7.3; section 6.4.4.3. 
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nature of the resulting institutional arrangements could work against the achievement of 
efficiency and value for money in the system.     
Secondly, provisions under the domestic system do not adequately regulate the 
jurisdiction or the boundary of application of rules in the multiple systems in Ghana. In 
this respect, there is little limitation on the extent to which the rules of donors could 
apply to procurement funded from domestic resources. The domestic rules do not 
prevent donors from exercising powers beyond their funded procurement.15 This implies 
that the influence of donors on domestic policies in ways that could be remotely related 
to their funding activities may not be prevented. This form of influence from donors is 
distinct from those voluntarily adopted by the domestic system, for example in situations 
where rules of donors could serve as a guide for procurement decisions taken under 
procurement funded from domestic resources.16  
However, Ghana’s domestic law cannot realistically regulate multiplicity in Ghana. It is 
simply the decision of donors to require application of procurement rules set out by the 
donor and there is little Ghana’s domestic law can do to address that. Nevertheless, a 
systematic approach may be required to address the issue of multiplicity as part of a 
reform process, particularly in aid dependent countries such as Ghana.  
Indeed, the role of foreign aid in the development of Ghana’s economy requires 
redefining the nature of Ghana’s relationship with the different donor regimes in order to 
ensure efficiency and legal certainty.17 The problem of multiplicity could not be dealt with 
by the domestic system alone but rather requires donors to coordinate with the domestic 
system in this respect. 
                                                          
15 See discussions in section 6.4.4. 
16 See discussions in section 3.10. 
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